"NATO:
THE END IN SIGHT?"
Sir
Timothy Garden
February 2003
The Iraq crisis may have taken its first casualty before a shot is
fired. NATO is looking damaged after an acrimonious internal division
over preparations for a possible war. Much of the anglo-saxon media
characterised the breaking of NATO's silence procedure by France,
Belgium and Germany as outrageous. Was this not a case of those who
had benefited from Alliance security for half a century, biting the
hand of their most steadfast protector? Since NATO celebrated its
50th birthday in Washington in 1999, questions about its continuing
role and relevance have grown ever louder. The current spat over Iraq
reflects underlying tensions between members over new strategies to
cope with new threats. The Cold War certainties have long since gone,
and the future of the Alliance as a serious military player is now
in doubt. This has profound implications for the future of European
security.
Decline and Fall
How has the most successful military alliance come to this fragile
state? Even as the Washington birthday summit was taking place, NATO
in Kosovo was fighting its first – and most probably last –
war. Despite the difficulties of achieving consensus among the newly
enlarged 19 members, a successful air campaign was sustained. Yet
America was not impressed that it had to provide the vast majority
of the firepower, and at the same time act under the constraints of
a consensus organisation. Nor did the European members seem to be
doing much to fulfil their grandiose promises to modernise and increase
their military capabilities.
When
NATO declared that the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington
were an attack on the whole alliance, the US were grateful for such
immediate and strong political support. But for the Afghanistan campaign,
they dealt with allies individually rather than through NATO so that
they could remain in control of the operation. By the Prague summit
last year, the transatlantic differences in strategic thinking were
becoming yet more marked. Further NATO enlargement was nodded through.
New ways of kick starting European defence capabilities were debated;
but there was little expectation of rapid transformation.
Now,
as US and UK forces ready themselves for an apparently inevitable
war in Iraq, NATO seems even more sidelined. The French and Germans
worry that precautionary deployments to Turkey will be taken as a
NATO endorsement of military action in Iraq. The US rages that "old
Europe" is betraying the alliance. That the debate is conducted
under the television lights scarcely helps achievement of consensus.
Doubtless, when tempers cool, NATO will manage to recompose its image;
but the damage is real and will be long lasting.
After NATO
It seems now that NATO's days at the centre of international security
affairs are numbered. The organisation will probably continue to exist,
unless the US decides to end it by withdrawing its participation.
This seems unlikely, although significant withdrawals of US forces
from Europe may now follow. NATO remains useful in reaching out to
new members; and in providing some military standardisation for coalition
operations. It should have a role in encouraging European members
to develop more appropriate military capabilities; but the record
here is less encouraging. Certainly, the US is not interested in using
NATO for its serious military adventures. The only significant hardware
that NATO owns is its airborne early warning AWACS force. This was
deployed to help protect American airspace in the immediate aftermath
of the World Trade Center attack. Any other useful capabilities are
owned by member nations, and the US is more comfortable negotiating
one by one to use them as part of a US led coalition.
For Europe, this change in the relevance of NATO has had surprisingly
little impact. It might be expected to have made the moves towards
producing a real EU military capability more urgent. Yet the force
proposals which stemmed from the Helsinki Headline Goals have made
as little real progress as the much vaunted NATO Defence Capabilities
Initiative. Defence budgets across Europe show little sign of real
increases despite the worsening international security situation.
The money that is spent is often wasted on propping up declining national
defence industries.
The divisions between EU members on policy for Iraq have been very
serious. While the damage to NATO has been the focus of attention,
the implications for the development of EU common foreign and security
policy is even more significant. Without some hope of moving to the
development of a mechanism for a European foreign policy, there is
little hope for the much needed rationalisation of defence capabilities
across the EU.
The Helsinki goals have occupied the bureaucrats but have delivered
no new capabilities or greater efficiency.
At
a time when the EU is looking at how it should change, the discussion
on defence issues in the Convention give little hope than we shall
see any real changes. What is needed is a strategic defence review
on an EU wide basis. This raises deep political difficulties about
national sovereignty. As a result the decline in military power in
each EU state will continue, and the influence of Europe on US foreign
policy will further reduce. If a common European security approach
could be achieved, then serious military capabilities would flow from
integration and pooling. These would make Europe more effective, might
stem the decline of NATO, and would provide an option for life after
NATO.
Transatlantic Bridge Collapses
These sorry developments perhaps affect one nation more than any other.
The UK has cast itself in the role of a bridge between the US and
the mainland of Europe. As the divide widens, Britain finds this position
more and more difficult. In the military sphere, the UK seems to have
already decided that its future is with the US concept of power. The
latest UK defence policy paper makes it clear that plugging into US
transformational capabilities is the priority. Whether these are affordable
is another question, but the British push to lead the new EU military
capabilities is now history. UK defence capabilities continue to decline
under the remorseless effect of budget constraints. Industrial featherbedding
makes the problem worse, as has been seen by the recent bizarre decision
on the contracts for the new aircraft carriers.
The UK will find it difficult to take a lead in Europe when it is
seen as a military dependency of the US. The likely lack of any movement
towards monetary union will reinforce this irrelevance to the rest
of Europe. The new US strategy calls for a much more proactive global
intervention policy. This will be an expensive tiger for the UK to
ride. With tiny armed forces spread between Northern Ireland, firefighting
duties, domestic counter-terrorism duties, the Balkans, Afghanistan
and Iraq, Britain is already "punching above its weight".
As time goes on we shall have ever more difficult choices to make
about which capabilities can be afforded. By linking future security
so directly to the USA, British sovereignty is likely to become yet
more illusory. The door is closing on alternative future where Europe
could have developed a serious integrated military capability to underpin
a common foreign policy. And all of this is before a shot is fired
in Iraq.
Sir Timothy Garden is visiting professor at the Centre for Defence
Studies, King's College London, and an associate fellow of the RIIA.
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