"THE
TRAGEDY OF THIS UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIP: BY OPTING TO JOIN THE AMERICAN
HARD RIGHT, TONY BLAIR HAS MADE THE GRAVEST MISTAKE OF HIS POLITICAL
LIFE "
Will
Hutton
The Observer
March 30, 2003
Will Hutton argues that, by opting to join the American hard Right,
Tony Blair has made the gravest mistake of his political life, one
from which he cannot recover.
Blair's drawn face, with its deepening gullies set in a near permanent
hard frown, tells the story. This is the internationalist who is aiding
and abetting, however unintentionally, the break-up of the UN system.
The pro-European who is the trigger of the most acute divisions in
the European Union since its foundation. The wannabe progressive whose
closest allies are Washington's neo-conservatives and conservative
leaders in Italy and Spain.
Worse, he is fighting a barely legitimate war that is already a military
and diplomatic quagmire, where even eventual victory may not avert
a political disaster. He knows his capacity to survive the diplomatic
humiliations piled on him by the Bush administration is limited; you
cannot long lead Britain's centre and centre-left from such a compromised
position, wounding not only the country's profoundest interests but
torching any linkage with the progressive project. For the first time
his premiership is genuinely at risk.
It is a political tragedy, Shakespearean in the cruelty of its denouement.
9/11 accelerated trends in America that had been crystallising since
the 1970s and which made the political structures in which successive
British Governments have managed simultaneously to play both the American
and European cards unsustainable. Blair was confronted with an invidious
choice that nobody in the British establishment has wanted to make:
Europe or America. Side with Europe to insist that the price of collaboration
in the fight against terrorism had to be that the US observe genuinely
multilateral international due process - and certainly say No to some
of Washington's wilder aims. Or side with America insisting from the
inside that it engaged in its wars multilaterally, and hope to bring
Europe along in your wake.
Either choice was beset with risk, but it's hard to believe that siding
with Europe, for all its evident difficulties, would have produced
an outcome worse than the situation in which we currently find ourselves:
a protracted war with no second UN Resolution, no commitment to UN
governance of post-war Iraq, no commitment to a mid-East peace settlement.
But Blair misread the character of American conservatism, its grip
on the American body politic and its scope for rationality. He continues
to do so, the miscalculation of his life.
The rise and rise of American conservatism is neither well documented
nor well understood in Britain - but it's one of the pillars on which
I build my case for Europe in The World We're In*. Ever since the
pivotal Supreme Court judgement in 1973 legalising abortion (the Roe
v Wade case) which marked the high water mark of American liberalism,
it's been downhill all the way. American conservatism, an eccentric
creed even within the pantheon of the western conservative tradition,
now rules supreme. Domestically it offers disproportionately aggressive
tax cuts for the rich and for business, reforms that shrink America's
already threadbare social contract and a carte blanche for the increasingly
feral, unaccountable character of US capitalism.
Internationally it is this philosophy that lies behind pre-emptive
unilateralism and the wilful disregard of the UN. American conservatives
are bravely willing to use force to advance democracy and markets
worldwide - the exemplars of a civilisation the rest of the world
must want to copy. No other legitimacy is needed, the reason for the
wrong-headed self-confidence that could launch war in Iraq expecting
so little resistance. Rumsfeld's exploded strategy is ideological
in its roots. This conservatism is a witches brew - a menace to the
USA and the world alike.
The conservative movement has deep roots. It made its first gains
in the 1970s in reaction to economic problems at home that it wrongly
claimed were wholly the fault of liberals, helped by the reaction
of white working class Americans to the application of affirmative
action: quotas of housing, university places and even jobs for blacks
to equalise centuries of discrimination. When President Lyndon Johnson
signed the Civil Rights Act in 1964, outlawing the obstacles American
blacks had experienced in exercising their civil rights from voting
to sitting on juries, he famously joked that he had lost the Democrats
the south. He could not have been more prescient; the uneasy coalition
between southern conservative Democrats and the more liberal North
was sundered - a political opportunity that Ronald Reagan was brilliantly
to seize.
This laid the foundations for the conservatisation of American politics,
helped by the growing economic power of the south and the west. The
new sun-belt entrepreneurs, building fortunes on defence contracts
and Texan oil, naturally believed in the toxicity of federal government
and the god-given right of employers to cheap labour with as few rights
as possible. Put that together with the south's visceral dislike of
welfare, well understood to be transferring money from God-fearing,
hard-working whites to black welfare queens, and the need for crime
- again understood to be perpetrated by blacks against whites - to
be met with ferocious penalties and you had the beginning of the new
conservative constituency. Include a dose of Christian fundamentalism,
and the building blocks of a new dominant coalition of Republican
southerners and middle class, suburban northerners were in place.
What was needed to complete the picture was intellectual coherence
and money. America's notoriously lax rules on political financing
allowed the conservatives to outspend the Democrats sometimes by as
much four or five times. Yet what opened the financial floodgates
was intellectual conviction; a new generation of intellectual conservatives
took on the apparently effortless liberal dominance, and beat it at
its own game - the realm of ideas. The great right-wing thinktanks
- the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute and the
Hoover Institute - became the intellectual inspiration of the conservative
revival. The rich were virtuous and moral because they worked hard;
the poor worthless and amoral because they had not boot-strapped themselves
out of poverty. Welfare thus bred a dependency culture, they claimed,
and made poverty worse. Taxation was an act of coercion and an affront
to liberty. Markets worked like magic; choice was always better than
public provision. Corporations spearheaded wealth creation. Conservatism
was transmuted into a moral crusade. The rich could back it aggressively
both in their own self-interest and America's.
The capture of universities by the rich and the lack of education
for the poor has meant that social mobility in the US has collapsed.
American capitalism, in thrall to the stock market and quick bucks
it offers, has hollowed out its great corporations in the name of
the hallowed conservative conception of share-holder value - the sole
purpose of a company is to enrich its owners. Productivity and social
mobility are now higher in Old Europe than in the US - despite a tidal
wave of propaganda to the contrary. Ordinary Americans are beset by
risks and lack of opportunity in a land of extraordinary inequality.
Yet it is internationally that the rest of the world feels the consequences.
Even before 9/11 the Bush administration had signalled its intention
to be unencumbered by - as it saw it - vitality sapping, virility
constraining, option closing international treaties and alliances,
whether membership of the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto
accords on climate change. It intended to assert American power as
a matter of ideological principle; 9/11 turned principle into an apparent
imperative in order to guarantee the security of the 'homeland'.
There are only two possible rival power centres that champion a more
rational approach to world order - in the US a revived and self-confident
Democratic party, and abroad an unified European Union. Britain's
national interest requires that we ally ourselves as powerfully as
we can with these forces - both of whom are only too ready to make
common cause. Blair has done neither. Either he is now a convinced
conservative or the author of a historic political misjudgment. Neither
the Labour party nor the country can indulge this ineptitude much
longer.
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