

**NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES:
CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ**

**APPENDIX 2
BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS**

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“THE ELEPHANT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROOM”

Extended text of the speech given to the Conference at the Friday Plenary Session,
“Models of Global Governance and US power”

Professor Nabil Ayad – Director, Diplomatic Academy of London, University of Westminster

After the shock of the anarchic confusion and suffering of 30 years of imperial, territorial, and religious struggle, the Westphalian system was created. After the shock of the September 11, a New World Order/disorder is emerging. The fact that many trends are leading towards an end to the Westphalia system of national interest and realism and towards a globalise world has almost become a side issue. The fundamental issue for all governance in the world today is the **asymmetry of power**. The power of the United States levelled against petty dictators and/or the disenchanting, dispossessed and dissidents who are using terrorism in an attempt to disrupt and defeat. Before the September 11 attack, the increasing power of the United States was emerging as a relevant issue to other nations, now it is bludgeoning all other concerns out of the picture.

The United States today is, according to many observers, the single most powerful country since the beginning of human history. Militarily and economically no country or no combinations of countries have the ability to challenge its complete supremacy. It bestrides "the narrow world like a Colossus."

Asymmetrical 21st Century Warfare

A Wake Up Call occurred for the world community on September 11, 2001. It became apparent that security was no longer defined by armed forces standing between the aggressor and the homeland. War was no longer defined as approximately equal armed forces fighting for supremacy.

Superpowers with hundreds of thousands of well trained soldiers and every modern weapon now stand against a mixture of selected Petty Dictators and ‘virtual’ enemies (the Disenchanted, the Dispossessed & Dissidents), who are using terrorism to disrupt and defeat.


Today the only major Superpower is the United States of America - third most populous country in the world with a population of 278,058,881, a Land Area of 9,363,130 sq. km, and a GDP of \$10,082,000,000,000. The US is predominant in all areas of global activity from culture, to media, to economy, to the military.

In his State of the Union address last year President George Bush stated that the United States was “threatened” by the “Axis of Evil” – Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. In Krakow, Poland on May 31, 2003, he reiterated the threat: “Today our alliance of freedom faces a new enemy, a lethal combination of terrorist groups, outlaw states seeking weapons of mass destruction, and an ideology of power and domination that targets the innocent and justifies any crime.”


President George Bush because of a perceived a threat from the “Lethal Combination” made a preemptive strike on Iraq “to protect the ‘unthreatened’ security of the American people.” What was and is the extent of the threat from nations such as Iran and North Korea?

Looking at the relative population size, GDP, and projected military spending, there seems to be little threat.


Relative Population Size



Relative GDP



Projected Military Spending



What is the challenge to superpowers? With asymmetrical weapons, “rogue” states, terrorists and criminals have the potential to challenge any superpower. Lack of wealth or inferiority in the production of conventional weapons is no longer an obstacle.

The Major Questions are WHO and WHY.

Who wants to challenge the position of the US as superpower? Why do they want to challenge the power of the US? A number of groups and individuals challenge the world order that currently exists. These include:

- The Defeated - Large numbers of persons in Afghanistan and in Iraq feel resentment about the way their countries have been treated.
- The Dispossessed – There are 16 million refugees, of whom 12 million are under the jurisdiction of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The remaining 4 million are Palestinian refugees under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
- The Disenchanted (including migrants, legal and illegal) - 175 million people reside in a country other than where they were born. The number of migrants in the world has more than doubled since 1975.
- The Dissidents who live in a number of countries where current world conditions have spawned a growing dissident movement, which is destabilizing to strong governments.

The world is a very unbalanced place in terms of security, wealth, weapons power, and communications power. The US, towering above all other nations, has become more powerful than any combination of countries that may oppose its policies. Can the United States maintain enough force to keep the defeated, petty dictators, the dispossessed, the disenchanted, and dissidents at bay? Will those who are isolated from the world’s wealth and power become willing to use more frightening terrorist tactics to make their voices heard?

Many hoped that the defeat of Communism and the destruction of the Berlin Wall would lead the world to a period of peace and security. However, a number of prominent American intellectuals and writers saw a new threat emerging.

This outlook can be observed in the writings of Paul Kennedy of Yale University. Writing shortly after the events of September 11, he said:

And yet this Colossus [the United States] is also extremely vulnerable to weapons that are far different from Yamamoto's aircraft carriers and Hitler's panzer divisions. It has an Achilles heel that is, to a great extent, of its own making. Its cultural and commercial superiority and the relentless drumbeat of its free-market doctrines have been seen as a threat to many religious and class groups, especially in traditional societies. Its powerful corporations are viewed by America's critics as having an undue and powerful influence, say, in blocking international agreements on climate control, in forcing changes upon restricted markets, in overawing weak Third World governments.¹

Samuel P. Huntington, writing before September 11, expressed more definite sentiments. He writes:

At a 1997 Harvard conference, scholars reported that the elites of countries comprising at least two-thirds of the world's people -- Chinese, Russians, Indians, Arabs, Muslims, and Africans -- see the United States as the single greatest external threat to their societies. They do not regard America as a military threat but as a menace to their integrity, autonomy, prosperity, and freedom of action. They view the United States as intrusive, interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, hypocritical, and applying double standards, engaging in what they label "financial imperialism" and "intellectual colonialism," with a foreign policy driven overwhelmingly by domestic politics. For Indian elites, an Indian scholar reported, "the United States represents the major diplomatic and political threat. On virtually every issue of concern to India, the United States has 'veto' or mobilization power, whether it is on nuclear, technological, economic, environmental, or political matters."²

In his 1993 article "The Clash of Civilizations?" Huntington made the following prophecy: "The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be . . . the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values."³ In his book "*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*," he has gone so far as to identify the Islamic World and China as the new enemies of the United States. He maintains that these countries are in cultural conflict with American values.

"Axis of Evil"

Some politicians in the United States, amplifying the views of these intellectuals have established a mind set which pits "good" against "evil." Even before September 11th, these commonly expressed attitudes had resulted in a growing siege mentality against the "powers of evil" which seek to destroy the American "way of life." President Bush, in the early days after the terrorist attack, expressed this opinion openly when he referred to the war on terrorism as a "crusade."

American Military Build Up

With the end of the Cold War, the United States had no powerful enemy to engage its military. However, in the year 2000, the United States carried out thirty-six percent of military spending in the whole world.

¹ Paul Kennedy, "*The Colossus With An Achilles Heel*" , *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Fall 2001, http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2001_fall/colossus.html

² Samuel P. Huntington , "*The Lonely Superpower*" , *Foreign Affairs* March/April 1999 (volume 78, number 2)

³ Samuel P. Huntington, "*The Clash of Civilizations?*", *Foreign Affairs* , Summer, 1993 (volume 72, number 3)

Since September 11th the United States has been more willing than ever to sell or give away weapons to countries that have pledged assistance in the global war on terror. According to President Bush, countries are either with the United States in the war on terrorism or against the United States. As a result, the American government has revised the list of countries that are ineligible to receive weapons and has made billions of dollars of arms deals in strategic countries. In many cases the United States has put weapons in the hands of regimes that are at best unstable and at worst threatening to their own citizens and to surrounding countries.

Many wonder where this unprecedented build up is directed, since there is no military power or combination of military powers in the world today that can threaten American supremacy.

Monolithic Cultural, Political, and Religious Beliefs?

Those who are developing American Foreign Policy see countries of the world as distinct national and cultural groups with cohesive attitudes and beliefs. The fact that there is a growing “internationalization” of all world populations does not appear to factor into their thinking.

When, in fact, all countries of the world are now integrated into a global culture, is it possible to single out a country and say that it has a monolithic cultural, political, or religious belief?

What is “the axis of evil” that the World is facing?

In George Orwell’s *1984* there was always an enemy, someone who represents pure evil – according to the current United States government; there is an “axis of evil.” A few months ago the ultimate evil was Osama Bin Laden. Then it was Saddam. Who will it be tomorrow? To quote from George Orwell:

The face will always be there to be stamped upon. The heretic, the enemy of society, will always be there, so that he can be defeated and humiliated over again. ...

The Hate continued exactly as before, except that the target had been changed.⁴

To comprehend the type of thinking that is pervading the mind set of many influential writers in the United States, you only need to read this article by Thomas L. Friedman in the *New York Times* when he discusses the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s regime:

So why isn't everyone celebrating this triumph? Why is there still an undertow out there, a holding back of jubilation? There are several explanations. For me, it has to do with the nature of Iraq and the Middle East. You always have this worry that in the Middle East, fighting evil is like holding back the desert. The minute you fight off one evil, three others blow in to take its place.

You always worry that maybe these countries are not real states, but are simply collections of tribes that can be controlled only with a fist, and the only options are an evil iron fist or a softer, more benign one. No sooner is Saddam gone than up pops a group of Shiite clerics demanding that Iraq be turned into another Iran. So as much as I believe we did good and right in toppling Saddam, I will whoop it up only when the Iraqi people are really free not free just to loot or to protest against us, but free to praise us out loud, free to speak their minds in any direction, because they have built a government and rule of law that can accommodate pluralism and stand in the way of evil returning.⁵

What is the real face of the enemy of the United States?

On nightly news programmers around the globe there are images of hundreds of people attempting to swim, run, float, smuggle and fight their way into countries that control the world’s wealth and power. In the ten years from 1990 to 2000 the number of refugees of concern to UNHCR increased by almost

⁴ Orwell, George. Penguin Books, 1954, p 149

⁵ Friedman, Thomas L. “The meaning of a skull,” *New York Times*, Sunday, April 27, 2003

150%. In the year 2000 there were more than 22 million refugees. And the really frightening figure is the number who are being denied the basics of food, water, human rights, medical care, and a means to make a living and whose property is being confiscated within their own countries. These people cannot escape as refugees, so they are not included in the statistics.

An example of the type of suffering inflicted on people can be found in the substance farmers in Mali, a number of whom are women and the only source of income for themselves and their families. Clyde Prestowitz, counsellor to the Secretary of Commerce in the Reagan administration, recently wrote:

[President Bush] ...charged that the refusal of the European Union to certify imports of new U.S. strains of genetically modified crops had perpetuated famine in Africa. He alleged that the EU had a moratorium on such crops, thus discouraging African nations from adopting, and benefiting, from them. The speech followed the filing of a formal U.S. complaint on the matter with the World Trade Organization (WTO).

While there is no doubt that EU agriculture policies badly need reform, one of the main causes of hunger and poverty in Africa lies much closer to home -- U.S. subsidies for our own farmers.

Cotton is a prime example. In the West African countries of the Niger River's northern delta, cotton is the main cash crop, and cotton farming provides employment to more than 2 million people and sustenance to several times that number. But with world cotton prices down 10 percent from last year's 30-year low, people can barely survive. Extended families of 20 to 30 are trying to live on annual earnings of less than \$2,000...

Meanwhile, half a world away in the Mississippi Delta, American growers are thriving. At first glance, the reason seems obvious. In Mali, farmers hitch their one-bladed plows to oxen and take two weeks to till 10- to 20-acre plots from which the cotton is eventually picked by hand. In contrast, the Mississippi Delta growers tend giant spreads of 10,000 acres or more in air-conditioned tractors using global positioning satellite systems to determine the proper amount of fertilizer to apply to sprouting seedlings. No wonder U.S. cotton growers have an average net household worth of nearly \$1 million. Sad though it may be, it would seem that oxen and ploughs on tiny plots are just no match for tractors and satellite systems on huge spreads.

In fact, however, the U.S. growers are the higher-cost producers.... In all, it costs 82 cents to produce a pound of cotton in Mississippi versus only 23 cents a pound in Mali. So why are the Americans expanding their acreage while the Malians fight to survive? In a word: subsidies. A few days before the oxen were roped to ploughs in Mali last year, Bush signed into law a piece of legislation that greatly increased last year's \$3.4 billion in subsidies to America's 25,000 cotton farmers. This year, some of these farm families can expect to receive nearly \$1 million just in subsidies. Thus, the U.S. government is subsidizing American farmers to produce more and more cotton that will further depress world prices and further impoverish families in West Africa -- precisely what the president accused the Europeans of doing.⁶

If the United States, most importantly, and other wealthy nations cannot develop a way to more equally distribute the world's wealth and power, all other discussions become irrelevant. We will see increasing violence and terror from the petty dictators and/or the disenfranchised, dispossessed and dissidents.

⁶ As Accusations Fly, Poor Nations Suffer , Clyde Prestowitz, *The Washington Post*, June 8, 2002. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26765-2003Jun6.html>

“Will the Real *Big Brother* Please Stand Up?”

When countries from outside question the American government's actions, they are labelled “enemies” and “haters of the United States.” Today there can be only one challenge to the actions of the government in power – a challenge from the people of the United States. For politicians in the United States it is essential to have public support for their actions, or they will not be returned to power in elections that are held every four years. As world citizens, we have to examine the extent to which the current American government is manipulating the media in the United States to shape public opinion.

Looking at TV images from the war in Iraq, with huge pictures and statues of Saddam on every street corner and in every public building, it is possible to see living examples of George Orwell's *Big Brother* from 1984. It is obvious that Saddam was a megalomaniac who led a totalitarian regimen. However, are there other less often drawn parallels between the world situation and George Orwell's 1984? To what extent does the concept "perception is reality" govern the opinions that the American public at large holds about events in the world around us?

Today much of public reality in the United States comes through the mass media. People are used to believing what they see and hear reported by the mainstream press. However, in 2003 when viewing and listening to the American language mass media, it is possible to see and hear echoes from George Orwell's 1984. In 1984, “Doublespeak” is the language of the state, Oceania. The words of Doublespeak are used to mask the truth - often connoting their semantic opposites.

US President George Bush would feel very comfortable with Oceania's concept that ‘war is peace.’ Remember he made a pre-emptive strike on Iraq to prevent the Saddam regime from attacking the United States and exporting large quantities of weapons of mass destruction to Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network and to other terrorist groups. When he was asked whether Congress would approve his request for a resolution authorizing force wherever he deemed necessary, he said, “If you want to keep the peace, you've got to have the authorization to use force.”

During the recent Iraq war, the firebombing of Baghdad was called “shock and awe” – a term that might be used to describe a “sound and light” show that your family attends at a public building. The phrase “shock and awe” first appeared publicly in the book of the same title by Harlan Ullman and James Wade in 1996, which came out of a report by the Rapid Dominance Study Group, an informal association of mainly ex-military men. As they described “shock and awe,” it was not about destruction, but about power. By demonstrating such might that an opponent was stunned into surrender, and by concentrating on matters that reduce the ability to resist, it combines military force with psychological warfare. Their book argued that: “The ability to shock and awe rests ultimately in the ability to frighten, scare, intimidate and disarm”. The Philadelphia Daily News describes from a distance the impact of “shock and awe.”

In the pre-dawn darkness, Baghdad reels from one bomb blast, then another - one just about every four minutes. As the sun rises, the missile assault continues at the same brutal pace, wiping out not only military units but also power plants and water supplies.

By the end of 48 hours, as many as 800 Tomahawks will have fallen on Baghdad - more than during the entire 1991 Gulf War. At the same time, Stealth bombers will strike as many as 3,000 military targets across Iraq.⁷

The many Iraqis on the receiving end of this campaign, who have been without power, work, and hospital care for months, and who saw all their institutions including schools and museums looted and shut down, could argue that the obvious intent was to “terrorize and demoralize” - not “shock and awe.” Here is a description from an Iraqi hospital by Robert Fisk:

It was a scene from the Crimean War; a hospital of screaming wounded and floors running with blood. I stepped in the stuff; it stuck to my shoes, to the clothes of all the

⁷ [Philadelphia Daily News](#)

doctors in the packed emergency room, it swamped the passageways and the blankets and sheets.

The Iraqi civilians and soldiers brought to the Adnan Khairallah Martyr Hospital in the last hours of Saddam Hussein's regime yesterday - sometimes still clinging to severed limbs - are the dark side of victory and defeat; final proof, like the dead who are buried within hours, that war is about the total failure of the human spirit. As I wandered amid the beds and the groaning men and women lying on them - Dante's visit to the circles of hell should have included these visions - the same old questions recur. Was this for 11 September? For human rights? For weapons of mass destruction?

In a jammed corridor, I came across a middle-aged man on a soaked hospital trolley. He had a head wound which was almost indescribable. From his right eye socket hung a handkerchief that was streaming blood on to the floor. A little girl lay on a filthy bed, one leg broken, the other so badly gouged out by shrapnel during an American air attack that the only way doctors could prevent her moving it was to tie her foot to a rope weighed down with concrete blocks.⁸

Much of "public perception" and "public opinion" is carefully shaped and crafted by "national interest" in the United States today.

The Bush administration reacted angrily when the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reminded US forces in Iraq of their duties as an "occupying power" in the country. (Speech to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva, April 24, 2003.)

Speaking on April 24, 2003 the UK Ambassador to France expressed the hope that ties between the UK and France could be mended. He pointed out that much discussion would focus on whether Europe should regard America as "our main basic ally and a continuing force for good in the world, rather than something akin to a rogue country itself, which Europe has to try to control from the outside, as some here seem to regard the US".⁹

In an interview with the *Financial Times* newspaper which goes to the heart of the dilemma facing world leaders today, Tony Blair revealed concisely his reasons for supporting the actions of the Bush administration in Iraq. He said the best way to stop Washington acting unilaterally was to join forces with it rather than opposing it.

One would assume that he meant that by working with the Bush administration, nations could try to be a moderating force, as opposed to forcing the Bush administration into a corner where they would be free to act alone in any way they saw fit. However, on the face of it, that is a strange statement indeed. If the Bush administration decided to impose heavy sanctions against France for not supporting the war in Iraq or if it decided to attack Syria or Iran, would Britain "join forces with them to prevent Washington acting unilaterally?"

The Financial Times goes on to quote Mr. Blair:

"I don't want to see a situation develop again in which either Europe or America sees a huge strategic interest at stake and we are not helping each other," Blair said in what the paper described as a warning to French President Jacques Chirac.

"Some want a so-called multi-polar world where you have different centres of power, which I believe will quickly develop into rival centers of power.

"And others believe, and this is my notion, that we need one polar power which encompasses a strategic partnership between Europe and America."

⁸ Fisk, Robert; "Final Proof That War Is About The Failure Of The Human Spirit", April 11, 2003

⁹ BBC News, *Call to rebuild US-French ties*, Quoting Sir John Holmes, UK Ambassador to France, April 24, 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2972295.stm>

"Those people who fear 'unilateralism' -- so called and in inverted commas -- in America should realize that the quickest way to get that is to set up a rival polar power to America."¹⁰

Mr. Blair has reached the conclusion that cooperating with the Bush Administration is the best way to overcome "unilateralism," ensuring that Bush Administration policies are tempered by the opinions of others. Other countries, such as France, have reached a different conclusion, believing that the best way to overcome "unilateralism," is to develop a powerful bloc of countries that are ready to oppose Bush Administration policies when they do not agree with them.

In my opinion, the Bush Administration represents an extreme viewpoint that is not held by a majority of the American people. In the 2000 presidential election, only 51.3 % of voters of eligible age turned out to vote, of those less than half voted for the Bush Administration, meaning that the current President was voted into power by less than 25% of the American population. What the current government has been doing is creating an atmosphere of panic and fear in the nation through the mass media in order to ensure their re-election.

In the current circumstances other countries do not have the combined power to oppose the Bush Administration policies. It is incumbent upon the rest of the world to insure that points of view and information reach the American public. The only people in the world who can now control the behaviour of the Bush Administration are the American public.

¹⁰ CNN.com Blair calls for Europe-U.S. unity; Sunday, April 27, 2003.
<http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/UK/04/27/britain.blair.reut/index.html>

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“THE NEW EUROPE IN THE 21ST CENTURY WORLD”

José Aguilar de Ben – President, the North-South Institute

At the beginning of the new millennium and century, the new Europe that we are building after more than thirty years of construction, is about to reach an historic moment with the incorporation of ten new members, bringing the member states of the Union to 25, and the adoption of a new European Constitution at the end of the current Convention and the 2004 intergovernmental conference. It seems that a new historical cycle is about to commence in Europe, as it did more than 300 year ago at the end of the so-called Thirty Years War with the Peace of Westphalia, marked also by the move of the centre of gravity of the regional historical events from the Mediterranean to the central zone of Brussels.

Nevertheless, the Europe of the 21st century, heir to that of the 20th, has to take into account the existence, action and presence of the USA, during its present expansionism at the beginning of this century much as they had to in the last. True, the USA saved Europe from Nazism and fascism in Germany and Italy, but allowed and consolidated other fascisms in Spain and Portugal. The USA now seems to follow the same strategy in its new expansionism beyond Europe in the Middle East, where while liquidating tyrannical regimes in Iraq or Afghanistan, it supports and collaborates with others no less authoritarian such as Saudi Arabia or others.

Therefore the new Europe, in the age of globalisation, and given this new international reality that has been developing in the last fifty years since the end of World War II, has to define its vision of the world.

The relations of Europe with the rest of the world cannot consist in trying to play an alternative role to that of the USA, because the member states of the EU, despite transatlantic treaties, have different and disparate visions, relations and influences from those of the USA. The American friend is a friend sometimes to one, sometimes to others, and the different US administrations have played well the differences among European nations to their advantage. The role that the American administration has played in supporting the Popular Party's administration in Spain during the Iraq crisis has been paradigmatic in that respect. Not that the main opposition party has better credentials: who does not remember the “No NATO Entrance” slogan, only for the main socialist administration spokesman to become NATO Secretary-General and thence the current Secretary-General of the European Council!

The dilemma of the new Europe in its vision and action with the rest of the world is conditioned by two predominant world maps that were formed during the last century: the map of the Pentagon, and the United Nations map.

The European countries that were liberated in World War II by the Pentagon and keep US military bases in their territories seem framed to have the role of subsidiary allies of the USA, not only in their countries but also in respect to the interests of the USA in other parts of the world, that can or need not coincide with European interests and principles. These countries are a majority in the European Union.

On the other hand there is the United Nations Organisation, where the whole world is represented, but not on equal terms. The veto right of permanent members at the security council, some more permanent than others, like France, and the absence of a qualified vote by population of member countries in the General Assembly, prevent and equitable functioning of the world organisation. The absence of a truly democratic UN, not only in its internal structure but also in that of many of its member states, deprives the UN of all principles of democratic legitimacy. The UN is an inter-governmental organisation, but that should be restricted to democratic states while giving a provisional associated status to non-democratic states until they become legitimate democracies. A United Nations reformed and enforced in the same spirit of the Millennium Declaration and its objectives is the only democratic international alternative today.

If, as may probably be the case, the USA suffers in the coming year an internal cyclical disequilibrium, like during its Civil War and the depression years of the thirties last century, the rest of the world, and in our case the EU would have to know how to take the helm, take its own initiatives, help its American friends restructure north-south relations with the rest of the world. But rebalancing transatlantic relations should be a priority, and would better be done in the framework of an empowered and democratised UN, as is also sought by US citizens of the Woodrow Wilson school – who first proposed a world organisation of united democratic nations – than in that of a new European unilateralism.

Therefore it is clear that for relations with Arab countries and their democratisation as much as for relations with China and the rest of Asia, or the new Russia, Africa and Latin America, the member states of the EU have to decide whether to live in a world dominated by the pentagon map or in a world organised by the UN map. The European bilateralism with the rest of the world, as a counterpoint to the USA, would not go far outside the UN framework.

In the era of globalisation, local and world citizens, national and global civil society organisations need to be conscious of their obligations beyond periodic democratic elections and the exercise of free opinion. We have to request from national and European politicians a definition and a clear option between another piece in the pentagon map or being a sovereign member of the UN map.

The European Convention that drafted the future European Constitution, which should be approved by the Inter-Governmental Conference and ratified by a pan-European referendum, should include the constitutionalisation of relations between the EU and the UN as the best way to defend EU sovereignty and that of the rest of UN member states in a framework of international independence.

It is time for the citizens of the world of different nations to learn civil mobilisation, to create another possible world, another possible democracy, for wars against terrorists will not overshadow but complement the UN Millennium Declaration adopted by heads of state and governments of the majority of nations representing the citizenship of the world at the beginning of this millennium.

29th May 2003

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“DECLARATION ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: HOW TO OVERCOME THE DIVISIONS”

- Carl Bildt and Others

The West is badly divided, both across the Atlantic and among Europeans. The emotions which recent diplomatic and military events have aroused still run high. But Americans, Europeans and people in other parts of the world have a strong interest in healing the current wounds. When the U.S. and Europe work together most global challenges are easier to surmount. Fortunately, despite our differences, there is still much that unites Europeans and Americans.

Now is the time to stop the provocations and work towards a common agenda. We reject a policy of revenge — whether it is to “punish” those who disagree with the U.S. and its allies; or to refuse to participate constructively and wholeheartedly in the rebuilding of Iraq. Neither strategy is viable and each would deepen the divisions.

Repairing transatlantic relations is not an impossible task, for many of our interests are similar. We should focus our immediate attention on forging joint strategies with respect to post-war Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Iran, anti-terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We should also be able to co-operate better on medium-term challenges such as development, world trade and global warming. If we can work together on all these issues, we are more likely to achieve positive results, as well as revive the spirit of transatlantic relations.

Iraq

In recent months Iraq has been the most divisive issue in U.S.-European relations, but it also offers the greatest opportunity for reviving transatlantic co-operation. Although western countries disagreed over the necessity and timing of the war, they agree on the need to foster the emergence of a united, peaceful, prosperous and democratic Iraq, free of WMD. The pursuit of those goals will require a major commitment of people, money and time. We therefore need the broadest possible participation in the reconstruction of the country, making best use of all the instruments and institutions at our disposal.

Europeans and Americans should strike a broad bargain on Iraq. The U.S. should accept the need for a UN Security Council endorsement of the peacekeeping force, and a meaningful UN role in the rebuilding of Iraq. United Nations inspectors should be involved in the verification of any finds of WMD, and in their destruction. In return the Europeans, including those who opposed the war, should accept and contribute to a NATO security force in the country, and show pragmatism on the manner in which sanctions are lifted.

Israel-Palestine

In the aftermath of the Iraq war, the U.S. and Europe have a special opportunity to promote a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The politics of the wider region are now more conducive to an agreement than they have been in a decade. Moreover, the U.S. and Europe agree not only on the fundamental elements of a final settlement but also on the diplomatic mechanism to achieve it: the roadmap prepared by the Quartet (the U.S., the EU, the UN and Russia).

It will be hard to coax the parties to implement the provisions of the roadmap. But the absence of a peace accord carries a high human cost for both Israelis and Palestinians, harms western interests in the region and creates transatlantic tension. Moreover, many other shared objectives in the region – such as tackling fanatical terrorism, stemming WMD proliferation and promoting political reforms – would be easier to achieve if Americans and Europeans made the implementation of the roadmap a top priority.

Iran

The U.S. and Europe should start a new dialogue on Iran, with the aim of forging – as much as possible – a joint strategy to achieve their shared goals of promoting genuine democracy, halting support for terrorism and ending nuclear and other WMD programmes. This dialogue should also include the

Russian Federation. Washington should recognize the potential benefits of the European Union's policy of 'conditional engagement' provided that the Europeans really keep it conditional: thus if Iran actively persists in a nuclear weapons programme, or seriously undermined order in Iraq or Afghanistan, the EU would take political and economic sanctions. Above all, the U.S. and Europe, together with Russia, should unite behind the demand that Iran live up to all its non-proliferation commitments — starting with full and unfettered access for IAEA inspectors to all nuclear sites.

Terrorism

Transatlantic co-operation on fighting terrorism has improved dramatically since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Importantly, it has continued to strengthen, even as differences in other areas emerged. In particular, we are building stronger intelligence and law enforcement ties not only bilaterally, but also between the United States and EU institutions such as Europol and Eurojust. Deeper intra-European co-operation (as for example on the common arrest warrant) opens new vistas for even closer U.S.-European collaboration. The two sides should build ties between the new U.S. and European institutions that deal with terrorism. Our common work in promoting peace in the Middle East and development in the Muslim world is an important element of this overall strategy. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must make clear to their publics that terrorism constitutes a challenge that threatens us all.

Weapons of mass destruction

Europe and the U.S. should embark on a serious dialogue on the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The proliferation of technologies and materials, and especially the risk that these may fall into the hands of states or groups which are unstable and hostile to the West, should concern Europeans as much as Americans. The U.S. and Europe should agree that this threat calls for a broad spectrum of policy responses.

Specifically, the U.S. and Europe should agree that the WMD non-proliferation regime must remain the basis of policy, and that this regime needs strengthening and developing. But they must also agree that the treaties making up this regime are not, in themselves, sufficient. A number of measures, including, as a last resort, the use of force, may be required to enforce compliance with non-proliferation treaties. Moreover, in extreme cases, where the proliferating state or group clearly shows an aggressive intent, preventive military interventions may be needed. However, such actions should have the widest possible international support. To that end, UN authorization, though not a prerequisite, would be highly desirable.

Development

Poverty does not necessarily create terrorists. But a sense of hopelessness foments unrest, undermines states, nurtures fundamentalism and drives emigration. It is clearly in the interest of the U.S. and Europe to tackle the root causes of these ills. What is needed is a shared willingness to commit the resources that are required to accelerate economic development, alleviate the ravages of disease and improve standards of governance. Promoting trade and encouraging private investment have a crucial role to play in the development process. If necessary, a new and more ambitious development strategy should include the possibility of direct military interventions in failed states, to prevent humanitarian disaster, and if possible under UN auspices. With the Millennium Challenge Account, the U.S. has reversed a long period of decline in its development effort. It should now put this renewed financial commitment to good use by forging a strong multilateral effort – together with Europe and other donors such as Japan – to tackle the most pressing development needs.

Trade

Protectionist pressure has always imperiled the growth of world trade, on which the prosperity of all depends. But worries about security and the fragile state of transatlantic relations have now become a sizeable additional threat. The U.S. and the EU must act together to bring the Doha development round to a successful conclusion. A central priority for the G8 summit in Evian should be to move ahead with the round. The immediate requirement for the U.S. is to accept the broad consensus of WTO members on lifting patent restrictions and on promoting developing countries' access to cheap medicines. In turn, the EU must accept that liberalization of its Common Agricultural Policy is a political as well as an economic imperative.

Climate change

Closer transatlantic co-operation is required to tackle global climate change. While some scientific uncertainties remain, policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic accept that climate change presents a serious threat that warrants shifts in policy. But an effective global solution to climate change is unlikely in the absence of a transatlantic agreement.

To bridge the divide both sides will need to change policies and behaviour. Europeans must recognize that there are flaws with the Kyoto process (particularly with respect to the performance of some EU members in meeting their targets, and the lack of involvement of the developing world), and that continued insistence on the United States rejoining that effort will not produce the desired result. The United States must be prepared to put forward alternative proposals that meaningfully address the problem by reducing carbon emissions. Both sides will need to show leadership in the face of entrenched domestic political constituencies that resist meeting the tough challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Conclusion

The U.S. and Europe need to strike bargains and co-operate on these and many other issues. Clearly, a shared engagement to devise common strategies requires a genuine commitment to a search for consensus. That is why in future American and European leaders should refrain from publicly voicing disagreements through the media before – or while – they are discussed behind closed doors.

We are aware that the rules of international law which govern the legitimacy of military measures require a careful re-examination, and possible adaptation to the contemporary circumstances of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and massive violations of human rights. However, it is of the utmost importance that this re-examination and adaptation be done jointly.

A rejuvenation of transatlantic co-operation requires changes on both sides. Americans need to understand that policies intended to divide Europe are not conducive to healthy and constructive transatlantic relations. By the same token, the Europeans will not be able to pursue an ever-closer Union if they seek to build up Europe as a counterweight to the U.S.

Ronald Asmus – German Marshall Fund

Christoph Bertram – Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

Carl Bildt – Former Prime Minister of Sweden

Richard Burt – Former U.S. Ambassador to Germany

Ivo Daalder – The Brookings Institution

Marta Dassu – Aspen Institute Italia

Thérèse Delpech – Atomic Energy Commission of France

James Dobbins – RAND Corporation

Steven Everts – Centre for European Reform

Lawrence Freedman – King's College London

Philip Gordon – The Brookings Institution

Charles Grant – Centre for European Reform

Ulrike Guerot – German Council on Foreign Relations

Karl Kaiser – German Council on Foreign Relations

Charles Kupchan – Council on Foreign Relations

Christopher Makins – Atlantic Council of the United States

Dominique Moïsi – French Institute for Int’l Relations

Simon Serfaty – Center for Strategic and Int’l Studies

James Steinberg – The Brookings Institution

Fred van Staden – Clingendael Institute

Karsten Voight – Former member of Bundestag

(Note: Institutional Affiliations are listed for Identification Purposes Only)

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“TIME TO ABOLISH THE G8?”

Fraser Cameron – Director of Studies at the EPC

Introduction

It is to be hoped that this week's gathering of G8 leaders at Evian in France will amount to more than the usual media circus. There are a number of vitally important issues to discuss including the future of multilateral institutions and the dangers facing the global economy. Recent history, however, would tend to suggest that we should not expect any dramatic new policy initiatives let alone any real substantial agreement on the fundamental issues of global governance. Attention so far has focused on whether George W Bush will actually over-night in France and whether he will shake the hand of Gerhard Schroeder! After more than 25 years of G8 summits it is worth asking what useful functions does the G8 perform? Has it outlived its “sell by” date? What are the implications of the G8 structures for the cohesion of the EU and its desire to speak with one voice on the world stage?

Background

It was Valéry Giscard d'Estaing who created the G8 in 1975. At first it was only a G5 of the leading industrial democracies (Italy and Canada joined a year later; Russia only in 1997 and then for political reasons). Giscard's idea was to have an informal meeting of the world's principal leaders to discuss financial and economic issues in the wake of the first oil crisis and the turbulence in foreign exchange markets. Initially the summits provided a useful venue to prepare measures such as the *Louvre accord* that helped stabilize currency markets. But gradually they become bigger and bigger affairs spanning numerous sub-groups of ministers and officials dealing with an array of subjects from the economy and foreign policy to third world debt and terrorism. Although there is no permanent secretariat (there is an annual rotation of the chair), a group of “sherpas” prepare the summits. Soon after the G8 began, the summits lost their original fireside chat atmosphere and became massive PR events, usually with more style than substance.

Neoliberalism and Globalisation protestors

From the mid 1980s (Thatcher/Reagan era) the G8 began to promote neoliberal economic policies. Privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation of trade and services, and the importance of balanced budgets became key phrases in the G8 communiqués. Inflation was deemed public enemy number one and cuts in public expenditure the preferred instrument. There was little difference between policies advocated by the G8 and the international financial institutions (IFIs). The ‘Washington consensus’ reigned supreme.

Towards the mid 1980s, NGOs involved in the growing anti-globalisation movement, such as ATTAC in France, began to take a closer interest in the G8 charging it with responsibility for the IMF's imposition of austerity measures on poor countries running into debt problems. Gradually an umbrella movement – the Other Economic Summit – developed which led to increasingly large demonstrations at G8 meetings in Birmingham, Cologne, Okinawa and Genoa. The protestors even organised their own alternative summits at Porte Alegre in Brazil.

In response to these protests, last year Canada attempted to recreate the original intimate atmosphere by holding the meeting at a remote venue (Kananaskis) in the Rocky Mountains. This week France has chosen Evian, a small resort on the border with Switzerland, but there is no sign of a lessening of the pomp. Over 3,000 media representatives have registered for the event. France has sought to dampen criticism by inviting a number of African leaders to discuss debt and development issues (NEPAD) and a range of other world leaders from China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. The

agenda includes the usual prospects for the global economy, the Doha round, terrorism and proliferation.

Reform or Abolition?

Proponents of the status quo argue that the G8 continues to serve a useful purpose in providing a forum for the most powerful nations to meet. Opponents counter by questioning the legitimacy of the G8. The leaders may have a democratic mandate at home but they have no legitimacy in trying to run the world. Furthermore, what is the logic of including Canada but not China which has a bigger GDP than two G8 members? Where is the voice of the developing countries? The Arab world or Africa or Latin America? Critics also maintain that the fine words in the communiqués, e.g. on debt relief, are rarely transformed into actions. Other critics argue that the very existence of the G8 undermines the authority of the UN and other international organisations. The members of the G8 control more than half the world's economic output, nearly three-quarters of military expenditure, but represent only 12% of global population.

In recent years there have been a number of proposals to change the G8. One idea, first proposed by Jacques Delors, and supported by the Commission on Global Governance, would be to create an Economic Security Council under the aegis of the UN. Others have proposed a G3 comprising the US, EU and E.Asia. Another formula, which again envisages a single EU seat, would be a revised G8 comprising the US, EU, Japan, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa and Turkey (as the world's premier Islamic democracy). A variation put forward by the Bishops Conference (COMECE) calls for a Global Governance Group comprising the 24 heads of government which have executive directors on the IMF, plus the secretary general of the UN and the director generals of the IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organisation and International Labour Organisation.

Although proposals for change are likely to be met with opposition from existing members of the club, almost any changes would increase the legitimacy of the institution thus improving the prospect of gaining broader public support for its policy recommendations. But some argue that increased legitimacy would come at a price-reduced efficiency. Clearly a fundamental problem of multilateral cooperation is how to increase transparency and accountability without subjecting all deals to deconstruction and unwinding. If diffusing power increases legitimacy, it also makes it harder to take decisions. How do you get everyone into the act and still get action?

The EU Dimension

The question of the size and efficiency of the G8 poses a particular problem for the EU with four states - the UK, France, Germany and Italy - members. Spain would also like to join and there is speculation that this is also a Polish ambition. Both the European Commission and the Presidency, when not in the hands of one of the Big Four, are involved in the G8, albeit not in every sphere. It is no wonder that some outsiders question the number of Europeans involved while others are bemused at the Union's inability to speak with one voice. The Commission is supposed to look after the wider European interest but arguably it could and should do this without any Member State being involved. In short, the EU representation in the G8 is unsatisfactory and damaging to the cohesion of the Union and its alleged desire to speak with a unified voice in international fora.

Conclusion

The G8 has provided little in the way of concrete results over the years. It undermines the authority of the UN, causes widespread resentment in the rest of the world, and is harmful to the cohesiveness of the EU. It is clearly past its "sell by" date and should be taken off the shelf. No one would notice. Instead it is time to consider a more representative body with the EU having just a single voice.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“MARCH-APRIL 2003: THE END OF THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRD WORLD WAR?”

Extended text of the speech given to the Conference at the Thursday Plenary Session,
“The Aftermath of War”

MacGregor Knox - The London School of Economics and Political Science¹¹

I would ... assert the broad doctrine that ... we will do it in our own time and in our own way; that it makes no difference whether it be in one year, or two, or ten, or twenty; that we will remove and destroy every obstacle, if need be, take every life, every acre of land, every particle of property, every thing that to us seems proper; that we will not cease till the end is attained; that all who do not aid us are enemies, and that we will not account to them for our acts.

– William Tecumseh Sherman, 17 September 1863¹²

This is no aftermath. Regardless of coalition success or lack of it in stabilizing Iraq, the war against Saddam, like that against the Taliban, was in all likelihood only an initial passing phase of a much larger conflict, a long series of campaigns against rogue states and terrorist groups. If the world is fortunate, the spring of 2003 was merely the proverbial end of the beginning of the Third World War.

What does that mean, and how did it happen? Three propositions:

1. United States policy since 11 September is no new invention, no sudden aberration, but rather the third appearance of a genuinely terrifying phenomenon: “American total war.”¹³
2. That phenomenon will not soon subside, because the threats that summoned it up will not subside soon, and because the United States has the capacity to address threats in ways not available during the Cold War era.
3. The best way to face the phenomenon is to help remove the threats.

¹¹ This essay is a purely personal statement that should in no sense be taken as implicating the London School of Economics and Political Science in any way; inevitably, given the conference remit, it also requires writing the “history of the future” – a business both hazardous and logically absurd. It started, however, as an attempt to explain the United States since 9/11, and in that sense, and to that extent, is a legitimate historical endeavor.

¹² Sherman to Halleck, 17 September 1863, in *Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman*, Book 2, Chapter XIII (emphasis added); Halleck, from Washington, had requested Sherman’s views on the conduct of the war; Lincoln emphatically commended the resulting document. Sherman was writing of the “right, and also physical power, [of the United States] to penetrate to every part of our national domain,” but his remarks are directly relevant to American policy after 7 December 1941 and 11 September 2001.

¹³ I ultimately owe this notion in part to a unique European perspective stumbled across in the 1970s: the wonderful works of Raimondo Luraghi, “La grande strategia della guerra civile americana e l’avvento della guerra totale,” *Revue internationale d’histoire militaire* (1978), pp. 290-321, and *Storia della guerra civile americana* (Turin, 1967); my warmest thanks to Eugene D. Genovese for long ago recommending Luraghi’s work.

I.

The widespread shock, horror, and fury, genuine or contrived, at Saddam's destruction at the hands of the United States and Britain derive from many sources – but seeking to psychoanalyze Jacques Derrida or Harold Pinter is pointless.¹⁴ Universal hostility nevertheless has a lowest common denominator: an astonishing lack of historical perspective. As do the widespread hopes and expectations that the United States will in the end inevitably quail at the price in blood, treasure, and reputation entailed in crushing the world's rogue states and hunting down the fanatics that swarm in the numerous dysfunctional societies stalled at the threshold of modernity.

Explaining the tradition that – in conjunction with Osama bin Laden and the societies that created him and his movement – produced the Third World War requires a chronological backward step. Until 1941 the United States was the least military of major industrial societies. Its diminutive and derided professional army was confined to remote and dusty Southern and Western garrisons, and universally reputed to consist of men who distinctly resembled the Duke of Wellington's "scum of the earth ... enlisted for drink." But the United States was – and is – also a nation made in a literal sense by war, against the British empire (twice), against Mexico, and against the Indian nations through a long and bloody century.

Its decisive and formative conflict, the template against which Americans measure all subsequent wars, was the U.S. Civil War or "Second American Revolution" of 1861-65. That war destroyed the institution of slavery that Britain had bequeathed. It killed in absolute terms as many Americans as all other American wars – *so far* – combined: well over 620,000 military dead. Relative to a total population of 34 million, that was a staggering toll. In the Confederacy, almost *one white male of military age in five died*, surpassing the one in six sustained by National Socialist Germany, the European gold standard for a fight to the last cartridge.¹⁵

Yet the true peculiarity of this largest and deadliest war between industrial societies before 1914 lay not in its extreme lethality, but in the element that drove that lethality: the war aims of the two sides. The aristocratic hotheads of the Confederacy sought to destroy the United States, and counted on swift victory over the effete mercantile Yankees. But Abraham Lincoln contrived to maneuver the South into firing the first shot, then used that provocation and the mortal threat that it dramatized to mobilize the superior manpower and industrial resources of the Union for an unambiguous and implacable aim.

The Union fought from the beginning to extinguish the Confederacy as a state, an aim already more total than anything applied to major powers in Eurasia since the Mongols. That was only the beginning. After a year and a half of increasing indecisive carnage and the Union's bloody defensive victory at Antietam Creek in September 1862, Lincoln struck at the root of the Confederate social and economic order. The logic of war – a phrase not invented by Jacques Chirac – dictated the ultimate escalation: in Lincoln's words, "We must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued." The war became a crusade to remake the South as a society.

This was *American total war*: self-defense focused implacably on the offending state *and* on its society, with the aim of "reconstructing" that society to end further aggression from that quarter forever. As Lincoln summed up in his second inaugural in March 1864, "if God wills that it continue" the Union was prepared to fight on "until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword."

American total war ultimately stopped short of the murder of enemy civilians – except on the nihilist fringes, the merciless partisan warfare in the western and border states that prompted the Union to produce the first systematic compilation of Western "law and usages of war," General

¹⁴ Derrida, *Voyous* (Paris, 2003); "Pinter blasts 'Nazi America' and 'deluded idiot' Blair," *The Guardian*, 11 June 2003.

¹⁵ Data: Maris A. Vinovskis, "Have Social Historians lost the Civil War? Some Preliminary Demographic Speculations," *Journal of American History* 76:1 (1989), pp. 36-48 (18 percent of white males of military age died), and Rüdiger Overmans, *Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich, 1999), pp. 219, 234 (16.8 percent of German and Austrian males of military age died; 1938 borders). For a higher estimate of Confederate dead (one-quarter of white males of military age) see James M. McPherson, "From Limited War to Total War in America," in Stig Förster, Jörg Nagler, eds., *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 295.

Order No. 100 or the Lieber Code.¹⁶ But by 1863 enemy *property*, slaves, farms, provisions, livestock, had fallen under the hammer of war. William Tecumseh Sherman, America's greatest military leader, and apostle of "the hard hand of war," recognized full well that "we cannot change the hearts and minds of these people of the South." But he was confident that he and Ulysses S. Grant would in due course "make them so sick of war that generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it."¹⁷ Sherman was a man of his word – even if the full and final "reconstruction" of the South required an entire century.

The next war of national effort, in 1917-18, was too brief and under the paradoxical leadership of a man whose proudest boast was that there was "such a thing as being too proud to fight." American total war failed to make an appearance. The provocation was there: Imperial Germany's bid, immortalized in Zimmermann's famous telegram, to reverse the outcome of the Mexican War. The commitment existed: the chief of staff of the U.S. Army, without fear of contradiction, could announce publicly in August 1918 that "we are going to win the war if it takes every man in the United States."¹⁸ But Woodrow Wilson's utopian war aims gave the main enemy, the Prusso-German army, an eagerly seized chance to sustain the bogus claim that it had been "undefeated in the field."¹⁹ As General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, had warned on 30 October 1918, if the Allies conceded an armistice rather than pressing on to Berlin against Germany's disintegrating forces, they "would possibly lose the chance actually to secure world peace on terms that would ensure its permanence."²⁰

The rematch that resulted from failure to "reconstruct" Germany in 1918-19 – and the resulting absurdity, even against the defenseless Weimar Republic, of the world's first weapons inspection regime – had very different results. By the 1940s the shrinking of the globe through air and naval power gave threats and provocations infinitely greater immediacy to than in the past. Germany's conquest of France made peacetime conscription, massive rearmament, and unlimited financial and material aid to Britain acceptable to the U.S. Congress. Then Japan's killing of 2,408 soldiers, sailors, and civilians by surprise attack on U.S. soil created modern America.

Pearl Harbor and Hitler's declaration of war imposed unlimited rearmament and commitment to a fight to the finish. They revived American total war: the destruction of the enemy *state* and the "reconstruction" of the enemy *society*. Within eighteen months of Pearl Harbor the United States had assassinated – in midair, over Bougainville – the man who had planned and led the attack, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. Within less than four years it had destroyed Imperial Japan. And as Italians, Germans, and Japanese experienced the unconditional surrender and reconstruction once applied to the Confederacy, the United States unprecedentedly declined to disarm in the face of Soviet ambitions.

The fundamental U.S. aim since 1941, even after the surrender and remolding of western Germany and Japan, has been a world without Hitlers and Pearl Harbors. Its achievement on a globe shrunk by the technologies of the 1940s and 1950s demanded forward defence beyond seas that no longer guarded U.S. security, sizeable standing forces instead of the customary dwarf-army, and massive social engineering projects to transform the German and Japanese warrior races into contented bourgeois pacifists. The existence of the Soviet superpower and its threat to Europe and the United States nevertheless forced America to limit unilaterally its two major wars of containment, Korea and Vietnam. The Vietnamese Communists, for their part, also constrained

¹⁶ See especially Michael Fellman, "At the Nihilist Edge: Reflections on Guerrilla Warfare during the American Civil War," pp. 519-40 in Förster and Nagler, eds., *On the Road to Total War*, and Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 145-51.

¹⁷ Sherman to Halleck, 17 September 1863, *Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman*, Book 2, Chapter XIII.

¹⁸ General Peyton C. March, quoted in Irving Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March* (Madison, WI, 1966), p. 91.

¹⁹ A claim publicly – and tragically – endorsed, at the Brandenburg Gate on 10 December 1918, by Friedrich Ebert, social-democratic chief of the provisional German government and subsequently first president of the Weimar Republic, in greeting the returning troops: "*Kein Feind hat euch überwunden*" (Siegfried A. Kaehler, "Vier quellenkritische Untersuchungen zum Kriegsende 1918," in his *Studien zur Deutschen Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* [Göttingen, 1961], p. 305).

²⁰ Pershing to Supreme War Council (Paris), 30 October 1918, in *United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919*, v. 10, *The Armistice* (Washington, D.C., 1948), p. 28.

U.S. power by learning from the mistakes of Soviets and North Koreans, and astutely avoiding direct provocations even as salient as Kim Il-Sung's June 1950 *Blitzkrieg*. Visions of Vietcong sappers snaking up the San Diego beaches – sometimes tentatively offered as answer to a despairing or ironic “Hey Sarge, what the [expletive deleted] *are* we doin’ here?” – lacked conviction. Hanoi was likewise unusually fortunate in drawing as adversary the least decisive and resolute war president in U.S. history, Lyndon Baines Johnson.

II.

The warriors of militant Islamism have been less astute and less fortunate than their Communist predecessors. By killing more Americans – almost all of them civilians – than died at Pearl Harbor they again unleashed American total war. Indeed it is hard to imagine a provocation – on live television in the continental United States – better designed than 11 September to achieve the precise opposite of its authors’ goal of cosmic *Jihad* and Islamist world domination. As with European critics of the U.S. war effort – *any* U.S. war effort – who wallowed voluptuously in autumn 2001 and again in winter 2003-03 in predictions of impending American defeat, al-Qaeda’s stunning ignorance of the United States far exceeded the United States’ culpable ignorance of al-Qaeda.²¹

The outcome in Afghanistan and Iraq has not been primarily the affirmation of a new and towering “American Empire” – a profound misapprehension, even if shared in some quarters within and around the Beltway. A global if largely informal rather than territorial American empire has indeed existed since the Second World War. But even in its present unipolar eminence, that empire is less unprecedented in its extent and power than *in its character*. To borrow a phrase from recent Cold War historians, it is an empire *by invitation* – first from the Japanese warlords and Adolf Hitler, then from the peoples of Western Europe hypnotized by Josef Stalin’s tank armies, then from Saddam Hussein *and* the Saudi princes, and now from Osama bin Laden.²² Yet this empire at bottom aspires to fold its tents and depart – as it is currently doing from Western Europe. The naive souls of the European Left never imagined how well their favorite slogan summarized their despised antagonist’s fondest wish: “U.S. GO HOME.”

Mortal threats – Hitlers and Stalins, Pearl Harbors and nine-elevens – have in the past overcome America’s innate isolationism for long enough to destroy those responsible. The Cold War – cold at the center, incandescent at the periphery – lasted forty-five years. And the Third World War, because of the Pearl Harbor-style provocation, the abiding threat, the absence of a superpower antagonist or counterweight, and the revolution in U.S. military means through U.S. economic dynamism and dominance in information technology, has unleashed enduring American violence. 11 September and globalization – of weapons of mass destruction – have made the thermonuclear arsenal in the hands of Stalin and his stolid successors seem a modest danger indeed. Containment is dead. Deterrence is irrelevant to genocidal sado-masochists. Only pre-emption and the “reconstruction” of entire societies seems an effective answer to the ideologies and weapons of the twenty-first century.

The immediate capabilities of rogue states are not particularly important. “Regime change” in Iraq seemed imperative not because Saddam necessarily still had weapons of mass destruction – although the coalition, judging by the rubber suits the troops initially wore, genuinely feared that he did – but because his continuance in power and his oil wealth guaranteed that he *would* have them again if he survived.

The tolerated *cinéma vérité* of satellite television, the legalistic prevarications and misgivings of allies and ex-allies, and self-imposed humanitarian restraint – the Lieber Code – have so far mitigated the potential totality of U.S. means. *But ultimately it is the threat that has determined and will continue to determine the totality of U.S. aims.* The 1 April 2003 demand for Iraq’s “unconditional surrender,” and the subsequently declared policy of “de-Ba’athization” were not rhetorical flourishes, but expressions of the tradition established in 1865 and 1945. The “tar-baby effect” – the current diversion of almost half the U.S. Army’s combat power to playing hide-and-

²¹ See for instance Paul Kennedy, “Puissance de l’ennemi et fragilité américaine,” *Le Monde*, 27 September 2001.

²² Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952,” *Journal of Peace Research* 23:3 (1986), pp. 263-77.

seek with Saddam's remaining partisans – is likely to prove a feeble deterrent to further offensive action.

Many Europeans believe that a small cabal of “neo-conservative” maniacs – possibly Jewish in ancestry and loyalties? – has suddenly, unexpectedly, and above all briefly hijacked U.S. policy. Many Europeans see American patriotism as an adolescent inauthentic product of Rupert Murdoch propaganda. Many Europeans assume that the natural order of things as they perceive it, the restraint of American power through European wisdom, will sooner or later triumph. But such notions are delusional.

The “neo-conservatives” are merely a small, if vocal and influential, part of a response that derives from American traditions, and is widely shared among the many Americans who are neither film stars nor readers of *The New York Review of Books*. Fox News is only *one* wagging tail of a very large dog, in a world in which – except for conspiracy theorists and lunatics – dogs wag their tails rather than the reverse. And European wisdom seems to most Americans, on the evidence of the twentieth century, to have been dramatically overstated. Unforeseen events or ultimate failure in the quixotic enterprise of founding democracy in Iraq may indeed interrupt George W. Bush's run of success, and cause the Third World War to appear to fizzle out for a time. But ultimately, and regardless of the administration in power, it can only end if and when rogue states and genocidal terrorists are gone.

III.

Most proposals for papering over the mid-Atlantic chasm and the fractures running through Europe, and for soothing global fretfulness and rage at U.S. conduct, require radical changes in American policy. For obvious reasons, such changes are likely to be primarily cosmetic. *The United States is at war.*

The obvious alternatives in the face of American total war are fight, flight, fence-sitting, and cooperation. Resistance lacks political and economic-military foundations. For the peculiar theory of international relations that misleadingly calls itself “realist,” a balancing superpower, a multipolar system, or a coalition against the United States to resurrect the deterrent function of the Soviet Union is the logical and inevitable outcome of current U.S. conduct. Romantic insurrection by the “Arab masses” may seem a potential counterweight to U.S. power – except that Arab regimes cannot permit any such insurrection; the Third World War is also a civil war within the Arab world. Of the great powers, China under its succession of dynasts – native, Manchu, Marxist-Leninist, and market-Leninist – has always taken a millennial long view. Barring accidents, it will not challenge the United States for mastery in East Asia and the Pacific before it is ready. The primary role in any great-power balancing scenario thus falls to the European Union. But that entity suffers from a congenital lack of democratic legitimacy and deep and durable disunity; never did the Maastricht treaty's “common foreign and security policy” seem a greater mockery than in winter-spring 2003. Above all, the share of world GDP of an enlarged EU – according to the exhaustively documented report of the *Institut français des relations internationales* to the European Commission of November 2002 – will on current trends decline from its present 22 percent to 12 percent by 2050, while North America seems likely to hold its own.²³

The apparent causes of this creeping economic and political catastrophe – Europe's absolute demographic decline after about 2018, and its institutional, social, and economic-technological rigidities – are unlikely to yield to pious exhortation or authoritarian prescriptions by the European Commission.²⁴ Britain and France excepted, European military expenditure is too low to sustain forces that inspire respect, much less protect the external energy supplies without which Europe's

²³ Rapport réalisé pour la Commission européenne, *Le commerce mondial au 21e siècle. Scénarios pour l'union européenne*, 1 November 2002, <http://www.ifri.org/>; essential data summarized in Appendix, Figure 1; see also “Le déclin assuré de l'Europe au XXIe siècle, sauf si...,” *Le Monde*, 3 May 2003: “Continent vieilli, incapable de se donner les moyens d'une défense autonome, impuissante à retrouver les chemins de l'innovation, l'Europe s'endort au XXIe siècle. Retour à l'avant-révolution industrielle, direction le Moyen Age. Chirac, roi fainéant!”

²⁴ Appendix, Figures 2 and 3; the ceaseless proclamations by EU statesmen, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and press of the immeasurable superiority of the European “social model” over that of the United States fail to explain why European women are so extraordinarily reluctant to have children.

economies would disintegrate; EU dependence on imported oil is roughly 75 percent and rising, and 30 percent of Western Europe's imports come from the Persian Gulf.²⁵ Europe's states, Britain apart, normally lack the resolve to commit their troops to offensive ground combat; hanging sheepishly about in the immediate vicinity of ethnic massacres is their limit. Effective allies are not available at acceptable political and strategic cost: a genuine Paris-Moscow-Beijing Axis would not make the United States more docile, and any such combination would amount at best to two-fifths of U.S. military potential measured by expenditure, and far less in view of such a coalition's political and strategic incoherence, and massive deficiencies in procurement scale, technology, and tactical-operational experience.²⁶ Even diplomatic resistance has its price. As France's *politique du pire* of February-March 2003 demonstrated, defying the United States in the Security Council merely guaranteed a U.S.-led war that damaged both the United Nations and the very state that smugly threatened to exercise its veto "whatever the circumstances."²⁷

Flight – or detachment, the construction through diplomacy, economics, and good works of an alternative international universe "as if" the United States did not exist – is no more promising. As with resistance, Europe is at present too politically divided, and lacks the economic and military foundations for success. The United States remains too involved in Europe and in international institutions that might otherwise be bent to serve such an objective. Europe cannot create a parallel universe while remaining dependent on the United States for its ultimate security – as it will for decades more, in the absence of a wholly improbable revolution in funding, organization, procurement, technology, logistics, strategic mobility, and – above all else – will to battle. Nor do terrorists aiming at world revolution tolerate neutrals, especially "Christian" ones.

Fence-sitting is tempting, but it too has limits and costs. America's voters will not necessarily evict George W. Bush from the White House in 2004. A successor in January 2005 or even 2009 may still be relentlessly bent on creating a world without Hitlers, Saddams, Pearl Harbors, and nine-elevens. President Bill Clinton, however ineffectually, launched volleys of cruise missiles at Baghdad; Senator Hillary Clinton has been shockingly bellicose since 11 September.²⁸ Antagonistic *attentisme* – the third of France that voted so very publicly for America's defeat and Saddam's victory in *Le Monde's* famous opinion poll of 28/29 March 2003 – is in any case highly dangerous to European interests.²⁹ And terrorists do not spare fence-sitters.

The final option is cooperation, which a number of European governments, above all that of Britain, have pursued all along although at considerable domestic cost. It offers modest advantages. The best way to restrain the United States – up to a point – is to espouse wholeheartedly the incisive, implacable, and effective efforts, including credible and immediate threats of destruction as a regime, that might compel rogue states to disarm and behave. Current proposals for maritime interdiction against North Korea are one case in point; the pressing need to shut down the impending Persian-theocratic nuclear device is another. On both issues, the customary foot-dragging and evasion by the "international community" appears to be the order of the day.

²⁵ Data: Graph, "EU 30: External Dependence per energy product," in European Commission, *Green Paper: Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply* (2000), http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/library/press-kit-lv-en.pdf, p. 5; US DOE (EIA), "Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet," 17 April 2003, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.pdf>. A British junior minister, Peter Hain, announced in October 2002 that providing security for Middle Eastern oil cost as much as \$25 a barrel – paid primarily by the United States ("Blood and Oil," *The Guardian*, 17 October 2002).

²⁶ Appendix, Figure 4.

²⁷ "Par son intransigeance et la promesse d'un veto 'quelles que soient les circonstances', notre pays a divisé l'Europe, paralysé l'OTAN et l'ONU, anéanti les possibilités non militaires de faire céder, par un ultimatum commun et précis, la dictature irakienne." (Pascal Bruckner, André Glucksmann, Romain Goupil, "La faute," *Le Monde*, 14 April 2003).

²⁸ See (for instance) "Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton In Response to the U.S.-Led Military Campaign in Afghanistan," 7 October 2001, <http://clinton.senate.gov/~clinton/news/2001/10/2001A09837.html> and "Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton on the President's Remarks to the Nation," 17 March 2003, <http://clinton.senate.gov/~clinton/news/2003/03/2003318307.html>. It would be a profound mistake to ascribe these positions solely to the fact that the Twin Towers used to be located in Senator Clinton's constituency.

²⁹ IPSOS-*Le Monde* opinion poll, "Les Français et la guerre en Irak," 28-29 March 2003 (Banque des Sondages, <http://www.ipsos.fr/>).

For cooperation to succeed, European governments will have to repress their self-indulgent ideological distaste for George W. Bush, and sharply contest the moral validity of pacifism and the foolishness of anti-Americanism in a world of Hitlers, Stalins, Pol Pots, Saddams, Kim Jong-Ils, Ayatollahs, and Osama bin Ladens. M. Raffarin's "*Les Américains ne sont pas nos ennemis*" of early April was on the right track, but far too negative and plaintive.³⁰ A sense of irony – not at present a European strength – might also usefully leaven the current earnest chagrin at U.S. conduct. Since 1914 it has been the aim of the European democracies – perhaps especially France – to get and keep the USA involved in world security. The great lament was always U.S. absence; Neville Chamberlain, 1938: "It is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans except words." Yet now the United States is committed, how many second thoughts. How little recognition that it was America's infamous "cut-and-dried, simplistic, Manichaean approach" (as M. Hubert Védrine indignantly described it) in confronting an earlier "Axis of Evil" that in the end brought democracy back to France and Germany, and created it for the first time in Japan.³¹ Gratitude – the shortest-lived of human emotions – is not what the United States seeks or needs, but rather the tacit recognition, by even the most petulant Europeans, that *American Jihad* has saved the civilized world before, and may do so again. And then America can go home.

In the end, restraint may fail. New terrorist successes on U.S. – or NATO – soil are likely merely to stiffen U.S. policy further, to make it more rather than less implacable and radical. The higher the level of violence, the greater the advantage of the West. War is the surest remedy for totalitarian regimes. Only the "reconstruction" of entire societies can eradicate Islamism. These stern outcomes are inherent in the threat, and no diplomacy, however subtle or pliable, however self-regardingly insistent on the complexity of the world and on the supposed priority of other global issues, can evade it forever.

If the West and the "international community" balk, the United States has proven its willingness to strike alone, or almost so. The defeat of the world's oldest mass democracy would not make the world a safer place. And victory, if the United States fights on alone, risks an embitterment that might indeed transform it into that very Roman empire – *oderint dum metuant* – that detractors prematurely invoke. The world's last best hope is to smother America's militant democracy in affection and support.

³⁰ "Raffarin: 'Les Américains ne sont pas nos ennemis,'" *Libération*, 2 April 2003.

³¹ "*Façon schématique, simpliste, manichéenne*": Hubert Védrine: Press conference for the French media, 1 February 2002, in "Déclarations françaises de politique étrangère depuis 1990," <http://www.france.diplomatie.fr>; similarly Kennedy, "Puissance de l'ennemi," 27 September 2001 ("Si seulement ce pouvait être aussi simple.")

“A Parting of Ways: Europe and America are not coming back together. This is not a Catastrophe”

American and British troops are in the midst of prosecuting a war in Iraq that Germany, France, Russia, and most of Europe's citizens see as unjust and unnecessary. Policy-makers and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic tend to see this rift as temporary, a passing product of differing opinions about how best to deal with Saddam Hussein. This interpretation is dangerously misguided. Opposing views on the Iraq war are a symptom, not a cause, of a widening transatlantic divide that has deep roots - and is likely to prove irreversible.

The growing separation between Europe and America, which calls into question the viability of a community founded upon the principle of indivisible security, is the product of ongoing changes on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, new geopolitical conditions are compelling the EU to strive for more strategic autonomy from the United States. At the same time, America's unilateralist behaviour has irked many Europeans, inducing them to wonder whether they would want to remain under America's shield even if it were available. Rather than welcoming a dominant U.S. role in the world, many Europeans are coming to see America as a superpower that has lost its way - and needs to be contained.

Traditional power politics is also at play, with the maturation of the European Union furthering the separation of Europe from America. History is paradoxically reversing itself. During the nineteenth century, the United States gradually came together as a unitary federation, emerged as a great power, and demanded of European nations that they make room for a rising America. Now the EU is gradually coming together, increasing its collective character, and demanding of America that it accord Europe greater weight.

In addition, a changed political discourse is emerging. Instead of justifying integration as a way to check the power and geopolitical ambition of the national state, it portrays integration as a way to acquire power and project geopolitical ambition for Europe as a whole. It used to be only French leaders who called for the EU to emerge as a counterweight to the United States. Now virtually all other European leaders have joined in. Although the current crisis has unquestionably weakened European unity for now, it may well have the opposite effect over the longer run. The Atlantic Alliance has been dealt a fatal blow by the Iraq crisis, essentially foreclosing the option of an Atlanticist Europe. France and Germany have realized as much and the Poles and their neighbors in Europe's center can ignore reality for only so long; Warsaw and other like-minded capitals will soon realize they have no choice but to settle for a strong EU.

Changes taking place in the United States are equally profound - and paint a similarly gloomy picture of the future of the Atlantic Alliance. America began losing interest in remaining Europe's protector well before the rift over Iraq. Europe is wealthy and at peace. America faces pressing strategic challenges elsewhere, especially in the wake of September 11. There is simply no compelling reason for the United States to remain a European power.

It is not only America's strategic priorities that are changing, but also the character of its internationalism. The centrist multilateralism of the Cold War is giving way to unilateralist alternatives, which have a long tradition in America's political culture and its preoccupation with liberty and sovereignty. In the absence of the Cold War threat, which bound America to allies and international institutions, this libertarian tradition is reasserting itself. Were Democrats in the White House, Europeans would likely find the United States somewhat more pliant. But they would still find little enthusiasm for the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, or other initiatives over which America and Europe have differed sharply.

The challenge for the future is thus not repairing the Western Alliance. That is a lost cause. Instead, it is to ensure that the end of alliance takes the form of an amicable separation rather than a nasty divorce. As the war in Iraq drags on, even that challenge may well prove most difficult to attain.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“THE END OF THE AMERICAN ERA”

- **Charles A. Kupchan** – Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University

Die Zeit, May 22, 2003

“Europe Sets the limits of the United States”

With the dust still settling in Baghdad, it is too soon to judge how the Iraq war and the transatlantic rift that accompanied it will affect the evolution of the international system.

From one perspective, the United States demonstrated its overwhelming military might and its willingness to use it, with clear lessons. Germany, France, and Russia had better do what they can to make up with the world's only superpower. Rogue nations had better prepare for the worst. A new American century is poised to unfold.

From another perspective, the war seems to mark just the opposite, the end of the American era. The United States may have unfurled its new doctrine of preemption and preeminence. But in doing so, it also has acted against the court of world opinion, compromising its international legitimacy. America's benign hegemony is no longer so benign. From here on out, countries may well resist rather than rally behind U.S. leadership.

This second vision is far more likely to be the accurate one. The war over Iraq was a symptom, not a cause, of the rift that has divide America from much of the world. Most members of the U.N. Security Council were prepared to resist Washington's rush to war because they had already come to believe that the United States posed a greater threat to international stability than Iraq. American unilateralism, strengthened by the vulnerability and anger left behind by September 11, is tearing away at the fabric of the international community.

Although America's military supremacy will remain uncontested for decades to come, this fundamental change in the perception of U.S. power and purpose will quietly erode America's unipolar moment. Many countries are now distancing themselves from the United States, expediting the transition to a world of multiple centers of power. The return of a multipolar landscape will reawaken the competitive instincts that have been held in abeyance by U.S. primacy. Preparing for this transition is one of the central challenges facing the global community.

Although many analysts would agree that the current strains in transatlantic relations are the most serious since World War II, they see this state of affairs as temporary, a passing idiosyncrasy of the Bush administration. This is, however, a dangerous illusion. Beneath them surface, the international system is in the midst of profound and irreversible change.

The rise of a more self-confident and assertive Europe is one of the key engines of this change. The EU's collective wealth is drawing equal with that of the United States, and the euro has been steadily gaining ground against the dollar. As investors shift their holdings into euro-denominated assets, America's heavy dependence on inflows of foreign capital could become a major source of economic vulnerability.

Europe's gradual emergence as an alternative center of power is not just economic in nature. EU members are debating the adoption of a constitution and the appointment of a single foreign minister and directly elected chief executive. The EU has replaced the U.S. as the primary diplomatic arbiter in the Balkans and enlargement will enhance the union's influence across Central and Eastern Europe. Europe's newer members are admittedly less enthusiastic than the older ones about the EU's emergence as a counterweight to the United States. But as the Continent's security order inevitably becomes more European and less Atlantic, the Central Europeans will realize that it is in their interests to throw their weight behind a stronger EU.

The EU's efforts to acquire greater military capacity will unquestionably lag far behind its progress on

the economic and political front. But there are encouraging signs: France is increasing its defense spending by 20%; Germany appears ready to end conscription in favor of a more capable professional force; in the wake of the fall-out over Iraq, Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg are considering new steps to deepen defense cooperation.

Even under the most optimistic of scenarios, the EU will not challenge America's military primacy anytime soon, if ever. But Europe will become far less reliant on the United States for its security. Its autonomy and its willingness to stand its ground against America will increase. Changes on the other side of the Atlantic are also fundamental in nature. Rather than leading through consensus and working through international institutions, America has embraced a stiff-necked unilateralism. The causes run much deeper than George W. Bush.

Unilateralism is very much a part of America's political culture and its preoccupation with liberty and sovereignty. In the absence of the Cold War threat, which bound America to allies and international institutions, this libertarian tradition is reasserting itself. The American heartland, the fastest growing part of the country, favors such populist proclivities. And September 11 has altered America's electoral landscape for many years to come, making it politically perilous to challenge the hawks.

The defining geopolitical development of this decade thus promises to be the separation of a rising Europe and a difficult America, leading to a West divided against itself. As the Atlantic Alliance expires, the EU and the United States are unlikely to become adversaries, but they are destined to become competitors across the board. The world will not be bipolar because of Europe's military inferiority, but neither will it be unipolar as the EU more frequently holds it own against America.

As the second decade of this century unfolds, the geopolitical axis is likely to shift to the Pacific, with China gradually emerging as a world-class economic power, perhaps with a military to match. Japan will eventually climb out of recession, adding to Asia's rise. A multipolar world thus looms on the horizon. This century will not belong to America, Europe, or East Asia, it will belong to no one.

The world is thus entering an era of geopolitical transformation, not one of continued U.S. hegemony. Transitions in the international system have always been fraught with danger, hence the urgent need to recognize that change is afoot and map out a strategy for managing it peacefully.

An effective strategy for dealing with the challenges ahead has three critical ingredients. First, Americans must rediscover that multilateralism has at least some merits. Otherwise, the international system will collapse as America and Europe head for a nasty divorce rather than an amicable separation. Perhaps voices of reason will eventually make themselves heard in the United States, even amid a politics still tinged with anxiety about terrorism. If such self-correcting mechanisms fail to operate, then it will be up to others, Europeans in particular, to restrain America.

A Europe that redoubles efforts to build a union capable of acting collectively on the international stage is the second key ingredient of a new strategy. The EU is currently in a no-man's-land. It is too strong to be America's lackey, but too weak and divided to be either an effective partner or a formidable counterweight, inviting Washington's disdain. If the United States faces a strong and coherent EU, however, it will at least have the option of eventually striking a more balanced and mature partnership with Europe. The EU, whether or not America has the good sense to rekindle multilateralism, will at least emerge as a responsible center of power helping to anchor an uncertain world.

Collective efforts to integrate China and other developing regions into global markets and institutions are the final ingredient of a strategy for managing the return to multipolarity. Doing so will help ensure that China aligns its power with rather than against Europe and America. It will also alleviate the underlying conditions that lead to instability, arms proliferation, and terrorism. This task is an onerous one, underscoring the ultimate need for a tamed America and a collective Europe to approach it together.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“THE UNIVERSAL CHALLENGE OF ENERGY AND ECOSYSTEMS”

J. Steven Lovink – Institute for Environmental Security/TransGlobal Ventures, Inc.

One of the most fundamental universal challenges facing human kind in the first decades of the 21st Century is the transition to a solar or hydrogen economy³². Global production of non-renewable energy resources such as oil and shortly thereafter natural gas are now expected to peak some time in the next decade or so. When this happens, the world's current fossil fuels-centric global infrastructure will unravel the foundations of many of the commercial, political, and social advances of the past two centuries. Two influential factors will compound upcoming security issues, whether economic, environmental, human or national in nature. First, virtually all of the untapped remaining reserves will be located in the Middle East with all its political and socio-economic challenges, and second, an unprepared world will be forced to use dirtier fossil fuel substitutes such as coal, heavy oil, and tar sand at a time when a further rise in CO₂ emission levels, the prime determinant of global warming, would have even more devastating effects on the Earth's ecosystems than those already predicted.

Energy has always played an important, some would argue pivotal, role in the rise and fall of civilizations. A fact is that the laws of thermodynamics imply that those societies that ignore the limitations to their energy infrastructure are forced to invest progressively more in securing access to their energy, but become increasingly vulnerable in the process. Yet, geopolitical realities remain thus far fiercely loyal to the vested interests of what should sooner rather than later transition to a bygone fossil fuel economy. The United States, now often referred to as today's Roman Empire or hyper power, along with every other nation around the globe faces this conundrum -- failure to address it ensures breakdown or even collapse.

A constructive way for nations to address this formidable universal challenge would be to make the necessary large-scale investments in the infrastructure of a solar or hydrogen economy. The promise of this type of economy opens the door to what great societies should stand for: freedom, democracy, the rule of law, free markets and empowerment for all on a life-sustaining planet, as opposed to infringed upon liberties, centralized command and control, disrespect of the law, protected markets and dependency of the many within highly compromised environmental commons. The estimated investment requirement for the transition to this new economy probably exceeds \$ 100 billion per annum (and/or should offset fossil fuel subsidies to level the playing field) for at least the next decade(s). But, which stakeholders will put up that kind of money first? And, if too few do, can we take out a collective insurance against the consequences of such policy and market failures?

Eco-insurance -- a proposed home insurance policy for our planet -- is currently being developed as a financially prudent mechanism promoting global environmental, economic, and human security by mobilizing financial resources from people, organizations and nations for investment in the restoration and maintenance of the globe's life-supporting ecosystems for and by global citizens. Eco-insurance premiums, based on ecological impact, income and global eco-insurance risk, would be invested by a trust, fund or facility through a qualified network of asset managers, multilateral development agencies, cooperatives and NGOs from around the world following clear and transparent criteria. A large scale investment program catalyzing the transition to the new hydrogen or solar economy complemented with the preservation of critical regional ecosystems through innovative payment systems for

³² See for example: Hermann Scheer, *The Solar Economy*, 2002 and Jeremy Rifkin, *The Hydrogen Economy*, 2002.

environmental goods and services is a very practical way of fulfilling the stated mission of eco-insurance for the ultimate benefit of every global citizen.

Eco-insurance -- a global public good -- can best be realized through international cooperation between governments, the private sector, multilateral institutions, academia, and non-government organizations (NGOs), with support from the globe's citizens. Strong leadership by example from a network of committed launch partners would be a logical next step. Ideally, the combined dynamism and power of the United States and Europe should be actively engaged as part of what could be a reinvigorated transatlantic dialogue along what are essentially shared global national interests. At a minimum, the challenge is up to at least one of these transatlantic partners to take the lead in building a coalition of the willing to prepare for, invest in and reap the benefits from the post fossil fuel era.

The issues outlined above cut across much of what *National Sovereignty and Universal Challenges in the post-Iraq Era* will be about. May this conference become the prelude to constructive development of practical responses to the critical universal challenge of energy and ecosystems.

Eco-insurance for a Sustainable Future is a joint initiative of TransGlobal Ventures, Inc., a Washington DC-based finance and venture development company and the Institute for Environmental Security based in The Hague, the Netherlands and dedicated to advance global environmental security through Horizon 21, a work program integrating the fields of diplomacy, law, finance and education.

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NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY IN THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES”

J.R. McNeill – Georgetown University, 2002

A chapter in Michael Brown, ed., *Grave New World*

*“Had I been consulted at the moment of Creation,
I would have recommended something simpler”*

– Alfonso El Sabio, King of Castile and León, (1221-1284)

I. Introduction

King Alfonso the Wise noted that Creation seems unduly complex. In the seven and one-half centuries since his observation, it has grown no simpler. Indeed, if evolutionary biologists are correct, the biosphere should have gotten slightly more complicated since the 13th century, as the usual direction of biological evolution is towards greater complexity—punctuated by catastrophic simplifications of the sort not recently seen on earth. The march of science (which the King did his share to promote) has resolved many mysteries since the 13th century, but has only enhanced the sense of Nature’s complexity.

International relations and international security is almost equally as tangled and inscrutable as the natural world. While there is no shortage of rigorous theory—as in biological evolution—everything of importance on the human scale is contingent and unpredictable. In the study of international affairs, as in environmental matters, there are too many mutually interactive variables, and too many non-linear effects, for human brains to understand how things work until they have happened and can be observed in detail.

Lately, an interdisciplinary inquiry has grown up that tries to link the fields of environment and international relations. It is not, as fields go, highly theoretical, but more often based on case studies.¹ Drawing useful lessons from these cases is no easy business, in part because they combine the uncertainties and complexities of these two very uncertain and complex fields.² It is, therefore, an unpromising intellectual enterprise to seek connections between environment and security. This chapter, however, aims to do just that for the 20th and, to a very limited extent, for the 21st centuries. It argues that such connections existed in the past and will exist with greater force in the future, but that they have been and will remain modest in comparison to the traditional concerns of international security.³

II. Environmental Change in the 20th Century: A Brief History

One of the distinguishing features of the 20th century was its tumultuous environmental change. While earlier periods in earth history contained moments far more disruptive, these invariably were the work of volcanoes, asteroids or other purely natural forces. In recent millennia humankind has proved the

¹The best sampler of this literature is the *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, edited by G. Dabelko and published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. It contains an invaluable bibliography in each issue.

²Among the more careful work, which displays fewer of the shortcomings so difficult to avoid in this field, is that of T. Homer-Dixon, e.g. his *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

³My discussion will not extend to intra-state conflicts that involve environmental dimensions, such as the resource wars over diamonds, gold, timber, or oil that bedevil societies with weak states in parts of Africa and southeast Asia. On these, see Michael Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Henry Holt, 2001).

most ecologically disruptive force on the planet, and never more so than in the last hundred years. From forests to fisheries and from soils to the stratosphere, humankind had never before altered ecosystems so comprehensively. A very rough appreciation of the magnitude of the process emerges from the following table, which seeks to give some measure to this proposition.

Table 1
Measures of Environmental Change, 1890s-1990s

Environmental Indicator	Co-efficient of Increase, 1890s-1990s
Energy use	13-15
Population	4
Urban population	13
World GDP	14
Industrial output	40
Freshwater use	9
Cropland	2
Irrigated area	5
Cattle population	4
Marine fish catch	35
Lead emissions to atmosphere	8
Carbon dioxide emissions	17
Air pollution in general	2-10
Forest area	0.8 (20% decrease)
Bird and mammal species	0.99 (1% decrease)

Source: McNeill 2000:360-1

Note: some of these figures deserve more confidence than others. For details, see McNeill 2000, *passim*.

The table is less than thorough. It presents only data that are fairly easily retrieved, for example bird and mammal species but not fish and insects. It neglects variables for which the co-efficient of growth in the 20th century would be astronomical, say automobiles or organic chemicals, and those for which the co-efficient would be infinite, such as chloroflouorocarbon emissions, which were zero prior to the 1930s. Its figures are all global ones, whereas most environmental effects—not all—are local or regional in scope. Nonetheless, it conveys the right impression and gives some precision, where that is feasible, to the proposition that 20th-century environmental change was both broad and deep, comprehensive and thorough.

As a heuristic exercise, it may be helpful to imagine a single index of human-induced environmental disruption, conflating all the variables, and consider its history. If one did, one would find that environmental disruption, on some scale, existed from the dawn of human history, grew extremely slowly, roughly in step with human population growth, and then around 1800 or so sped up slightly. This modest acceleration came as a result of faster population growth and faster economic growth, although both were still very slow by recent standards. Technical change, in particular the emergence of coal-powered steam engines, helped too. A much more marked acceleration came around 1950. This one too resulted from faster (this time much faster) population growth, but also from the emergence of more energy-intensive economies, made feasible in particular the arrival of cheap oil—of which more below.

Throughout the whole period since 1800, and especially since 1950, the human relationship with the rest of nature has been very much in flux. Ecologically, we have—without much awareness of the process—created a regime of constant disturbance. This regime is itself both a result of and a contributor to rapid social and economic change. Our modern social regime and our modern ecological regime co-evolved, adjusting to one another while shaping one another.

This, in very general terms, is the trajectory of modern environmental history. Let us now look more closely at two components of it, water and energy, chosen for their relevance to contemporary security concerns.

III. A Brief History of Freshwater Use

The world has always had plenty of fresh water, but it is often inconveniently distributed in time and space for human designs. Getting just the right amounts of water in the right places at the right times is an ancient art, at least 9,000 years old. Success or failure in the arts of water management was crucial in the distant past. Irrigation made crops grow where they otherwise would not, allowing states greater population, revenues, and power. Urban life depended on the ability to assure a supply of clean drinking water and to provide a means to disperse wastes. Failure to segregate drinking water from waste water assured a heavy burden of gastro-enteric diseases and made urban life all but unsustainable. The great civilizations of the ancient world, in Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Indus valley, and north China, all rested on sophisticated water management—as did the great precolumbian empires of the Americas. No great states of the past except the transitory Mongol Empire existed without great cities at their core, and all great cities required careful water management.

In the modern world water management remains fundamental. One of the differences between rich and poor societies is their ability to provide adequate clean water, and thereby to minimize the burdens of disease (and the time spent in fetching water).

Irrigation remains the most important use of freshwater, accounting for about two-thirds of global water use, down from 90% a century ago. Roughly a sixth of the world's farm acreage is irrigated, and it produces about a third of the world's food. The tenth of the world's freshwater usage that goes to cities is responsible for the comparative good health of a billion or two people (of the three billion in all who lives in cities). The enormous expansion of water use in modern history (see Table 2), has generated inestimable benefits to human health and nutrition, and sizeable ones to industry and routine household life. Table 2 outlines the quantities of fresh water withdrawn from lakes, rivers, and aquifers, and the uses to which they have been put over the past 300 years.

Table 2

Estimated Global Freshwater Use, 1700-2000

year	withdrawals (km ²)	withdrawals per capita	Uses (percent of total)		
			irrigation	industry	municipal
1700	110	0.17	90	2	8
1800	243	0.27	90	3	7
1900	580	0.36	90	6	3
1950	1,360	0.54	83	13	4
1970	2,590	0.70	72	22	5
1990	4,130	0.78	66	24	8
2000*	5,190	0.87	64	25	9

*A projection, which may be too high.

Source: McNeill 2000:121, elaborated from Shiklomanov 1993 and L'vovich and White 1990.

While the benefits of this enormous replumbing of the planet have been great, it has come at a cost. Irrigation everywhere leads to the salinization of land, although at widely divergent rates. Today the accumulation of salts forces the abandonment of farmland at about the same rate as engineers bring new land under irrigation. So, in effect, irrigation amounts to a short-term maximization strategy. It is also notoriously wasteful, although again to widely varying degrees. Half the water diverted for crops never reaches a root or leaf. In some of the more poorly designed irrigation schemes in high-evaporation zones, the proportion wasted reaches 90%. Probably the most costly irrigation scheme is that of Central Asia, planned by Soviet engineers in the 1950s, a region-wide project far more ambitious than anything tried in the long history of Central Asian irrigation. The plan diverted the snowmelt waters of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers into the cotton fields of Soviet Central Asia, principally Uzbekistan. Since 1960 it has strangled the Aral Sea, killing off its fishing industry and most of its fish, exposing the salt-encrusted seabed to steppe winds, which distribute airborne salt throughout Central Asia. The Aral, now about one-half its 1960 area, now has a weaker moderating effect on the Central Asian climate, which is getting hotter in summer, colder in winter, and drier, so that the Himalayan snowmelt that feeds Central Asia's rivers is declining. The usual curses of irrigation, rising groundwater and salinization, affect much of Turkmenistan's and Uzbekistan's best soils. All this in order to make the USSR self-sufficient in low-quality cotton, unmarketable anywhere outside the Soviet bloc.⁴

The Soviet experience with the Aral Sea is unique in its severity but typical in its origins. While water manipulation had been a part of state efforts for millennia, in the 20th century new skills and technology, and a new ambitiousness, raised the ceiling on what states might attempt. From the end of the 19th century it was possible to generate electricity from water-powered turbines. With improvements in engineering and construction techniques it became possible from the 1930s to build gigantic dams across all but the largest rivers. Large dams in particular acquired a certain totemic quality for ambitious states and their leaders: Nehru called dams the "temples of modern India." Like Franklin Roosevelt, Franco, Stalin, Nasser, Mao, Deng and a legion of lesser leaders, Nehru saw in big dams a mighty symbol of an energetic, modernizing state, tangible evidence of a commitment to improve life for the masses. That some of the costs of dam-building could often be shunted onto the poor and powerless, foreigners, or the future, made dam projects all the more appealing.⁵

Two notable examples of large-scale rerouting of waters in the interests of state power are Italy and the United States. When by the 1890s it had become clear that the basis of military power had shifted away from cannon fodder, horseflesh, and heroism to heavy industry, Italy appeared to be in a particularly unenviable position. It had almost no coal. Imported coal was expensive, and unreliable in time of war. The Italian solution lay in turning the alpine lakes and rivers into sources of electric power on which to construct an industrial base on the northern rim of the Po Valley. Italy built its first hydroelectric power station in 1885 and by 1905 led all Europe in hydropower. Further electrification became a major goal for fascist Italy (1922-43), which was intent on building a self-sufficient military industrial complex. This it never quite achieved (Italy still imported coal through World War II, from Germany and Poland), but by the 1930s Italy had built up its metallurgical, shipbuilding, aircraft, rail, and armaments industries to the point where Mussolini could field a semi-industrialized military in wars in Ethiopia and Spain, and could seriously rival Britain's Royal Navy as top dog on the Mediterranean Sea. Without the harnessing of alpine hydropower, fascist geopolitical ambitions would have been impossible, instead of merely impractical.⁶

The United States recast its waterways too, and on a much larger scale. The state was deeply involved from the 1930s, building dams, channelizing rivers, subsidizing irrigation and hydropower. The agricultural development of arid regions in the southwest, in California, and in Washington and Oregon

⁴For a thorough treatment see the German government's remote sensing program's Aral Sea Homepage at: <http://www.dfd.dlr.de/app/land/aralsee/index.html>. See also, McNeill, *Something New Under the Sun*, 162-66 and the sources cited there.

⁵On state ambitions and environmental interventions, see James Scott, *Seeing Like A State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

⁶See Piero Bevilacqua, "Le rivoluzioni dell'acqua" in Bevilacqua, ed., *Storia dell'agricoltura italiana in etB contemporanea* Venice: Marsilio, 1989), 255-318; J.J. Sadkovich, "The Indispensable Navy." In: N.A.M. Rodger, ed., *Naval Power in the 20th Century* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 66-76.

depended fundamentally on government enterprise. So too did the vast hydropower schemes on the Columbia river. These were not deliberately built in order to construct a military-industrial complex, but the fact that the US was able to construct one in a single year, 1942, required as a pre-condition the cheap hydropower just recently installed.⁷ Without it, the aircraft industry in Seattle and the shipyards of the Pacific coast could not have been as enormously productive as they were. You can't weld a Liberty ship together every eight days without plenty of electricity.⁸

The vast effort to reorganize rivers and lakes for human purposes had, as always, state power as well as social welfare among its motives. State ambition and security anxiety played an equal role in shaping the energy regime of the 20th century. Only a small part of the modern energy regime derived from hydropower. The lion's share came from fossil fuels.

IV. A Brief History of Energy Use

Energy is essential for making things, for transport, and for mere survival. Before the use of fossil fuels, people could use only the tiniest fraction of the energy available on earth. By eating plants people acquired chemical energy that photosynthesis had captured from sunlight. By eating animals, or using the muscle power of draft animals, humans tapped further energy. Wind and water power, available only in favorable locations, also harnessed a fraction of the annual energy delivered to the earth from the sun. Each of these methods tapped only the annual flow of energy generated by the sun, which although abundant, was very inefficiently converted into useful forms. By burning wood or charcoal people could tap energy stocks accumulated in trees over a century or two. But ultimately all these methods provided a very limited energy harvest which meant that almost all people would always be poor, dependent upon grinding toil for their daily rice or bread.

Fossil fuels changed all that. The Dutch were the first people to make them central to their economy. They burned peat to heat their homes and fuel industries such as brewing, brick-making, sugar-refining, or glass-making (but not metallurgy, for which a peat-flame was not hot enough). Peat is accumulated vegetable matter, preserved by water. The Dutch cut it out of bogs, dried it, and burned it to harvest energy that plants had captured over a few millennia. This delivered more concentrated energy than wood or charcoal and gave the Netherlands a unique advantage (until coal) in energy-intensive industries. To a considerable extent, the prosperity of the Dutch in their Golden Age (c. 1580-1700) depended on low energy costs.⁹

While wood allowed access to stores of energy captured over centuries, and peat to energy captured over millennia, coal represented eons of accumulated energy stocks. People around the world had known of coal's uses for a long time, and Song China had used it on a large scale in its iron industry. London had burned coal for home heating from at least the 13th century. Britain had plentiful coal deposits, part of a 'carboniferous crescent' that stretched from the Scottish lowlands through England to northern France and Belgium and on to the Ruhr region of Germany. This would become the industrial heartland of Europe, as important for modern history as the Fertile Crescent was for ancient history. By 1815, annual British coal production yielded energy equivalent to what could be garnered from a hypothetical forest equal in area to all of England, Scotland and Wales, twenty times what the actual woodlands of Britain could then produce. Steam engines did the work of perhaps 50 million vigorous men, far more than Britain actually had.¹⁰ Britain was on its way to becoming the first high-energy society. Table 3 shows the difference in energy use before and after fossil fuels:

⁷It had other pre-conditions as well, most notably the world's largest industrial sector which was swiftly converted from civilian to military production.

⁸On the American military-industrial buildup see Richard Overly, *Why the Allies Won* (New York: Norton, 1995); on water management, Donald Worster, *Rivers of Empire* (New York, Pantheon, 1985).

⁹J.W. de Zeeuw, "Peat and the Dutch Golden Age," *A.A.G. Bijdragen* 21(1978), 3-31.

¹⁰The 23 million tons of coal produced in 1815, even if burned in inefficient steam engines, could do the work of perhaps 50 million vigorous men. The total population of Britain was about 13 million, so the number of vigorous men was perhaps 3 million.

Table 3

Average Annual Per Capita Energy Use

Basic Requirements of the Human Body	1
Hunting and gathering societies	3-6
Agrarian societies	18-24
Industrial societies	70-80
The unit here is the average basal metabolic requirements of an adult human body, about 3.5 gigajoules per year. Based on: Rolf-Peter Sieferle, <i>Der Europäische Sonderweg: Ursachen und Faktoren</i> (Stuttgart: Breuninger Stiftung, 2001), 18-19.	

The harnessing of fossil fuels ratcheted up the energy supplies available for human use, thereby permitting a vast increase in human numbers and wealth. Between 1800 and 2000, the total increase in energy use was about 60- or 80-fold. The expanded energy harvest meant that for the first time in history mass poverty became unnecessary. It had other implications as well.

The most pertinent ones are the geopolitical and environmental. The wealth generated in the Netherlands through the use of peat in select industries helped underwrite Dutch imperial ambitions in the 17th century. But peat conferred no direct military advantages. Coal was different. It made cheap iron possible, and eventually steam-powered ships. Whereas in 1793 a British embassy to China was dismissed peremptorily and the Qianlong Emperor (reigned 1735-95) could suppose that Britain was of no consequence, in 1840 British gunboats could sail up rivers 10,000 miles from home and therefore British diplomats could dictate terms even to the most populous country on earth. The ships and weapons made possible and affordable by coal also tipped the balance in Britain's favor in India and Africa in the 19th century.¹¹ Britain was the first state to adjust, economically and militarily, to the potentials of coal, and its geopolitical position in the 19th century reflected this. By the 1890s, Germany too had converted its abundant coal and ore deposits into cheap metals and good weaponry, and thus also fielded a formidable industrialized military.

In the 20th century the U.S. revamped the world's energy regime by developing oil as a primary fuel. Large-scale oil production began on the shores of the Caspian Sea, late in the 19th century. America's first big gusher, in Spindletop, Texas, came appropriately in the first month of the 20th century, in January 1901. Thereafter Americans led the way in the technologies necessary for drilling, transporting, refining, and burning oil. They led the world in oil production for much of the 20th century, and in oil consumption for all of it. This was crucial to the emergence of the U.S. as a great power, because the mobile warfare--on land and sea and in the air--that characterized the 20th century after 1918 was an extremely oil-intensive business. So the U.S., like Britain a century before, profited handsomely in geopolitical terms (as in economic terms) by being the first to adapt thoroughly to a new energy regime.

The transition to fossil fuels was just as consequential in environmental terms. Coal created urban air pollution of a new intensity and lethality. By 1900 air pollution caused or exacerbated respiratory diseases that killed hundreds of thousands annually in the coal-burning cities around the world. At its worst, coal-smoke and associated sulfur dioxide and particulates could kill 4,000 people in a week, as

¹¹An example on the Gambia River is detailed in Donald Wright, *The World and a Very Small Place in Africa* (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

in London in December 1952.¹² Through railroads and steamships, coal made it feasible to open up agricultural frontiers around the world, producing cotton, coffee, wheat, and after the 1880s, meat and butter, for shipment to growing cities. This led to very widespread conversion of grassland and forest into farmland and pasture in the Americas, South Africa, Siberia, Australia, and New Zealand. Oil led to still greater changes.

Oil burns more cleanly than coal. But because oil is a useful fuel in a broad range of applications, its emergence sharply raised the total amount of fossil-fuel combustion, increasing total air pollution loads. In Mexico City, for example, by 2002 air pollution, mainly from tailpipes, killed 35,000 people annually according to the municipal government. Oil also made possible machinery that revolutionized extractive industries, mining and lumber for instance. By the late 20th century humankind had become a major geological agent, moving ten times as much earth and soil as all the world's glaciers and almost as much as all the world's streams and rivers. Oil-powered machines made this possible. They also enabled people to cut timber far faster than had hitherto been possible, helping to propel the dramatic surge in deforestation since 1960. Of all the factors underlying the tumultuous environmental changes of modern times, high energy use, and especially the liberal use of oil after 1950, is probably the most important.¹³

V. Environment, Security, and Resources: A Brief History

The chief contentions of the environmental security literature are that environmental changes may prove so destabilizing as to create security problems and that resource scarcity may lead to war. I will review these contentions in light of 20th-century history, and add a third: that a scarcity of security led to greater environmental change.

The first proposition is a weak one in the sense that of all the security problems and conflicts observable in history, almost none of them may confidently be put down to environmental changes. That is because until recently environmental changes happened so infrequently and proceeded so slowly that they normally gave societies ample time to adapt. The likeliest exception to this is climate change, which prior to the last 150 years took place for exclusively natural reasons. It is plausible, although uncertain, that cycles of drought helped to propel migrations that set pastoral peoples of the Eurasian steppe (Xiongnu, Turks, Mongols, e.g.) against settled populations in China, Iran, or eastern Europe. Equally plausibly, drought may have led to intensified slave-raiding and concomitant warfare in Angola and the West African sahel. These are only speculations: in general the propensity to award climate change a causative role in large-scale political events (the collapse of the ancient Indus civilization, or the classic Maya e.g.) is inversely proportional to our knowledge of these events. This should encourage skepticism.

In the 20th century, the strongest case for this first proposition is the drought cycle that befell much of Africa after 1967, hitting the sahel belt from Senegal to Somalia hardest. After more than 50 years of broadly favorable rains, which roughly coincided with the colonial era in Africa, killing drought returned in 1968. Its impact was probably greater than the previous severe drought, because in the interim population and herds had grown, and colonial policy had purposely reduced the mobility of the population to make it more manageable and taxable. In the six years after 1967, desiccation, starvation, and related diseases killed 1% of the population of the sahel, and 30-40% of the cattle, a severe blow in cattle-keeping societies. This catastrophe probably played some role in bringing on a spate of coups in the 1970s, ushering in some of modern African history's most unsavory regimes.

However, a note of skepticism is in order. The location of coups and instability does not correlate perfectly with the location of the most intense drought. The 1970s were politically turbulent in parts of Africa least affected by drought, such as South Africa and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, as well as in the regions hardest hit. Independent African states in the late 1960s were, most of them, fully-laden camels, needing only a single straw to break their backs. The hike in oil prices in 1973 might have

¹²Peter Brimblecombe, *The Big Smoke: A History of Air Pollution in London since Medieval Times* (London: Methuen, 1987), ch. 8.

¹³For further elaboration, McNeill, *Something New Under the Sun*, chapters 2, 8, 10; and Christian Pfister, ed., *Das 1950er Syndrom* (Bern: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1996).

been that straw just as plausibly as drought. So might some less conspicuous events. So the most one can reliably say is that the drought, while extremely disruptive environmentally, socially, and economically, probably helped bring about the dissatisfactions, instability, and coups that affected Niger, Chad, Ethiopia, and Uganda among other countries. That is a modest and guarded claim made for an extreme environmental event. Less extreme environmental events, or trends, presumably cannot carry heavier explanatory loads or support stronger claims.

All this is not to say that this first proposition is uninteresting. It is, rather, to say that it has very little use for making sense of the conflicts and security dilemmas of history. But the future is a foreign country, and things may be different there.

The second proposition concerns resource scarcity, resource competition, and warfare. This has a firmer base in modern history, indeed in all history. If one adopts a broad enough definition of the term resources, then most wars have been over resources. Prior to the industrial revolution, most states had a keen interest in both land and labor, because these, when combined, were the main source of revenues on which states subsisted. Labor must be included as a scarce resource in most contexts prior to 1800, especially where disease burdens were heavy, death rates high, and the demand for labor great. In such contexts, rulers frequently made the capture of people a primary objective of warfare. They also did so in contexts where they could easily strike against ill-defended populations, that is, where the supply of captives could be cheaply acquired. All these conditions obtained in tropical Africa before 1850, and in southeast Asia as well, both the scene of extensive slaving. Wars and raids undertaken, at least in part, to secure captives took place wherever slaving and forced labor was a way of life: in the Mediterranean before 1600, in colonial Latin America, in precolumbian America, for example. Mongol captains consciously sought to capture skilled personnel to distribute as war booty among their supporters.¹⁴ In the Turko-Persian military tradition, which featured slave soldiers, conquerors had among their explicit goals the capture of skilled military personnel, and the capture of youths who could be trained as warriors. After 1850 the logic of forced labor declined quickly, mainly because of the onset of rapid population growth, but also because of the development of fossil fuels. The capture of labor as a motive for war quickly became vanishingly rare, although even today it is not entirely absent from, for example, the calculations behind the civil war in Sudan.

Land of course always figured as a motive in warfare wherever land, rather than labor, was the scarcer factor in producing revenue. This means, chiefly, the historically thickly populated regions of the world, Japan and China, North India, and Europe. Some lands were so rich that they were routinely fought over—Egypt or the Gangetic plain for example. As these two examples suggest, it was often land in combination with water that made control of a given territory worth warring over. Egypt without the Nile's irrigation system was as worthless as Arabia before oil. Nonetheless, whether the prize was land alone or land together with water, the conquest of territory routinely figured as a central motive for warfare.

It still does, although on a reduced scale. Only in a few places does land remain the basis of revenue. What is on or under the land is now usually more valuable. That brings us to a narrower definition of resources.

Occasionally a quest for other sorts of resources served as a *casus belli*. Just what counts as a resource changes over time. Pharaonic Egypt undertook the occasional campaign in Lebanon to secure ship timber. Ship timber, like saltpetre and flint, is no longer a strategic resource, and not worth fighting over. In the modern world the only resource worth the risks of war has been oil.

Oil became a strategic resource suddenly after 1912, when the British Admiralty began to convert the Royal Navy from coal to oil. When World War I began, the British Expeditionary Force in France had fewer than 1,000 motor vehicles. Before the war was over, it had 110,000 trucks, cars and motorcycles—and several hundred tanks. The Allies also used upwards of 100,000 airplanes in the war effort. All these engines needed fuel, which oil provided. Georges Clemenceau at the outset of the war allegedly said that if he wanted oil he would find it at his grocer's; by 1917 he thought "every drop of oil is worth a drop of blood." In World War I the quest for oil motivated modest campaigns (German

¹⁴Artisans, entertainers, animal-keepers, translators among others. For details see Thomas Allsen, *Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

offensives in Rumania and toward Baku). The Central Powers relied on oil from Austrian Galicia, which in 1909 was the world's third largest oil producer. But that source dried up by 1917, curtailing the German and Austrian U-boat campaigns for want of fuel at a crucial stage in the war. The rapid mechanization of warfare, and the general reliance upon oil in industry, soon made oil worth fighting wars.¹⁵

The best examples are the Pacific war of 1941-45 and the Gulf War of 1991. In the first case, Japan had embarked on an empire-building program in Asia after 1931, and a war in China after 1937. The Japanese navy and, after 1937, the army, needed oil, of which Japan had none. The nearest source lay in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia). In January of 1941 the Japanese demanded access to that oil but were refused; in August the Dutch, British, Chinese, and Americans organized oil sanctions against Japan. This obliged the Japanese either to surrender their imperial ambitions, a course unacceptable to the military, or to attack and seize the oilfields of Sumatra and Borneo. Attacking the Dutch islands implied war with the U.S., so it required a prior attack on American installations in the Philippines and Hawaii, begun on December 6-7, 1941. Had the Japanese not needed oil for their war in China, they could have avoided the Pacific War which brought their defeat, which would have led to a very different recent history for East Asia.

Sometimes timing is everything. Had the great Siberian oilfields, the world's second-largest after those of the Persian Gulf, been opened prior to 1941 (they were opened in the early 1960s), the Japanese would have had a much more palatable option at hand. From their base in Manchuria, they could have attacked the USSR, which after June 1941 was reeling under German assault. Then there would have been no Pearl Harbor, no Pacific War, no constraints on Japanese imperialism in China, and, very quickly, no USSR. That of course is what did not happen: let us return to what did.

The Gulf War of 1991 was also mainly over oil, specifically how much of the Gulf region's supply should be in the hands of Saddam Hussein, who invaded and occupied Kuwait late in 1990 and threatened Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer. At the time American officials marketed the war to the public as one over jobs (James Baker) or principle (George H.W. Bush). It was certainly not about principle: had Mozambique invaded Malawi the Americans would not have launched a war to undo it. It was about jobs in the sense that the American economy, and that of the industrial world generally, floated (and floats) on oil. Allowing a high proportion of the world's oil to be controlled by someone as unbidable as Saddam risked recession and many jobs. Indeed, American policy towards the Middle East since the 1940s has recognized that oil is a vital economic and military resource for the U.S. It is even more vital for Japan: when the Japanese agreed to pay a goodly share of the costs of the Gulf War they understood they were paying for continued access to cheap oil. They did not suppose they were paying for a principle. American leaders have felt it necessary to invoke principle only because in the modern world fighting over resources is deemed crass and morally dubious, and thus candor on this point might undermine popular support for a given war. This is perhaps a reaction in part to Hitler's justification for his war in terms of *lebensraum*. The ancient Athenians—at least Thucydides—had no compunctions about saying that the value of Amphipolis (in Thrace) lay in its timber.

In a sense wars over oil have replaced wars over people. Before fossil fuels, a ruler's most practical way to amass energy for any given task was to amass people, which was most quickly done by enslaving them. Human beings are considerably more energy-efficient than horses, oxen, llamas, elephants or any other work animal. But in the last 150 years machines and fossil fuels provided a cheaper way to build monuments or fortresses, and the usefulness of massed, unskilled labor has plummeted accordingly.

To sum up matters so far: while environmental degradation has almost never led to interstate conflict, at least not directly, wars over resources or a common refrain in human history. They used to be fought of labor and land, but more recently are fought over oil. Before proceeding I will offer some tentative answers to an obvious question: under what circumstances are wars over resources fought?

¹⁵Data from Daniel Yergin, *The Prize* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 167-189 *passim*. Clemenceau's words are variously reported and translated.

In general, wars over environmental resources occur when valued resources are somehow made to seem more scarce or when wide differentials in power make seizure of resources easy and tempting. A sense of heightened scarcity can occur with a technological shift that suddenly makes something indispensable. Before 1910 no state needed reliable access to oil. By 1930 all great powers did, because the technology of war had changed. Heightened scarcity may also come with shifts in patterns of distribution and supply: in the 1860s the American Civil War created a shortage of cotton, which made it seem important to the Russians that they should control the oases and river bottoms of Uzbekistan, where they might grow their own cotton; the Russian push there began in 1864. States (and societies) may also feel the pinch of resource scarcity in times of rapid population growth. This often took the form of land hunger and provoked ambitions of territorial conquest, as in the case of the U.S. Indian wars of the 19th century, the Chinese and Japanese pushes into Manchuria, and in other cases too numerous to mention.

The U.S. also fought its Indian Wars because they were so easy to win. Seizing resources becomes more tempting when it appears cheap and easy to do so. Farmers have routinely displaced hunting and gathering peoples from potential farmland because their technological and numerical edge made it simple to do. The Russians acquired Siberia and the Japanese Hokkaido because resistance was so feeble as to make the resources of those lands seem cheap to acquire. In the first decade of the 20th century, the Germans fought wars in what is now Tanzania and Namibia on the unconfirmed (and ultimately disappointed) hopes of finding useful natural resources. So, in short, wars over scarce resources are most likely when circumstances conspire to make the specific resources in view suddenly seem more valuable, or make the cost of taking them seem low. Such circumstances are most likely to arise in times of rapid and uneven population growth (or decline) and times of technological dynamism (when hitherto unvalued items suddenly become resources).

A third proposition, not prominent in the environmental security literature, is that security anxiety affects environmental change. Some researchers have shed light on the environmental effects of war itself, generally aiming to show that combat is bad for all life and land.¹⁶ It usually is, although there are some exceptions, such as the flourishing of North Atlantic fish populations during WWII while fishing fleets were stuck in port. More important than combat, however, is the business of preparing for war. This is because more states prepare for war than actually fight wars, and because war itself is usually briefer than periods of preparedness.

States have long altered environments in the interest of security. They sometimes pursued forest conservation for strategic reasons. Qing China in the 17th and 18th centuries tried to maintain a wooded blockade ('the willow pallisade') between Chinese cultivators and steppe pastoralists in Manchuria. Naval powers from the 13th century, if not before, sought to conserve forests for ship timber; Venice perhaps took this the furthest. More recently, after the shocking defeat of 1870, the French army won the power to preserve public and private forests in eastern France so as to channel any future German invasion along well-fortified corridors. (The next German invasion came via Belgium in 1914).¹⁷

States also brought on environmental change by seeking to stockpile strategic resources, whether food, rubber, oil, or soldiers. Mussolini, for example, wanted Italy to become self-sufficient in food so as to be less vulnerable to blockade of the sort he had seen weaken Germany in WWI. So he mounted the 'Battle for Wheat' encouraging Italians to clear forests and plant wheat on sloping and other marginal lands, inviting a surge of soil erosion. Crash programs of this sort proliferated in the 20th century when susceptibility to the interruption of international trade made autarky appealing, especially when war loomed. The USSR and China after 1949—for ideological as well as strategic reasons—undertook several such campaigns, of which the most famous example is the backyard steel furnaces of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), a great leap backward for Chinese forests which provided fuel for the inefficient furnaces. Such programs amounted to a form of environmental roulette, but states willingly

¹⁶E.g. Arthur P. Westing, *Warfare in A Fragile World* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1980); Westing, *Environmental Hazards of War* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990); Daniel Faber, *Environment Under Fire* (New York: Monthly review Press, 1993).

¹⁷On these examples, see Patrick Caffrey, "The Forests of Northeast China, 1600-1953: Environment, Politics, and Society" Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 2002; Karl Appuhn article; Jean-Paul Amat, "Le rôle stratégique de la forêt, 1871-1914: Exemples dans les forêts lorraines," *Revue historique des armées*, 1(1993), 62-9.

played because the ecological bills, if understood at all, fell due much later than would the political and military bills of unpreparedness.¹⁸

The most obvious connection between security anxiety and environmental change is the nuclear weapons programs organized after 1942. In the U.S. and especially in the USSR these led to the contamination of sizeable areas, to numerous health problems and premature deaths. The hair-raising risks taken, normally secretly, with their own populations show the lengths to which security anxiety during the Cold War drove both the Americans and Soviets. The plutonium buried at Hanford Engineering Works in the state of Washington, or dumped in Lake Karachay (in the southern Urals) will remain deadly for about 24,000 years, a long lien on the future. Cleaning up after the nuclear weapons programs will prove much more expensive than building the warheads and missiles in the first place, and will never be done completely.¹⁹

Less directly, states helped shape ecological change by building transport infrastructure in the name of military preparedness. New roads and railroads, aside from their immediate environmental impact, invariably change land use and human settlement patterns, especially in thinly populated areas. The Trans-Siberian railroad is a case in point. Built mainly for military reasons, it opened the gates to settlement and cultivation in the southern Siberian forest and northern steppe. It also made practical numerous mining and logging enterprises. The highways built in Brazilian Amazonia after 1960 also had strategic reasons behind them, and also led to waves of migration, settlement, forest clearance, and otherwise unimaginable mining and logging businesses. Even the U.S. interstate highway system begun in the 1950s—which strongly affected land use and settlement patterns—featured military considerations prominently among its justifications.

Lastly and least directly perhaps, states have often sought (and occasionally still seek) to maximize their supply of soldiers by various pro-natal policies. Insofar as these are successful (which is rarely far) they affected environments by raising population. Third Republic France, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Stalinist Russia all encouraged women to bear more children, with modest success. In Europe the only pro-natalist effort that produced a real surge in births was that of Ceaușescu's Rumania, which doubled its birth rate in 1966. Ceaușescu, who was interested in pursuing an independent foreign policy that carried serious risks, set a goal of 30 million Rumanians by the year 2000. He outlawed all forms of birth control and assigned the secret police the duty of making sure Rumanian women did not shirk their duty. Mao, too, thought that millions of additional Chinese would enhance the military security of China, and, with brief exceptions, resisted efforts to curtail population growth in his country.²⁰

Of course in most cases these population and transport policies had many motives behind them, of which security anxiety was only one. The point here is simply that historically, and especially in recent history, the ordinary business of preparing for war has helped drive states to actions that carried profound environmental consequences. Normally these consequences went unconsidered, but when they were not they were underestimated.

VI. Prospects

The prospects for security problems to arise from environmental changes are better than ever. That is not to say they outrank more traditional causes of conflict. They do not, nor will they any time soon.

¹⁸On the environmental aspects of the Great Leap Forward, Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 67-93.

¹⁹For details see Stephen Schwartz, ed., *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1998), ch. 6; and McNeill, *Something New Under the Sun*, 342-4 and the works cited there. The best English-language source on Soviet and Russian nuclear environmental issues is the Norwegian Bellona Foundation. Visit: www.bellona.no.

²⁰On Rumania see Jean-Claude Chesnais, *Le crépuscule de l'Occident: Démographie et politique* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995), 171-78. On Chinese population history and policy during the Mao years, see James Lee and Wang Feng, *One Quarter of Humankind: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Reality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 21-65.

But they are real enough to merit attention, and indeed now command attention in places such as the Pentagon.

The chief reason that environmental changes are more likely to play a larger role in security issues in the future than they have in the past is that ecological pressures of the sort most relevant to international competition are higher than ever before. Many of the reserves and ecological buffers—forests, unexploited fisheries, unpolluted fresh water—have been pared down. Put another way, there is less slack in the human-environment system now.

Against that is the welcome fact that the technological, and perhaps administrative, capacity to deal with environmental shocks and problems is also greater than ever before. The power of this to check conflict, however, is limited by the unwelcome fact that this capacity is so unevenly distributed around the world, and by and large is weak in places where the need for it is strongest.

Let us return to water and energy. At present some 30 or 40 countries in southwest Asia and North Africa are, by the conventional measures of hydrologists, short of water. They are also, as it happens, countries with population growth rates among the highest in the world, so that their scant water will have to be shared more widely in the years to come. Ethiopia and Sudan could make very good use of the Nile water that makes Egypt viable, and the temptations and pressures to do so will rise with growing populations. Similarly, Turkey in its quest to develop the poorer and politically disaffected southeast, could find uses for the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, the lifeblood of Syria and Iraq. Indeed the Turks have built a series of dams that give them the option of impounding the water of those rivers. In a severe drought, Ethiopia and Turkey would feel the urge to take a larger share, despite the clear threats voiced by downriver neighbors. The likelihood of frictions over these rivers is high, but the likelihood of war over those frictions is governed by other factors. That is true of all the other international river basins over which conflict might break out, among which the leading candidates are probably the Indus and the Jordan, where frictions are great for other reasons.

There are other ways in which water might affect security besides quarrels over supply. The economic strength of every society depends on (among many other things) its water. This will presumably be less true in the future, as sectoral shifts in the world economy emphasize agriculture and industry less and services more. But that process is slow and less than universal. To take only two large cases, both the U.S. and China face adjustment to looming shortages of groundwater. The cattle and wheat economy of the High Plains in the U.S. has rested in recent decades on a large aquifer called the Ogallala, which stretches from north Texas to South Dakota. Cheap energy allowed farmers to pump up Ogallala water at great rates since the 1940s, and now about half of it is gone. The aquifer recharges slowly, over thousands of years, so in effect this is water-mining. In 20 or 30 years the water will be gone, and the U.S. will have to find another source for beef and wheat—or find some more water somewhere, an idea that worries Canadians and residents of Great Lakes states.

Moving water rather than shifting patterns of production appeals to the Chinese leadership, which faces a broadly similar problem in North China. There too water is short, and agriculture and industry must either find more, grow more efficient in their use of water (there is plenty of room for that), or cut back operations. The current preferred choice is to reroute some of the water of the Yangzi to the north, a gigantic project that recalls in its towering ambition the Soviet plans to redirect some of the flow of the Siberian rivers from the Arctic to Central Asia. Whether or not the Chinese will carry through with the “Southern Waters North” scheme remains to be seen. Without it they face limits on production. With it, they need massive capital investment (that other infrastructure projects would lose) and create another source of vulnerability in the form of water pipelines, sitting targets for missiles or terrorists.

In the past, while water has motivated countless quarrels and much small-scale violence, it has yet to serve as a cause for war. It is somewhat more likely to do so in the future, but only in contexts where frictions are already high and war, should it break out, would have, as it normally does, many causes. In the meantime, water shortage will continue to constrain the economic development of dozens of countries, confine their military potential below what it otherwise might be. Climate change, should it continue on the path of the last 20 years, will exacerbate the trends in most cases by making dry regions a bit drier.

Although the economies of the rich and powerful countries of the world are growing less energy-intensive, the overall demand for energy will continue to increase and fossil fuels will for some time

remain the heart of the world's energy system. Thus the uneven match between the geography of petroleum production and the locii of oil consumption will continue to bedevil world politics for decades to come. In just which ways, of course, remains quite unpredictable, especially as the emergence of Central Asian oil and gas has begun to shift the balances. Control of these resources, and the offshore oil of the South China Sea, are plausible candidates as sources (or intensifiers) of international conflict. As natural gas slowly acquires a larger place in the world's energy mix—as it has been doing for decades and will almost surely continue to do—the geopolitics of fossil fuels will perhaps become less volatile, because gasfields are distributed much more widely around the planet than oilfields. No single country can have the power in that market that the U.S. had in the oil market early in the 20th century, and no combination of countries could easily acquire the power that OPEC had in the late 1970s.

Looking further forward, the fossil fuel energy regime will one day come to an end. Just what will replace it, when, and how, is up in the air. Some authorities think the world's oil supply will begin to grow short very soon (between 2004 and 2008), but this is a minority opinion.²¹ Nonetheless, it will happen one day and someone will take advantage of the shift in analogous ways to the deft exploitation of coal that Britain achieved 200 years ago or the quick and canny adaptation to oil that the U.S. pulled off 80 years ago. The future energy regime may or may not be as easy to turn to geopolitical advantage as those of coal and oil were, but it is sure that there will be winners and losers in the transition, and the winners will be selected from among those who pioneer the shift. On the strength of historical evidence, one should not expect the U.S. to be among the pioneers: typically beneficiaries of the old regime try to prolong it. Current American energy policy is fully consistent with this observation.

Perhaps substitutes for oil will emerge soon enough to prevent serious conflict, and (less plausibly) perhaps efficiency and conservation in water use will mitigate any potential international crises over water. Even should both these things happen, environmental considerations will impinge on international security. That is because environmental change in almost any form amounts to environmental degradation for someone, and environmental degradation leads to environmental refugees, that is, people who migrate because of deteriorating ecological circumstances at home.

The coming decades look to be another age of migration. This is true for many reasons, only one of which is environmental degradation. But in places where peasant populations are large and growing, and the material basis (soils, water, forests) for their livelihoods is wearing thin, the pressures and temptations to uproot and try to get to a richer country will intensify. Richer countries have shown wide variability in their willingness to accept migrants, an issue of some importance in rich-country politics now and surely of yet greater importance in the decades to come.

By far the most volatile relationship in this respect is that between Europe and Africa, including North Africa. Demographers expect that the world population will grow to about 9-10 billion by 2050, and that more than 95% of the growth will take place in poor countries, and that African ones will grow fastest. This means that adding the next three billion people to the global population will be a more difficult business than was adding the last increment of three billion (which happened between 1960 and 2000). A much larger share of the next three billion will be born into circumstances of greater shortage of soil, water, and forest, and will see migration as their best option. Because Europe is easily accessible from Africa, especially North Africa, because Africa will likely continue to have the highest rates of population growth, and because Africa's environment is fragile and already heavily stressed, the likelihood is strong that the greatest pressures will emerge between Africa and Europe. Sometimes location is everything.

How European countries will react is an open question, but it is likely that they will not all agree, that their capacity to enforce their (or EU) policy will be unequal, and that anti-immigrant politics will have a strong future. This implies a resurgence of European nationalisms with attendant pressures on the integrating and globalizing trends of recent decades. Almost inevitably this will add fuel to the fires of religious chauvinism, both within Europe and probably among Muslims suffering backlash effects in Europe and among their sympathizers elsewhere. Developments along these lines are likely to complicate the security picture, especially in Europe, but also in North Africa and the Middle East.

²¹K.N. Deffeyes, *Hubbert's Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

Ethnic and religious tensions deepened by currents of migration may also affect other regions, but probably less acutely. The flows from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean to the U.S. and Canada will likely not grow quickly, because population growth in the sending countries is slowing down fast. In any case, environmental refugees will not likely figure prominently in this migration.

VII. Conclusion

In the spirit of King Alfonso, this chapter sought to simplify the very complex nexus between environment and international security. It offers four main ideas, all based on historical perspectives. First, that in modern times environmental perturbation has grown to the point where it must be reckoned a serious factor in all manner of human affairs, security included. Some of this modern environmental disturbance derived from anxieties about international security, although modern patterns of energy use and population growth were probably more important. Second, that in the past such conflicts were routine if one adopts a generous definition of resources and environment, because there have been numerous wars over land, labor, and energy. But if one adopts more conventional and more restricted definitions, such wars have been rare, and in the modern world confined to struggles to secure oil. Third, that environmental perturbations and resource scarcities will likely figure more prominently in the future than they have in the past, because ecological buffers are becoming thinner with time, and that where they lead to war they are most likely to concern water and oil. Fourth, in the longer run and the larger sense, the big shifts in energy regime and population growth that are sure to come will revise this picture in fundamental ways, but ones quite impossible to envision. Just what constitutes a resource will always be changing. And just which parts of the environment are valued, which are preserved, which are transformed and on what scales—all this will be changing too. For all our scientific expertise, modeling skill, and theoretical sophistication, we remain subject to the unforeseen, the unintended consequence, the non-linear effect. In the security arena, the stakes grew much higher in the modern era, and our knowledge of how both the natural and political worlds work grew too. But we still cannot generate precise and reliable ideas about threats and risks until they are upon us. We must respect the wisdom of King Alfonso.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“CODIFICATION OF A DOCTRINE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND SOVEREIGN RESPONSIBILITY”

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International law and the system of international relations have continually evolved over the centuries towards the Omega point of universal justice and governance for all world citizens. Yet still in our supposedly enlightened age, conflicts continue and people are persecuted by their own governments. At points in this process, like the earth's geological evolution there have been cataclysmic events that have changed and reordered the system in ways unimaginable before. This phenomenon known as a bifurcation point is the most distant position from a state of relative equilibrium where there is maximum chaos in a system, but also where there is the greatest opportunity for innovation and change. It is quite possible that we are witnessing such a bifurcation point, and that its consequences will fundamentally change the nature international relations and with it international law.

One of the justifications for initiating this particular bifurcation point was the human rights argument, although superseded in the legal justification by pre-emptive self defence and weapons of mass destruction. Again we are seeing state policy makers claiming to intervene in the affairs of other states on human right grounds and doing so without UN Security Council Authorization. Is this action flouting the law or is it making the law?

The state practice of humanitarian military intervention is challenging accepted legal Principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Interventions that seek to prevent or Alleviate the suffering of populations without Security Council approval are widely held as unlawful despite their moral intent. As a result the nature of sovereignty in international relations has changed, yet the theoretical and legal debate surrounding this evolution still has to reconcile this controversial debate about interventions in certain extreme circumstances of ‘humanitarian necessity’. It is at this juncture that the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention have questionable status when faced with the choice of protecting or not protecting the fundamental human rights of citizens from gross state sanctioned systematic abuse.

There is a moral argument for forcible military intervention based on human rights grounds and if such a thing is possible perhaps there is an international legal ethic developing. Such an ethic of Sovereign Responsibility is derived from the concept that the right to sovereignty is based on due responsibility of states to protect their own citizens. It follows then that states that break this bond of sovereign responsibility toward their own citizens either through wilful intent or non compliance with respect to human rights abuses forgo this right of non-intervention.

‘The so called ‘right of humanitarian intervention’ has been one of the most controversial foreign policy issues of the last decade, both when intervention has appened, as in Kosovo and when it has failed, as in Rwanda. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his report to the 2000 Millennium Assembly, challenged the International community to try to forge consensus, once and for all, around the basic questions of the principles and process involved: when should intervention occur, under whose authority? and how? There have been some noble attempts at answering this question; however the intricacies of the legal side of the debate have been largely unaddressed. I believe it is possible to bridge the divide within the debate by arguing for the legality of this type of humanitarian intervention, by suggesting a legal framework for future interventions and articulating this legal ethic of sovereign responsibility.

My research argues that now that large scale human rights abuses have been defined as threats to peace and security, it is the moral duty of states that are able to alleviate suffering by undertaking such interventions against the apparatus of the perpetrating host governments to the end of preventing or alleviating the suffering that these governments are responsible for.

Interventions such as Kosovo have not been deemed legal yet they have been widely accepted as being morally acceptable and conducive toward a new evolving norm in customary international law. (UKFAC 2000) I am attempting to introduce into the debate the idea that such interventions can be legal in certain extreme circumstances even without Security Council authorisation, along with the notion that there is already an emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention, that justifies this right of intervention in customary international law. This right is based on accepted state practice and psychological intent of policymakers that their decision to intervene is legal, UN Security Council precedent, the evolution of human rights norms and the changing nature of sovereignty, which is now increasingly qualified by the two pillars of legitimacy in the international system: democratic governance and the protection of fundamental human rights.

There is a dichotomy in the UN Charter that seeks to maintain international peace and security while protecting the principle of sovereign equality among states this dichotomy is causing a tension in international society that cannot allow large scale human rights abuses to continue within realistic spheres of influence

The type of human rights abuse that I am articulating here is that of such severity that it 'shocks the moral conscience of mankind'. Namely the gross state sanctioned systematic abuses that deprive individuals and communities of their fundamental human rights. These human rights abuses, often termed 'crimes against humanity', are genocide, mass rape, enforced migration or ethnic cleansing, and the systematic terrorizing of entire groups or populations.

The emergence of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention that entails a duty to intervene rather than a right of intervention is based on a twofold evolution of international law. Firstly that there has been emerging state practice and opinio juris as regards military interventions undertaken forcibly against failing or irresponsible states throughout history and particularly since the end of the cold war.

Customary international law according to Article 88.1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is derived the following:

- International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states
- International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law
- The general principles of law recognized by civilised nations (all UN member states are considered civilised)
- Subsidiary means of determining rules of the law, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations.

I believe that the customary international law debate synthesised with the binding status of certain human rights legal norms holds the answers to formulating this doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Customary international law is more than mere state practice for that I can quote humanitarian interventions of:

- The British liberating slaves from slave ships of the African coast.
- The Europeans protecting Christians from slaughter in Bulgaria by the ottoman empire
- India in east Pakistan,
- Of Tanzania in Uganda the intervention of West African states in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
- The US in Somalia.
- The US in Haiti
- Australia and the UN in East Timor

- Vietnam in Cambodia
- The USA, UK and France in Northern Iraq, and to some extent the current operation there.
- And of course the 19 member states of NATO in Kosovo

One thing is certain that the answer to this question about the emergence of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention lies within a number of sources. These legal foundations include: fundamental natural law principles, the human rights provisions of the UN charter, the Universal declaration of Human rights together with the Genocide convention, the Geneva conventions and the additional protocols on international humanitarian law, the statute of the international criminal court and a number of other international human rights and human protection agreements and covenants, growing state practice and indeed the security councils own practice.

At times states have intervened primarily on human rights grounds, and this was a just and moral cause. Yet, the constraints of international law prevented these states from arguing for human rights in their legal justifications. Kosovo was the most recent of these interventions. Certain states and organisations (UK, Netherlands & NATO leaders 1999, 2000) thought the time ripe enough to argue for the case of such interventions to be legal, mindful that state practice can change the law. On the other hand intervention is often criticized as being founded in state interest and realpolitik. Codifying such a doctrine could set a dangerous precedent for states with immoral or territorial ambitions.

It is clear that with respect to humanitarian intervention state interest goes hand in hand with moral purpose, they are two sides of the same coin, and it should come as no surprise that the largest UN peacekeeping force yet deployed was in a state crucial to the stability of the world's diamond market. However if one human life is saved as a result of such interventions than that surely justifies the aim. Furthermore, human rights are now a vital security interest of western and cosmopolitan society. If our societies are legitimate because of institutionalised rights protection, then it must follow that we deligitimize ourselves by allowing these universal and fundamental human rights to be contravened within our realistic spheres of influence. So interventions of this kind are symbiotically altruistic and self interested. They merely mirror the nature of the human psyche at the macro scale and that, it seems is not so controversial.

I believe that rather than these interventions being illegal, they are in fact indicative of an emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The current debate has not yet evolved to the point where the jurisprudence of the argument can be accepted as lawful, when in fact the time that it should be so accepted is clearly overdue.

The complementary argument that certain fundamental human rights have become principles of jus cogens through the evolution of customary international law is of equal importance to this assertion.

Certain human rights are universally accepted in every society whether or not their governments have ratified the various rights conventions. There is a universalism of fundamental human rights that every individual irrespective of their particular value system can derive through a Ciceronian concept of the individual's capacity for right reason. This universalism is as much about everyone's capacity to know right from wrong as it is about governments adopting universal rights conventions into domestic law.

State acceptance and ratification of international human rights treaties provide the basis for this argument. Although the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was not intended to be a binding document, the fundamental human rights it seeks to protect, have been justified and complemented by other binding HR treaties, and the large scale ratification of many HR conventions by most states.

1948 convention against genocide

The 1984 convention against torture

The 1972 convention against apartheid.

and the international covenant on civil and political rights. etc.

This process of customary international law is indicative of the inalienability and universality of certain fundamental human rights. Thus complementing the argument that military interventions with the

intent of protecting these rights can be legal even if the current the international architecture does not yet deem it so.

So what would such doctrine entail? I will outline only a few points here.

- Interventions may only be taken with the aim of ending or preventing gross state sanctioned human rights abuses, the severity of which 'shocks the conscience of mankind'.
- They must be undertaken as a last resort and after the failure of all other alternatives put forward by the United Nations system. In the event of this failure or paralysis, it must be clear that all other alternatives would be unfeasible, and merely prolong the humanitarian crises given the particular situation.
- Interventions can be undertaken on behalf of a 'group' within a state that has broken its bond of sovereign responsibility, namely the protection of all individuals within its borders. The primary aim of the interveners must remain the alleviation or prevention of the groups suffering and the defence of their fundamental human rights.
- Interventions must be undertaken mindful of *jus in bello* principles of necessity and proportionality. And in accordance with humanitarian laws of war. Intervening parties must submit to the authority of the International Criminal Court or international tribunals for any unlawful acts committed by the parties' combatants.
- Interventions need not be taken multilaterally, although this would confer added legitimacy to the undertaking. However states acting unilaterally to alleviate or prevent suffering should be states that are democratically legitimate and have ratified the various international human rights protection systems or have fundamental human rights enshrined in domestic constitutional law. Such a basis of legitimacy shall constitute a paternal Rawlsian authority to act in these extreme situations.
- Intervening states must remain responsible in accordance with current international law for providing humanitarian relief and aid. Furthermore for post intervention societal reconstruction in the host state. Democratic systems of governance, independent judiciaries, and the enforcement of universal human rights values within the host state's domestic law must remain the primary purpose and responsibility of the post intervention reconstruction state or organisation.
- Although such a doctrine would be a general guideline, each case of intervention must have its merits assessed on an individual basis.
- Intervening parties must seek the retrospective opinion of the international Court of Justice or a Security Council resolution after the intervention and prove that initiating the intervention was a lawful act.
- Intervening parties must submit to the authority of the UN Security Council and in exception to the General Assembly under the auspices of the 'Uniting for Peace resolution' if these bodies uniformly call upon the parties to desist from operations.

In the inevitable interdisciplinary spirit of this venture I put the case forward for the 'cosmopolitan humanitarianism' theory. While addressing the problems of contemporary international law and society, my research will seek to prove that gross state sanctioned human rights abuses perpetrated by a state against its own citizens can no longer be allowed to occur within a realistic sphere of influence of those states with the power and will to act to prevent or to alleviate. Cosmopolitan theory argues for the primacy and protection of the individual citizen within international society. (Kant 1794, Held, 2002, Kaldor, 2003, Linklater, 2002) Furthermore that the protection and furtherance of the sovereign individual is the end and not the means of international society. There is no clash of civilisations but rather a clash of value systems. The world is divided into states that derive their authority through the democratic consent of the sovereign individual while protecting the individual's fundamental human rights, and those that do not. These cosmopolitan states form the core group of an international society

that is actively remaking the new world in a manner that is highlighting the shortcomings of international law.

They lead the argument in articulating universalism and more importantly they deploy military force to alleviate the suffering of individuals within other states or communities abroad. (Greenwood QC 2000, Lord Hurd 2000, Robertson QC 2002, Blair 1999) It is this willingness to enforce these universal values that has catapulted the international law and human security debate beyond that of refugee flows or regional stability, to a very fundamental question: What is the purpose of sovereignty? This radical cosmopolitan analysis together with a synthesis of Grotian just war theory (Vincent 1986, Roberts 1993) and elements of the new military humanism debate (Wheeler & Dunne 2001) will complement the case put.

Cosmopolitan society's legitimacy and moral standing is at risk if it does not intervene to protect the universal human rights values that are central to its identity, irrespective of in what state this abuse occurs. We must ask at what price must a state exercise its right to non intervention and territorial integrity? Cosmopolitan orientated states are increasingly undertaking military interventions in defence of these universal human rights values and norms, sometimes at the expense of transgressing international law. (Kosovo, 1999) We must seek to discern ways to adapt the law to legitimize such exceptional actions or risk facing a choice between maintaining the Bretton Woods international architecture or saving the lives of the persecuted by committing illegal interventions.

Cosmopolitan humanitarianism then is the duty of able democracies to undertake forcible military interventions to protect and promote universal human rights values, even if this means transgressing accepted principles in international law in certain extreme circumstances of humanitarian necessity.

This argument then seeks to establish the legality of interventions of the cosmopolitan humanitarian nature and suggest recommendations for a future framework of intervention because the law in this instance clearly is failing us and as a result clearly must change.

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NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“SEVEN EMPIRES IN SEARCH OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE”

- **Tom Spencer** – Visiting Professor of Global Governance, University of Surrey

Ladies and Gentlemen

May I start by paying tribute to Professor Andy Strauss for his enthusiasm, energy and unfailing faith that federalist principles are a better way of organising the species than our current global jungle. May I apologise to him “in absentia” for the cyber- disjunct across the Atlantic, which has meant that he cannot be here for this lecture which he inspired.

It is my belief that better global governance is eminently achievable. The major problems we face are political, and the prime problem is “What to do about America?” It is difficult to construct a functioning global system if the biggest player thinks that global governance is a zero sum game, the increase of which means a decrease in American power. September 11th has intensified the influence of the “hegemon uni-polar” camp in Washington, at the expense of the multilateralist “uni-multipolar” camp”.

In 1918, President Woodrow-Wilson announced that the “age of empires” had ended and the “age of nations” had arrived. I want to argue that we have now passed beyond the “age of nations”, but that the age of “global governance” has not arrived. The best hope for sanity in the next hundred years is the establishment of a system of civilised interaction of intermediate groupings, that I will mischievously call “empires”. I am using the definition deployed by Professor Deepak Lal of UCLA in his Henry Wendt Lecture on 30th October 2002 entitled “In Defence of Empires”. He defines empires as “multi ethnic conglomerates held together by trans national organisational and cultural ties”. Using this definition I will argue that American power is best exercised as an “empire” interacting with five or six others. In particular I believe that Americans underestimate the degree of European unification, its ultimate destination, and the fact that it functions as a modern day empire, albeit without an emperor.

The phrase empire is now fashionably tossed around in Washington, but generally with reference only to Rome. Professor Lal gives us an altogether wider perspective. He identifies two versions of empire. Firstly a group of “multi-cultural empires”. Amongst these he identifies the Abbasid, the Ottoman, the Hapsburg, the British and various Indian Empires. His second category consists of what he describes as “homogenising” empires, designed to change “habits of the heart”. In this he includes the Chinese and Soviet empires and the American empire, if you get it wrong! Let me explore the validity of this model by comparing the European Union as empire with the United States as empire.

The roots of the European Union lie in the trauma of two European civil wars in the twentieth century, which European thinkers ascribed to the failure of the nation state system in a crowded continent. They set out to deliberately share sovereignty under a system of supra-national law. The institutions which have resulted - the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament - form a triangle, held in creative tension by the interaction of the institutions and overseen by the European Court of Justice. The Convention on the Future of Europe is currently meeting to turn the ad hoc evolution of these institutions into a comprehensible constitution, that will incorporate within its framework defence, foreign policy, justice and home affairs. These three policies have been left until the late stage of European unification exactly because they touch most powerfully on questions of national sovereignty. We Europeans are currently struggling with this process in the certain knowledge that ten further nations will join the Union in 2004, and that up to a further dozen may complete the geographical unity of the continent by 2014. While the original impetus for unification was the desire to avoid further wars between Europeans, European public opinion now supports the European Union primarily as a way of defending Europe’s interests in the wider world. Not surprisingly such ambitions occasionally bring Europeans into conflict with a Washington which has for fifty years seen greater

unity in Europe as a desirable building block in holding back Communism and opening the markets to capitalist competition.

Europe certainly meets Deepak Lal's model of a multi ethnic conglomerate held together by multi cultural ties. Its roots indeed lie in Rome and its system of law, but also in Rome's successors such as Charlemagne's Empire and the Holy Roman Empire with its loose organisation and system of Electors, choosing amongst themselves an emperor. It also owes more than it probably realises to the Hapsburg Empire. Indeed we discover with every passing day why South Eastern Europe can only find peace under some multi ethnic imperial structure. As with the Indian Empires and Byzantium, Europe is about power, diversity and the management of complexity, backed up by an often-undeclared remaining fear of internal civil war. Like the British Empire, and one could argue the American Empire, it started from commercial inspiration and geo-political concern, and only subsequently acquired the institutions and symbols of an empire. The component nations of the European Union bring their own experience of empire, be it Dutch, Portuguese or Belgian, to the common European enterprise. Such experience has left them all with global expertise, a global memory and the habit of making extended networks work.

Harold Macmillan was fond of saying that Britain was playing Greece to America's Rome. The implication being that a sophisticated and intellectual, if failed, empire, could play a god-fatherly role towards a youthful, vigorous new Rome. The parallel is fatally flawed. America, whatever the pretensions of its imperial buildings in Washington, is different from Rome. A European Union of twenty five states, forming the largest consumer market in the world, is not equivalent to the ruined Greek city states which the Roman Empire absorbed.

What then should we say of the current aspirations of certain Americans to see the United States as a global empire? I have spent substantial time working in Washington and I am an enthusiastic admirer both of the city and of the brilliant institutions of American governance. However such governance was not designed for the exercise of external imperial power. Its system of checks and balances militates against coherent and sustained focus on global issues. If we review the exercise of American military and diplomatic power beyond its shores in the twentieth century, its prime characteristic is the alternation between engagement and disengagement. Americans have often wanted both global power and global affection, preferably without paying a price in blood or treasure. Such a yearning could fit the definition applied to the British press barons of the 1920s as "wanting power without responsibility, the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages". It is misleading for Americans to look only at the current military "full spectrum" dominance afforded by their spending on technology and defence. "Imperial overstretch" is an unfashionable concept in Washington at this moment, but the current weakness of the dollar and problems of the US economy are reminders that there is no such thing as a goldilocks empire any more than there could be a sustainable goldilocks economy in the 1990s. America is not Rome for other and more fundamental reasons. I do not believe that Americans will ever abandon their system of democracy, with its four yearly threat of retribution for executive hubris. I hope I am also justified in believing that the strong American attachment to individual liberty will never fall victim to a countervailing authoritarianism, even one justified by the need to defend the state from external threat.

All this is brought into sharper focus by the thinking which underpins many of those at the top of the current Administration. They share a sense of "manifest destiny". They exult in the doctrine and history of "US exceptionalism". In Bob Kagan's analysis they glory in the Hobbesian independence of a powerful state entitled to exercise the prerogatives to which it feels entitled. They despise the multi lateralist, treaty-entangled world view of the Europeans as the weapon of the weak. They reach easily for Rome as a metaphor for global omnipotence. They should look more closely at their history. Rome was never global. It did not conquer the Persian Empire, subdue India or even make much contact with distant China. Rome was not one entity, it was an evolving story which transmuted itself into the Byzantine Empire which conducted a thousand year dance with Islam and the East. Above all Rome was based on "civus romanus sum". A sense of law and of equality before that law. In a sense, America as melting pot has learned this lesson internally, but appears unable to draw conclusions from it internationally.

What can this extended exercise in metaphor teach us about coherent progress towards a stable system for governing the whole species. A species which faces the universal challenges of a degrading

environment, human rights abuse, international crime syndicates and terrorism, which are the symptoms of our joint political failure.

In my view, for Americans “patriotism is not enough”. At the very least Americans should honour their shared roots in Toynbee’s judeo-christian civilisation and return to thinking of Europe as a partner, a sibling and for many purposes as the “third coast” of a common system. They might usefully stop thinking in Manichean terms that search constantly for an enemy against which to define themselves. Such a quest offers only two candidates – Europe and China. Neither is best dealt with by imperial hauteur. I welcome the Bush Administration’s concentration on “big powers” – China, India, Russia. What seems to me to be missing is a mind map capable of taking a sustained overview of the next hundred years. Deepak Lal points out rightly how much we should now regret the easy demolition of the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires in the name of nationalism. How much easier life would now be if we were dealing with a single coherent entity in the “Greater Middle East”. A successor state to the Ottomans that could frame the aspirations of Islam and the Arab world, rather than feed the fury of a thousand Arab streets inflamed by the apocalyptic vision of a bin Laden. Al Qaida believes that Islam can only recreate itself after mortal damage has been done to its rival civilisations. I am not a believer in Samuel Huntingdon’s Clash of Civilisations, not least because he gets his definition of civilisations wrong. I do believe that we need a conscious order in the relationship between the power clusters of the planet, as we face up to the paradigm shift from industrial to knowledge based civilisation.

My Cherokee friends have taught me not to despise the symbolism of the natural world. As I polished these few thoughts and sought for an image of what American leadership might look like in the world which we now all inhabit, I took refuge from your smoke free building with a cigarette in the December light of Delaware. As I finished my cigarette, seven geese flew south above me. There was a gap between the lead goose and the other six, but between them they formed an elegant and efficient unit. Perhaps that is a model to which the best brains of America, Europe, China, India, Russia, Japan and the Arab world might turn their attentions.

December 2nd 2002, Speech delivered Widener University, Delaware

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“AFTER IRAQ: CHANGE, CHOICE & PARADOX”

(extract from article Journal of Public Affairs, 28th April 2003)

- **Tom Spencer** – Executive Director, European Centre for Public Affairs

I am in the imperial capital to address the Spring Board of Directors Meeting of the Public Affairs Council on the subject “Understanding the European Union: Politics, Process and Public Affairs”. This would be a challenge in any year. It is made more complex by my suffering from what we doctors call “Azores Syndrome”. A condition which I suspect I share with most Anglo-American multi-national companies. The symptoms are all too clear. On mainland Europe I am regarded as a dangerous Anglo-Saxon trampling on a thousand years of continental sensitivities. In Britain, I am regarded as a dangerous European Federalist, unreceptive to the latest version of euro-sceptic gloom about the future of the European idea. Meanwhile in America, I am regarded as another whinging European going on about complexity, consequences and global cooperation. My specialists advise me that this is only a passing condition and that global reality will reassert itself in due course. They point out that the world is suffering co-lateral disorientation as a result of SARS (Severe American Reaction Syndrome). They advise public affairs practitioners to put aside the now clichéd analysis of Robert Kagan and to adopt instead the thoughts of Professor Jack Snyder of Columbia University “America today embodies a paradox of omnipotence and vulnerability. The US military budget is greater than those of the next fourteen countries combined and the American economy is larger than the next three combined. Yet Americans going about their daily lives face a greater risk of sudden death from terrorist attack than ever before. This situation has fostered a psychology of vulnerability that makes Americans hyper-alert to foreign dangers and predisposed to use military power in what may be self-defeating attempts to escape their fears”.

The optimal relationship between business and governments is the area of most bewildering change since it goes to the heart of public affairs. Twenty years ago business was merely expected to pay for governments and keep quiet. Then business was expected to teach government, and indeed in the mind of some zealots to replace government and to run globalisation. No sooner had senior management settled into believing the rhetoric of this god-like vision, than they were censored by government for voting themselves financial immunity from consequences of their actions in privatising the super-profits of societal change for management rather than for shareholders or stakeholders. In what seems the mere twinkling of an eye, globalisation was declared the instrument of an American empire with the management class as its global civil service. Now we have reached the point post-Iraq where elected politicians have made such a mess of the international system that business is once again being invited to repair the damage and to be creative in institution building across the Atlantic. The one constant in this roller coaster of political ideology is the importance of ideas. Ideas are the ultimate public affairs weapon. Perhaps we should pay more attention to who funds and directs the think tanks in which these ideas are cooked?

The invasion of Iraq was not some random act of filial revenge. It followed the logic of a long-planned re-writing of American foreign policy by US defence companies. The Anglo-Saxon’s – American, British and Australian – removed Saddam Hussein without a UN mandate, in the face of unprecedented opposition from global public opinion. As I write this it is not clear whether weapons of mass destruction will be found; how long the occupation of Iraq will continue; or what the regional consequence will be. In one sense it does not matter what these outcomes are, because a good part of the tension of the last six months has been about America rather than about Iraq. The Bush Administration ignored all the elegant academic warnings about “the dangers of a foreign policy that combines unilateralism, arrogance and parochialism... leading throughout history to coalitions of countries to balance dominant powers” (Joseph S Nye, Jnr “The Paradox of American Power”). Regardless of French, German or Russian commercial interests in Iraq, the driving force for their opposition to Washington, at both elite and popular level, was a good old balance of power theory. We are assured that the aggressive use of US power has created a “New Reality”. At the very least we are in what a wise French colleague of mine describes as “a revolutionary moment”, when many of the assumptions governing the post-1945 world have been torn up or at least offered up for re-examination.

This then is a moment for choices. Things may never be the same, but neither are they ‘changed utterly’. The first set of choices are for President Bush. With open warfare inside his Administration, we could do with some “embedded” journalists inside the State Department and The Pentagon. In retrospect, Washington has been like a scene from one of those disaster movies, fashionable before September 11th, where the good guys and the bad guys struggle for control of a runaway bus that may explode at any moment. Those who know the White House claim that the President’s style is to choose between two vigorously expressed alternative viewpoints. Having gone this far with the “Texas Nexus” – conservative, unilateralist heirs to the Tidewater South military tradition of both foreign adventure and protectionism, does he continue down the path? He might like to look hard at the poll which showed that European public opinion was not solidly anti-American or even anti-war, but it was and remains overwhelmingly anti-Bush. He should not take this personally. Courtesy of Rumsfeld one-liners, the President has come to symbolise to much of Europe, Britain included, all the most negative aspects of the American bully image. It is paradoxically in a direct line of descent from the 1940’s jibe about Americans being “over-paid, over-sexed and over here”. Lack of gratitude for liberation is not new! However, he can use his undoubted charm to reverse these stereotypes if he decides that six months of hard power can now be followed by a reversion to soft power. After all, this is the Presidential candidate who said “If we are an arrogant nation, they’ll view us that way, but if we’re a humble nation, they’ll respect us”.

There are choices for other Americans that cannot long be delayed. Will Congress reassert itself against a President who has “elevated the office, but alienated most of the world”? Will the Democrat Party decide on a coherent response and on a candidate capable of explaining him or herself clearly? Can the US budget and the dollar take the strain with tax cuts and giveaways due in election year? How will the “civilian” US corporations suffering collateral damage assert themselves, especially if the US rejection of multilateralism spreads to the openness of world trade on which their prosperity has rested for two generations? All the “received wisdom” arguments, from needing UN cover to validate any discovery of weapons of mass destruction, to needing freely-given global support in fighting terrorism, point towards a return to some form of “aggressive multilateralism”. The full majesty of a US election year is going to seem more than usually relevant to the rest of us, as we wait to see how US power is to be deployed.

In the 1950s the mandarins of British foreign policy are supposed to have decreed that British success depended on avoiding choosing between Europe and America. Given the underlying importance of the struggle between the US dollar and the Euro, it is difficult to see how such choices can be avoided for much longer. A neighbour of mine in the North Georgia woods seeks to express his support for the British by comparing us to his faithful hunting dog! Better than a poodle perhaps, but not a destiny that the million-plus protestors in Hyde Park would have welcomed. Choices are the order of the day for civil society organisers both in Britain and around the world. How useful is it to put millions of demonstrators into impeccably well-behaved events if they are then ignored by the target governments. On the model of North Korean responses to Iraq, we might expect some return to the violence of globalisation demonstrations, if peaceful cross-party protest yields no response.

The most serious choices however confront the twenty-five European nations now locked simultaneously into enlarging, re-writing their constitution and tackling the most sovereignty-sensitive issues of defence and foreign policy. This is the moment when the usual chorus of Euro-sceptics giggles and announces that the game is up. Europe they claim will fail and fall back into the free trade area it should always have been. But, all the historical evidence is that when the stakes are raised this high, the Union makes real if surprising progress. This after all is the first year in which the blue and the gold stars have appeared sewn on the lapels of European troops deployed in Macedonia. Perhaps the crowning paradox of these strange times is that the law of unintended consequences is in full operation. The US-led attack on Iraq united European public opinion in a way that no speech or grassroots public affairs campaign could ever have done. Just as Bin Laden’s outrages drove the Union to make major progress on the integration of Justice and Home Affairs, so will the “shock and awe” US diplomacy of recent months goad the Union into the next steps towards a European Defence and Security Policy. Forget old Europe and new Europe. By the end of 2004, there will only be Europe – perverse, proud and politely determined to run its own show.

28th April 2003, Washington DC

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“A DIVIDED EUROPE WILL BE EASY FOR AMERICA TO RULE”

- Philip Stephens – Financial Times

Among the most important geopolitical shifts of the past two years has been the US administration's judgment that its interest now lies in dividing rather than uniting Europe. Among the most depressing has been the way European governments have colluded in the fracturing of the continent. Washington's segregation of erstwhile allies into friends and enemies is intended as a blunt assertion of American primacy. In the long term the strategy will prove to be corrosive of US power. In the short term it has worked. Europe is in disarray.

With the benefit of hindsight, it was obvious well before the Iraq war that George W. Bush was set on abandoning the postwar policy of promoting European unity. The calculated snub to Nato immediately after September 11 2001 was an early harbinger. The new either/or approach to foreign policy was briefly obscured by Mr Bush's detour at the United Nations. But even as the president paid lip service to the old multilateralism, the sheriff-and-posse model of selective alliances was hardening into strategic doctrine.

The new organising principle of US foreign policy is to assemble coalitions of the willing and of the coerced behind the projection of American power. It is laid out explicitly in Mr Bush's national security strategy. Seen from Washington, a cohesive Europe is one tempted to answer back. A divided one cannot challenge US power.

Distracted by a largely sterile debate about multipolar and unipolar worlds, Europeans have not properly understood the consequences. Iraq is still seen by many as the exception rather than the rule. Wounds can be salved, friendships rebuilt and the transatlantic alliance put back together again. That is a bad misreading of US intentions. The past is not recoverable.

By an accident of history, the enlargement of Nato and the European Union has made the US task that much easier. The former Soviet satellite states were always going to be more malleable than the bigger players of Old Europe. Washington calls it payback time.

We can see the US strategy in action in the punishments meted out to those who opposed the Iraq war. Friends are feted in the White House. Enemies - and, startlingly, these include Mexico and Chile as well as Germany and France - are frozen out. Each is ranked and the punitive response precisely calibrated.

Condoleezza Rice, the president's national security adviser, keeps the score. France is to be punished, Germany shunned and Russia brought back into the fold. When a middle-ranking US official recently travelled to Europe to press for the lifting of UN sanctions on Iraq he stopped off in Moscow and Berlin. But his instructions barred a visit to Paris. Persuading the French was left to the British. It gets worse. Colin Powell can visit Berlin but Mr Bush still refuses to take a telephone call from Gerhard Schröder. Think about that last one: Iraq is in chaos, al-Qaeda has launched new attacks and the US president has not spoken to the leader of Europe's largest nation since November.

Tony Blair's answer to all this has been that the bridges must be rebuilt. The prime minister has urged Mr Bush to thaw the relationship with Germany. He has pressed France to return to the Atlanticist fold. And he was humiliated in Moscow in his efforts to persuade Vladimir Putin to make his peace with Mr Bush.

On one level, Mr Blair is tapping into the instincts of the European foreign policy establishment. A recurrent theme of last weekend's gathering of British and German policymakers at the annual Konigswinter conference was a reluctance to walk away from 50 years of Atlanticism. Even France

seems anxious to de-escalate. Jacques Chirac is backing a new Security Council resolution on Iraq in spite of the fact that the text makes a mockery of US promises of a vital UN role.

Yet what struck me at Konigswinter was the countervailing undercurrent. Maybe, the private conversations said, the world has changed irrevocably. Maybe Europe should recognise that the past has been lost. The end of the cold war robbed the transatlantic alliance of an essential glue. America's transition from a status quo power to a revolutionary one has cut the threads of common understanding.

Up to now, the counter-argument has been that, whatever the periodic ups and downs, the relationship is sustained by its shared values. The mutual interest in things such as democracy, freedom and liberal capitalism will always count for more than any particular disagreement.

That is changing. Mr Bush's strategic doctrine has prompted Europeans to question the old assumptions. The international rule of law, concern for the global environment, multilateral rules and the universal application of human rights are all on Europe's list of values. None tops the charts in the White House. Aggressive US power is anathema to a continent deeply scarred by a history of nationalism. Preventative war is an alien concept. As for the superiority of the US economic model, well, think of Enron.

I am not sure what sort of world emerges from all this. Optimists say the mood will pass. Mr Bush will shed his extraordinary talent for turning friends into enemies. The US will rediscover the worth of "soft" alongside military power. Europe will see that the alliance can still be bound together by mutual interests.

But the old settlement cannot be remade. All sides of the present argument in Europe need to understand this. Nor will anything be gained from framing a new debate in terms of Mr Blair's unipolar versus Mr Chirac's multipolar worlds. The first speaks too much to the notion of British subservience to Washington, the second to the French instinct for rivalry at every turn.

Mr Blair is mistaken in seeking to reclaim the old alliance from the cold war era. So too is Mr Chirac in believing that the continent's interests are those of Charles de Gaulle. What Europe does need to do is to coolly reassess its strategic interests and to write its own security doctrine: not in opposition to the US but independently of it. Europe has thus far allowed Washington to frame the terms of its own internal debates. It should start thinking for itself.

May 23rd 2003, Financial Times, London

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“MIGHT VS. RIGHT IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER”

- **Andrew Strauss** – Professor of International Law at Widener University School of Law, Delaware

The Bush administration's neo-conservatives are capitalizing on military victory in Iraq to market American unilateralism as the new organizing principle of international relations. They talk triumphantly of the “salutary” effects of the war on the political situation in Syria and the Korean Peninsula. And they boast of the irrelevance of multilateralism as a philosophy and of the United Nations as an institution. Ultimately, they promise safety and security. It is a false promise.

The ideological battle they are waging to further American unilateralism over “old Europe” multilateralism is in many ways a modern replay of the classic conflict between might and right. The world's peoples and their leaders will not comply with the Bush administration's security demands because they believe in the righteousness of American domination. Rather, a world order based on America's military determination to act unilaterally will be secured by the barrel of a very large gun. In contrast, when the United Nations Security Council promulgates a resolution, its power mostly draws from voluntary international support for a still deeply flawed but evolving multilateral system of rules.

In promoting his vision of national might over international right President Bush at West Point last year spoke in terms of ending “armed conflict in our world”. In addition to his now well-known unilateral doctrine of preemptive war, he explained, “America has, and intends to keep, military strength beyond challenge thereby making the destabilizing arms race of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”

Is this possible? Can America bully the world into security? Surely, at least in the short term President Bush's approach has dramatically raised global tensions generally and anti-Americanism specifically. The days after September 11th when *Le Monde* declared, “We are all Americans,” seem like a distant memory. But, perhaps President Bush believes darkly with Machiavelli that it is better to be feared than loved. If so, he is wrong, not only morally, but functionally. The continued American stifling of a legitimate system of global right will exacerbate, not end, armed conflict.

If the Bush administration's disregard for multilateral institutions and constraints succeed in making them “irrelevant,” their irrelevancy won't just unfetter the United States. Other countries will almost certainly emulate the super power and use military force against their less powerful neighbors. India has already spoken of following the American pre-emptive war example in its dealing with Pakistan. In terms of terrorism, the Bush approach will not unnerve those who have made it abundantly clear they are willing to die “martyrs” deaths in gross acts of terrorism, and it stokes, rather than dampens, their fires of hatred. Finally, rather than accepting an American *imperium*, not only Russia and China, but even close allies such as Germany and France now talk about diplomatically or militarily checking the United States. If this serves to replicate the aggressive balance of power politics of the last century, but with new and proliferating weapons of mass destruction, even that century's unprecedented horror could be surpassed.

Of course President Bush is correct that the international system of right is not yet up to the job of securing a safe future. Before his election though it was making significant strides in that direction. During the 1990's beginning with the first Gulf War, though the road was often bumpy, the Security Council racked up considerable successes in places such as Cambodia, Haiti and East Timor. That decade also saw the birth of the World Trade Organization with its truly effective mechanism for resolving billions of dollars in trade disputes between nations, the considerable deepening of the European Union, the coming into force of the Law of the Sea Treaty, the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Agreement for a permanent International Criminal Court. If

the Bush administration was leading rather than undermining the development of this system, comprehensive global security goals could be achieved.

A system of American unilateral might over international legal right makes us all far less safe. And ultimately it betrays the very wisdom and democratic spirit of America's own deepest constitutional values which entrust governance to a system of laws and not of men.

June 1st 2003, Wilmington, USA

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

“TOWARDS AN INTEGRAL ANALYSIS OF THE IRAQ CRISIS”

- Gregory Wilpert

The cognitive dimension of integral means, among other things, examining an issue from as many perspectives as possible (all quadrants/all levels, AQAL, in Wilber's terms) and then integrating these perspectives into a more or less coherent whole, so as to form a more integral (and aperspectival, as Gebser says) analysis and course of action.

Using the AQAL map as a guideline, we can examine the different perspectives on the Iraq conflict, as they relate to the quadrants and the levels of arguments (meaning-making). To simplify things a bit, I will divide the perspectives on Iraq into two large categories: pro-war and anti-war. Perhaps this is not the best way to go about this because it reinforces a dichotomization of perspectives. However, my hope is that at the end of the analysis, we will be able to dissolve the dichotomy.

While examining each perspective, I will try to also pay attention to the level and quadrant perspective of reasoning/meaning-making employed. Based on this analysis, I will then venture some recommendations that integrally informed advocates or policy makers could push for.

Perspectives on the War against Iraq

Pro-war arguments:

1. Based on the premise that Hussein has and will use WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) for illegitimate reasons, Hussein is threat to:
 - a. neighboring states – While Hussein has attacked neighboring states and his own population, no neighboring country seems to be concerned about the danger that Iraq poses (not even Israel, since it has a very credible deterrent, in the form of its own fairly large arsenal of WMD). One could classify this reasoning as “green,”³³ assuming it is sincere, in that the motivation is to protect weaker or marginal parties in a potential conflict. One could also classify it as “orange,” in so far as it rests on international law, which might require the international community to protect the rights of aggrieved nations. Finally, the argument could (but hardly is) be “blue,” if we were talking about protecting a population that has a similar ethnic background (i.e., European) as the nation(s) interested in engaging in protective activity. One could perhaps say that the U.S.’ interest in protecting Israel is of this order.
 - b. his own population – This threat seems very real, given the repression Hussein's regime practices. But the West's concern rings somewhat hollow if one considers that Hussein gassed the Kurds with the knowledge and tacit support of the West (which largely supplied the chemicals) and that his repressive practices against his own population did not become an issue until his invasion of Kuwait three years later (up until which point U.S.-Iraqi relations were quite chummy). But even immediately following the Gulf war, Hussein launched a serious campaign against his Shiite population, which the West could have prevented, but permitted. In any case, for many in the pro-war camp, this is no doubt a sincere argument for getting rid of Hussein and should thus be taken seriously. As for the type of reasoning, it could be

³³ I will be using Spiral Dynamics and Wilber's quadrant terminology, simply as a shorthand for different developmental levels and perspectives. For an explanation of the quadrant terminology, see: <http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/books/kosmos/excerptA/part1.cfm> For an explanation of the Spiral Dynamics level terminology, see: <http://members.ams.chello.nl/f.visser3/wilber/beck2.html>

considered “green” in that it represents the defense of a marginalized people. It has recently also been called “humanitarian intervention.”

- c. the “West” (terror attacks on the U.S., for example) – Often mentioned in this context is Hussein’s supposed connection with Al Qaeda. However, as many analysts have pointed out, such a connection probably does not exist, mainly because Al Qaeda considers Hussein an enemy of Islam. Hussein might be interested in terrorist attacks of his own on western targets. While no actual terrorist attacks have yet to be linked to Hussein, it is not too far-fetched to believe that he would have the motivation to launch attacks against western countries, if he had the capability. One could thus say that the concern is one of self-defense, which is a right, according to international law. Attacking Iraq on this basis is being called “pre-emptive self-defense,” which has a basis in international law. However, “pre-emptive self-defense” applies only to an immediate danger, such as when bombers are already in the air and have not yet dropped any bombs. Rather, this is a case of “preventive war,” since there is no clear and present danger to the U.S., and this does not have a basis in international law. Still, one could classify this reasoning as “orange,” in the sense that it involves the calculated pursuit or defense of self-interest.
- d. regional stability – This would be another plausible concern, were it not for the problem that a war against Iraq could cause as much instability as Hussein currently does to the region. The concern for stability can be considered a typical “orange” or “green” type of concern, depending on why instability is considered a problem. If it’s because it is harming certain interests (such as economic profit-making), one could say that it is orange. If it harms an interest in maintaining stability for its own sake, as a systems concern, then it could be considered “green.”

Overall, the perspectives/arguments presented in #1a-c reflect a focus on the upper quadrants, in that they focus either on Hussein’s behavior (UR³⁴ - threatening behavior) or his intentions (UL – psychopathic and power-hungry dictator). Only #1d (regional stability) brings in systemic (LR) issues.

2. Democratization of the region – That is, the defeat of Hussein would allow the creation of a democratic Iraq, which would set a positive example for the region and perhaps lead to more democracy in the Middle East. Insofar as this perspective reflects an interest in promoting the political development of the countries in the region, it should be a concern of any integral approach (the Basic Moral Intuition). So, one could consider this argumentation yellow, but one has to beware that its implementation is not poisoned by “blue” western values, in the sense of imposing a “western democracy” on countries, or “orange” self-interest disguised as altruism (green would generally dismiss this argument, seeing “democratization” as an imposition of western values per se). In terms of the quadrants, this argument reflects a LR perspective, in the sense that it is interested in setting up democratic institutions. A more integral approach, however, would also pay attention to the LL and the need to promote a democratic political culture. Of course, the big question is whether democratic culture and institutions can actually best be promoted via an invasion and subsequently western style democratic institutions. While there have been some limited historical precedents (the most important that Bush policy officials have mentioned is post-WWII Japan), it is very doubtful whether this will happen in Iraq, given its ethnic diversity, its mostly pre-orange cultural development, and the interests of other countries in the region, which do not want to see currently marginalized (but majority) ethnic groups strengthened. A recent March 14 article in the *Los Angeles Times* uncovered a confidential State Department analysis, which flatly contradicts Bush’s claim that the region could be democratized through U.S. force.³⁵
3. Legitimate concern over strategic and essential resources (oil) – this is perhaps the least openly articulated concern, but, if one is to believe the strategy papers that Bush appointees have written,³⁶ this is perhaps one of the most important Bush administration concerns

³⁴ UR, UL, LL, LR are abbreviations that refer to the four quadrants Upper Right (exterior individual), Upper Left (interior individual), Lower Left (interior collective), and Lower Right (exterior collective).

³⁵ See: <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0314-06.htm> - reprinted in CommonDreams, since the LA Times charges for its articles.

³⁶ see Project for a New American Century www.newamericancentury.org

regarding the Middle East. Just because it has only rarely been publicly articulated, does not mean that it is not a valid concern. However, it is taboo to openly articulate such a blatant self-interest – one which has no basis in international law, on top of it all. Most public expressions of this argument focus on guaranteeing U.S. might and the protection of unnamed U.S. interests and values. But what are U.S. interests in the Middle East? There is little doubt that it is oil – and not just Iraq’s, but OPEC’s in general. High-level government analyses have been leaked that argue that Iraq is merely going to help the U.S. break Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s most powerful member and the origin of nearly all of the 9/11 terrorists. This perspective is embedded in an orange level type of concern (as long as it is rationally legitimated, otherwise it could be blue or red, depending on the reasoning) that focuses on the LR, the supply of a material resource.

Anti-war arguments:

1. A war without UN authorization violates international law (and without an authorization from the U.S. Congress it would violate the U.S. constitution). This is a fairly straight-forward “orange” argument that urges strict adherence to the rule of (rational/orange, not traditional/blue) law. In terms of the quadrants, the emphasis on legal norms belongs to the legal-rational culture, as Weber would say, thus the LL.
2. The U.S. is pursuing illegitimate imperial interests. This perspective looks at pro-war arguments 1 & 2 above and doubts their sincerity. Instead, it focuses on #3, saying that the pursuit of national interests goes far beyond the legitimate and are much darker than Bush’s policy experts let on.

Sidebar: Clearly, this is the type of argument that the left typically focuses on and, as such, it is also the type of argument championed by critical theory – that is, it represents what some have called (Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur) a “hermeneutics of suspicion.” The founders of this hermeneutics are (according to Habermas & Ricoeur) Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche. While there is little integral about their approaches (except Nietzsche, perhaps), integral theory ought to include the hermeneutics of suspicion. The hermeneutics of suspicion usually is un-integral because it tends to privilege a particular quadrant and level over all others, as Wilber has argued in several of his works (for Freud the sexual/physical - UL and beige to red; for Marx the economic - LR and orange; and for Nietzsche it is power – which could be given an integral interpretation, since power is very diffuse and can have roots in any quadrant and level). What integral-critical theorists thus ought to figure out is an integral hermeneutics of suspicion, which does not reduce everything to one quadrant/level, but which figures out what Q/L it is appropriate to trace truth claims to in given circumstances.

The existing (un-integral) hermeneutics of suspicion (anti-war perspective #2) comes in three basic variants. Most public pronouncements of this perspective, especially from the old left (which tends towards the “orange” and LR) and the new left (tends towards the “green” and LL) focus on the Marxist hermeneutics of suspicion: reduction of motives to economic (LR orange) or Anglo-European cultural interests (LL green). These boil down to a critique of U.S. efforts to establish:

- a. World economic hegemony – Clearly a LR perspective, which comes in two variants:
 - i. The pursuit of energy and oil-related profits. In other words, it reduces the war on Iraq to a “blood for oil” deal, whereby the U.S. is seen to pursue a secure and continuous supply of oil and of profits. This is essentially a critique of pro-war perspective #3, saying that the interest in maintaining a profitable oil supply is illegitimate for several reasons. First, it is illegitimate to wage war in the name of material gain. Second, others say that it is illegitimate to wage war over someone else’s resource, with which they are free to do as they please. Third, some say that it is illegitimate to wage war over a resource that is unsustainable and harmful to the environment. In effect, all of these arguments say that the need to preserve life and peace precedes any interest in maintaining access to an important but unsustainable resource. One could interpret this line of argumentation as being part “orange,” in that it questions the legality of the argument, and part “green,” in that it raises the interest in peace above material interests.

To skeptics of this line of argumentation, one would have to point to the rather compelling (in my view) evidence that the U.S. is pursuing these interests in its war with Iraq. For now, let me just point out that a U.S. government official has stated that an aim of U.S. policy was to “break OPEC’s back.” That is, the hermeneutics of suspicion says that the U.S. is aiming to control Iraqi oil so that it can give profitable contracts to U.S. oil companies, which then flood the oil market, which then could ruin the economies of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela (at the very least), eventually leading to the fall of unwanted governments in these countries.³⁷

- ii. Maintenance of dollar hegemony. U.S. economic might is based to a very large extent on the fact that the dollar is the world’s currency. This hegemony, however, is being threatened by the Euro and, indirectly, by Iraq. In 1999 Iraq switched its oil transactions to Euros and there has been some open speculation among other OPEC countries to switch all OPEC oil transactions to Euros, which would cause a collapse of the dollar and of the U.S. economy. One way to prevent this from happening would be to control Iraq, and destroy OPEC (see i. above).³⁸
- b. World political hegemony – This is certainly related to the above point, but the emphasis is on U.S. political and military power. In a sense, political and military hegemony are needed so as to maintain economic hegemony (Noam Chomsky tends to make this argument). One can find particularly strong evidence for this analysis of U.S. motivations in the writings of the Project for a New American Century.³⁹ Also, world systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein (the foremost world social systems theorist) argues that the U.S. is globally on the decline and that its military forays are its last desperate efforts to ward off this decline.⁴⁰
- c. World cultural hegemony – This last hermeneutic is the postmodern variant, which reduces the U.S. government’s motives to efforts to establish the dominance of western (blue/Christian) culture – these analysts see Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* as being the prime embodiment of this type of motivation. One could say that insofar as the Bush administration embodies blue Christian fundamentalism (Bush’s rather strong evangelical orientation comes out in his speeches against the evil of Hussein and is well documented in Bob Woodward’s rather sympathetic portrait of Bush in: *Bush at War*), as well as orange oil/profit interests (most major figures in Bush’s cabinet come from the oil and energy industry) it believes it can kill two birds with one stone with its war in Iraq. Of course, the additional justification that the war will protect Iraqi minorities (a “green” concern) and promote political development (a “yellow” concern) makes the whole endeavor look integral, as Alan Tonkin (of the Global Values Network: newsletter #43) argues.

The hermeneutics of suspicion, however, casts doubt on how sincere the latter two concerns are, especially in light of the West’s history in the region. That is, the U.S. helped create Hussein in the first place (just as it helped create the Taliban in Afghanistan) and therefore should not be trusted to do the right thing in Iraq now. That is, historical evidence is presented to provide further proof for the hermeneutics of suspicion. Also, the evidence suggests that the West lacks a clear understanding of the internal dynamics within Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and therefore cannot be trusted to come up with a decent solution to the somewhat pathological developments in the region. A truly integral approach to the problem would suggest that an integral analysis of the region and how its problems could best be solved is required.

³⁷ For a detailed analysis of oil and Iraq, see: <http://www.worldwatch.org/press/news/2002/11/26/> For a strong counter-argument of this perspective, see: <http://www.cato.org/dailys/03-18-03.html>

³⁸ For an interesting article on this, see:

<http://www.stopworldwar3.com/article.pl?sid=03/03/19/0241206>

³⁹ for an analysis of their writing, see: http://truthout.org/docs_03/022803A.shtml

⁴⁰ See Wallerstein’s analysis in Foreign Policy Magazine, “The Eagle Has Crash Landed” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_julyaug_2002/wallerstein.html

3. Pro-war arguments #1a & 1c are false: Hussein does not present a threat to the region or to the U.S. (no serious analyst doubts that he threatens his own people). This is where the U.N. debate is centered: does Hussein have weapons of mass destruction and, if so, how can one most effectively disarm him? War opponents say that he either does not have them or, if he does, one should spend more time tracking them down and destroying them under UN supervision. In effect, we are dealing here with a purely empirical (left quadrant) question that can be answered with orange cognitive skills. The need for more time is primarily challenged by the practical issue that going to war with Iraq in the summer is quite difficult, due to the heat. This overall anti-war perspective is based in the orange questions of international law and what is empirically true. Based on the numerous criticisms leveled against the Bush administration's "evidence" of Hussein's possession of WMDs, this anti-war perspective seems quite damning for the case for war.⁴¹
4. War is always wrong or, at least, should be the very last resort, exercised strictly in self-defense. This is, of course, one of the main reasons for why there is international law and a Just War Theory in the first place (when it is used to prevent war instead of justify it, as is all too often the case). With the emergence of the orange meme (or world-centric perspective) people began to realize that war had better be waged for very good reasons, if we ever want to live in peace, thus leading to the creation of rules governing the engagement in war. The most important rule in this respect is perhaps the one that resulted from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which provided the origins for the notion of national sovereignty. International law builds on this, especially with the founding of the United Nations.

While international law and the prevention of war are based on "orange" values, I would suggest, however, that with every subsequent stage the ability to avoid war while still maintaining one's values becomes greater. That is, while "orange" recognizes the basic shared humanness in all humans (something "blue" might not recognize, given its group-centered perspective), the de-centered perspective of "green" sees that "orange," despite its universal principles, has a tendency to marginalize and disregard the victims of its supposedly universal rationality. The typical "green" complaint here being the about the marginalization and victimization of the Third World at the hands of universalistic "orange" capitalist principles. The proto-typical "orange" war and "green" critique of it is the Vietnam War, where "orange" rationality said, "we must destroy the village in order to save it [from communism]." "Green," though, can at times condone war, as it did in the "humanitarian" war in Kosovo. That is, if the war is to protect a marginalized group, it could see this as being legitimate, since this is green's *raison d'être*. Other examples of "green" supporting warfare are the liberation theologians of Latin America (and the northern movements of solidarity with Latin American insurgents), who supported guerrilla movements of various kinds against tyrannical regimes.

An integral perspective on war would transcend and include the concern for the victims of "orange" (in contrast to Tonkin) and could also envision war for humanitarian reasons. However, the integral (a-centric) perspective demands a more comprehensive and meta-perspectival understanding of the causes and consequences of war, which ought to lead it to devising better ways for avoiding war (for conflict management), while still living up to its highest values (the BMI), than either "orange" or "green" could.

First of all, one has to recognize that all arguments presented in the international public discourse are arguments made from either a world-centered ("orange") or de-centered ("green") perspective. Practically no one nowadays would present arguments to the public that come from a socio-centric ("blue") perspective (such as, "Hussein has violated traditional rules, such as the Qur'an, the Bible, etc.") Although, claims that Hussein is "evil" should be considered "blue") or on ego-centric ("red") perspective ("I hate Hussein" - Well, Bush, when he said that Hussein "tried to kill my Daddy," did hint at this kind of perspective) as reasons for going to war.

Partisans of one side or the other generally refuse to take the other side's arguments seriously and will tend to say that their opponent's arguments are just a smokescreen for a hidden agenda. Key to an

⁴¹ See, for example, a scathing report by the Washington Post: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42517-2003Mar17.html> - one of a series of articles questioning the veracity of the Bush administration. By the way, the Washington Post's editorial line is to support the war.

integral analysis is to first of all take the arguments of all sides seriously, no matter how faulty one might think they ultimately are. As Ken Wilber frequently says, “no one can be smart enough to be 100% wrong.” However, one must also take into consideration the possible hidden agendas, via the hermeneutics of suspicion mentioned earlier. The trick is figuring out how all of the perspectives relate to each other and what their relative values/weights are.

Consequences of war and no war

A crucial dimension of the analysis that I have only hinted at so far is the careful examination of the possible consequences that war and no war would have had. This is, of course, an extremely difficult thing to do because there could potentially be an infinity of possible courses of action, leading to an infinity of possible consequences. For the sake of simplicity, let us examine only three possible courses of action with regard to the Iraq crisis: war (as it was waged), no war (i.e., what would have happened if weapons investigations had continued as before), and an as yet unspecified integral solution. We ought to examine the consequences particularly in light of the overall health of the spiral of social development (globally and for different nations/peoples).

First of all, the consequences would have been quite different, depending on whether the war had been brief or protracted, which means it would have been somewhat difficult to make educated guesses about the consequences of war beforehand. Still, there are some consequences that seemed reasonably probable in either case. Let’s look at them in terms of the aspect of social development health, globally, regionally, nationally, and ethnically.

Global – The maintenance of national sovereignty has been a core principle of international politics for centuries, but in recent years the violation of this principle in the name of higher values has often been tolerated by the international community. However, Bush’s and Blair’s going to war against Iraq, despite the lack of an international consensus (such as a Security Council resolution) will probably disturb and significantly weaken the principles of international law (not that they were all too strong to begin with). Using similar arguments as the U.S. has used, thus invoking precedent, other powerful countries could very well proceed to invade less powerful countries that it deems a potential threat to its security.⁴² The end result could very well be a regression (as Kinsley suggests) in international politics, where might makes right (i.e., from “orange” right to “blue” and “red” might).

Not going to war, in terms of the global scale might have sent the wrong message to Hussein, as pro-war analysts say, but one has consider what message is being sent to other countries. North Korea, which has WMDs was not attacked, while a nearly completely disarmed Iraq was. This provides a strong incentive for countries to arm themselves. Also, one has to consider which is the worse consequence, given the double-standards that the U.S. practices when it comes to international law and security council resolutions (consider Israel’s constant violation of numerous Security Council resolutions, for example, which the U.S. regularly ignores – according to some counts, Israel is in violation of 64 Security Council resolutions, compared to 17 for Iraq).

Regional and national consequences for the Middle East – A victorious “regime change” in Iraq might mean the possibility of greater democratization in the region. But this seems fairly unlikely because Iraq is not exactly the best candidate for democratization. That is, Iraq is ethnically a very internally divided nation, between tribal peoples (red), modern western educated individuals (orange), and several ethnic groups in between (blue). It is much more likely that democratization will follow similar paths as in Somalia and Afghanistan, instead of Kosovo or Bosnia, let’s say. In other words, the result is more likely going to be more instability for Iraq. On the other hand, a “regime change” in Iraq could have positive material benefits for the people of Iraq, primarily due to the lifting of the trade embargo and perhaps due to the stop of repression, assuming that they do not suffer too much during the war.

As for the region, we have to consider the effect U.S. dominance in Iraq will have for OPEC. In all likelihood, the U.S. is going to try to make sure that U.S. oil companies gain better access to Iraq’s

⁴² Michael Kinsley makes a strong argument along these lines in a recent essay on Slate: <http://slate.msn.com/id/2080455/>.

oil fields and break Iraq's OPEC quotas, flooding the market with oil, which would lead to a dramatic drop in the price of oil (\$10 per barrel seems to be the minimum where profits can still be made). This will have serious consequences for all of the world's oil producers, but especially for countries such as Iran, Venezuela, Russia, Mexico (all countries that are already producing at near their maximum capacity and which will face massive budget cuts, should the price of oil fall dramatically – the result will be popular unrest in these countries, possibly leading to the fall of the current governments – democratically in the democracies, violently in the autocracies). The most important country in the equation (and most unpredictable, perhaps) is Saudi Arabia. It is already on the brink of upheaval due to popular resentment and growing fundamentalism and could very well fall too.

War, waged unilaterally by two of the region's historically most hated enemies (the U.S. and the U.K.), will probably increase the amount and intensity of fundamentalism in the region (and subsequently of terrorism).

Not going to war against Iraq would mean that the repression against the Iraqi people continues (though, the U.S. missed a chance to get rid of Hussein when there were uprisings against the regime following the '91 Gulf war, which the U.S. allowed Hussein to repress). For the region, it seems the consequences have been exaggerated by the Bush administration. Even Kuwait, which was once invaded by Iraq, does not seem to be concerned about the danger that Iraq currently poses.

Regional and national consequences for the U.S. and Europe – Despite the Bush administration's claim that part of the reason for going to war against Iraq is to prevent terrorism, much more likely is that it will increase terrorism, as internal Bush administration analyses have warned. While the iron fist of the West might lead some to abandon terrorism, more likely, based on what we can observe in Israel and in other locations where efforts are made to crack down on terrorism, individuals inclined towards fundamentalism will experience U.S. intervention as repressive and will lash out against this.

Some analysts (such as Alan Tonkin) have characterized Iraq and Al Qaeda terrorists as being motivated by the "red" value memes, thus requiring "blue" authority to reign them in. However, one can question this characterization. While Hussein personally might act primarily out of the "red" meme, his followers probably are for the most part socio-centric, Islamic "blue" and will not take well to western "blue" authority. The same would go for Al Qaeda. Imposing someone else's blue (the U.S. military's or Bush's) on an Islamic culture's blue meme is just going to lead to more animosity (and thus terrorism). A better strategy, which some have suggested, would be for the region's leaders to reign-in their own.

Another consequence of the war is a tattered relationship between the war allies (U.S., Spain, and Britain) and war opponents (France, Germany, and Russia). On the other hand, one could argue that the relationship would have been just as tattered if war opponents had won out.

Summary: Integrating and balancing the perspectives

I have attempted to present the issue in as much complexity as I could, given the limitations of a paper of this length. I have tried to look at the problem in terms of:

1. the different level/quadrant perspectives that have been presented to the public,
2. past causes, present considerations, and possible future consequences
3. ethnic, national, regional, and global scales

Obviously, reality is always much more complex than any mere words can grasp and thus much detail is left out, perhaps some important aspects were completely overlooked. There is a last (4th) dimension that has not been explored yet, which is the overall health of the spiral of development/evolution, which I will focus on in the last section, on what can be done.

Examining the foregoing dimensions of analysis, we can perhaps distill some of the primary factors that ought to be considered in any integral analysis.⁴³

From pro-war perspectives:

1. Threats to security – insecurity of: (LR)
 - a. Iraqi people (green)
 - b. Neighboring states (green)
 - c. “The West” (orange)
 - d. The region (orange/green)
 - e. The global community (orange/green)
2. Advancing political development/democratization (yellow)
3. Access to vital resources (LR-orange)

From anti-war perspectives:

1. Respect for international law (LL-orange)
2. Avoid (U.S.) hegemony (green)
 - a. Economic (LR)
 - b. Political (LR)
 - c. Cultural (LL)
3. Verify accuracy of threat perception (LR-orange)
4. Avoid war whenever possible (green/yellow)
5. Advancing political development/democratization (yellow)

Addressing all of the above-mentioned concerns, insofar as they are authentic (serious doubts have been raised about the authenticity and sincerity of some of them) they also ought to automatically address the question of how to promote the greatest development for the greatest number of beings. The reason for this is that each perspective expresses a particular concern that if it is not addressed would potentially block or prevent further development.

A Possible Framework for Addressing Pro- and Anti-War Concerns, while Promoting the BMI

First, we could simply assume that the international community of nations possesses the political will to create a framework for properly dealing with the issues that the current Iraq crisis raises. What would such a framework look like, under such circumstances? Second, and more realistically, we can assume that there is no such will (at least not yet), then what could the most powerful nations do, such as the U.S. and Europe? This too makes a problematic assumption – that the leaders of these countries possess the political will to do what would be in the interest of an integral solution. Third, and perhaps most realistically, we can simply ask what should integrally oriented individuals push for, given the lack of a global and national political will to do what is right from an integral perspective. I will begin with the third and most realistic approach – what can integrally motivated individuals do? – and will then take a brief look at the more utopian perspectives of what, ideally, powerful states and the world community could and ought to do.

Just as the perspective of an integral approach is meta-perspectival, so would the strategy be meta-strategic. That is, rather than just focusing on influencing one’s own leaders to adopt a more integral approach or perspective in this particular issue, one should find ways that combine such influence with the larger issue of creating lasting institutions or structures that can cope with future crises in a more integral manner. While in this particular instance one might recommend going to war with Iraq as the most integral approach (which I do not think it is), such a recommendation should not contradict the possibility of creating more integral solutions in the long term. In other words, an integral solution would have its eyes on the long-term ideal solutions, even while formulating short-term proposals to the problem.

⁴³ In essence, what I am presenting here is an exterior perspective on the interiors of those who are involved in the debate on the Iraq crisis (mixed-in with some exterior observations on the exterior – such as my critical comments about the accuracy of claims about the threat that Hussein presents and on whether or not the war can bring about democratization). See Ken Wilber’s recent excerpts of Vol. 2 of his Kosmos trilogy (wilber.shambhala.com), for more info on the different perspectives on the interior and the exterior.

Here I am inspired by William Ury's conception of the "Third Side,"⁴⁴ which in his conflict resolution approach is the catalyst for defusing violent conflict. However, I would see the role of an integral approach perhaps as the "fourth side," in that it consists of the explicitly integrally-oriented elements within the "third side." That is, the third side, as Ury conceives it, consists of those who are capable of making sense of both sides in a conflict. As such, individuals who are part of the third side are capable of acting as facilitators, mediators, referees, or other roles necessary to de-escalate or resolve conflict. The third side, by virtue of being able to "put itself in the shoes of the other," can bring people on both sides together, build bridges between them, and get them to talk and perhaps even understand each other.

The integral third side would go beyond the conventional third side, in that it would be in a position to apply the skills and insights that would not be available to less integral perspectives. That is, it would not only be able to make sense of all sides in the conflict, but it would be able to figure out how these sides fit together in the larger scheme of things. Also, in the moral dimension, the integral third side would focus on what Ken Wilber has called the "basic moral intuition" of promoting the overall health of everyone's development, rather than just being focused on de-escalating or resolving the immediate conflict.

An integral third side, in my understanding of it, would thus base its advocacy on the following:

1. Find policies that are forward looking, that go beyond the immediate situation and contribute towards a future in which similar problems are resolved more effectively.
2. Make sense of different perspectives, understand how they relate to each other, and address the perspectives in accordance with how they relate to each other in the larger scheme of things.
3. Contribute towards finding solutions that promote the development of all individuals and of society as a whole (the basic moral intuition).

Based on the foregoing, I would say that an integral approach would lobby for the following complex of responses in relation to Iraq and similar situations:⁴⁵

1. **A consistent worldwide effort to root out groups or individuals that commit crimes against humanity** (as defined by the international criminal court). First of all, such a policy would address the pro-war concerns that regimes such as Hussein's Iraq threaten the security of its own people, of neighboring countries, of the region, or of First World countries. Key, however, to such a policy is that it is consistent. This is one of the main criticisms that war opponents have; that the effort to get rid of Saddam Hussein is a completely inconsistent application of an otherwise possibly decent policy; that the U.S. and its allies oppose tyrants when it is convenient to U.S. national interests, but also supports such tyrants (and the U.S. did support Hussein before he invaded Kuwait, just as it supported the Taliban in Afghanistan when they were fighting the Soviet Union) when it is convenient. In other words, if the U.S. is going to play the role of world police, then it better do so consistently, otherwise it will continue to have little to no credibility in enforcing human rights. A much better but more difficult solution, though, would be if the international community were to institutionalize the pursuit of criminals against humanity (see point 3 below).
2. **Awareness of possible ulterior motives** – on all sides of the debate – and avoid falling prey to these. This recommendation addresses the suspicion of anti-war advocates, who believe that the U.S. is primarily interested in bringing the country with the world's second largest oil reserves under the control of a pro-U.S. government. One way to avoid such a suspicion would be to separate the military pursuit of a regime that has committed crimes against humanity from the future governing of the country whose regime has been changed. In other

⁴⁴ *The Third Side: Why We Fight and How We Can Stop* (Penguin, 2000)

⁴⁵ In response to some of my critics on the post-con-pol discussion list, I want to stress that these recommendations are meant as an integral contribution towards a wider democratic political process that involves all parties, just as Ury's "third side" involves not just the third side, but obviously also the other two sides in a conflict. That is, these recommendations are not meant to be imposed just because someone claims them to be integral (not to mention that such an imposition would be impossible, since integrally informed individuals do not have that kind of power anyway).

words, by insisting that the U.S. play the dominant role in rebuilding Iraq (actually in governing – rebuilding will still be left to the Iraqis), the U.S. plays directly into the suspicions that this war was about oil and not about “bringing democracy to Iraq” or about ridding the world of a dangerous tyrant. However, suspicion should also be applied to some anti-war groups, such as the ones that appeared to be supporting Hussein (some elements in the U.S. anti-war movement, such as ANSWER) and opposing the existence of Israel – that these might be more motivated by red-meme hate against the U.S. or Israel than by reasoned (orange or above) reflection, as they claim.

3. **Work towards institutionalizing world-centric (orange) values** (while also paying attention to blue, green, and yellow/integral values). One of the reasons that the Bush administration (and nearly all others before it) has been able to go against the UN is because the UN has indeed become a fairly ineffective organization when it comes to enforcing international law. Such a development is to some extent due to the actions of the U.S. itself.⁴⁶ However, a large part of the UN’s failings can be traced to its less than world-centric construction. That is, by paying tribute to the world’s de-facto powers (by giving veto power to five permanent members: U.S., France, Britain, Soviet Union/Russia, and China), its founders institutionalized power politics of the worst kind, which stand in direct contradiction with the formal world-centric basis of the UN, the International Declaration on Human Rights. Power politics, which can be based in anything from red, to blue, to orange, to green values, have been guiding the policies of the UN ever since it was founded over 55 years ago, and have thus consistently undermined any real implementation or pursuit of the world-centric principles of the international human rights charter. So, the question for anyone seriously interested in institutionalizing world-centric (orange) principles⁴⁷ is how to reform the UN or create a world government of some kind that would do so. This is not the place to explore this issue, but a first step would have to involve the democratization of the UN (or similar organization) and a move away from power politics. This, of course, would require the political will for such an agenda and would thus involve a transformation of consciousness among the world’s politicians (and their populations) that so far does not seem to be on the horizon. If that is the case, then the most important task of the integral third side is to promote such a transformation of consciousness. As such, this third point indirectly addresses the developmental concerns of both pro- and anti-war perspectives, which argue that the political development of countries like Iraq should be an important concern. That is, the real political development of Iraq would require a real political development of the world’s polity (of both political culture/consciousness and political structures, LL and LR).

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⁴⁶ The U.S. contributed to weakening the UN when it withdrew from the International Court which ruled against the U.S.’s mining of Nicaragua’s harbors, when it refused to sign the treaty that set up the international criminal court, when it rebuffed a Security Council resolution condemning Iraq’s invasion of Iran, among many other incidents.

⁴⁷ Implementation of world-centric values is what nearly everyone on both sides of the Iraq war debate claim they want. An important exception represent some die-hard green-meme (post-modern, post-development, anti- all forms of globalization) perspectives, which fear that local cultures and traditions would be undermined by the enforcement of human rights and that the world-centric/universalistic rationality of more powerful would prevail.