JOHN C. POLANYI

In a letter to his colleagues this summer regarding "possible Canadian participation in the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence program," Defence Minister John McCallum sounded a cautious note.

"As you are aware," he wrote, "the government of Canada is entering discussion with the government of the United States on Canada's participation in a missile defence system for North America. Although a decision has yet to be taken, Canada is approaching this issue with an open and objective mind."

If this is the case, as many in this country devoutly hope, there are some questions we should be asking. Top of the list is why the U.S. is in such a hurry to deploy BMD. The answer is known, though perhaps not to the Canadian public.

The Bush administration has committed itself to deploy a missile defence system in October, 2004, in time for the November presidential election. This leaves a little over a year. What they deploy is conditioned by this political imperative.

The initial ballistic missile defence will comprise 10 ground-based missiles, distributed between Alaska and California. These anti-missile-missiles are intended to intercept incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles, disabling them by hitting them head-on.

The prognosis, in Washington, is upbeat: "We are highly confident that we will field an effective, reliable defence against long-range ballistic missiles aimed at any of our 50 states by the fall of 2004. This confidence comes from the outstanding technical success we have achieved in our development and test program," U.S. Missile Defence Agency spokesman Rick Lehner told the Defence Daily last June.

The objective mind (in McCallum's phrase) will find reason to question this. The missiles that are to be deployed have not, in fact, been tested, since they do not yet exist.

The U.S. defence department has conducted tests with old Minuteman missiles as surrogate "boosters" (the rockets that lift the "kill vehicles" responsible for destroying incoming missiles).

The actual boosters are required to be lighter and faster than the Minuteman. Due to time contstraints, two companies are being retained to build the boosters.

The second component, the kill vehicle, had a failure in its solid-state circuitry when tested this past December.

A third element is the high-performance radar required to identify, discriminate and track possible targets in space. This does not presently exist. It is planned that it be integrated into the system in fiscal year 2005 (i.e. by September, 2006). Since it will depend on 120-foot radars mounted on platforms at sea, questions have been raised about its viability. In the interim a mix of older radars with varying capabilities will be employed.

The fourth system-component comprises a fleet of 24 satellites, now re-named the Space Tracking Surveillance System (STSS). These will provide the vital infrared eyes needed for the targeting of opposing missiles in flight.

Though presently at a research and development stage, "the current plan is for the first two satellites to be launched in (fiscal year) 2007" (2008), the Missile Defence Agency has just announced. That, at any rate, is the current plan.

The MDA's actions constitute a more reliable guide to progress than its words.

On the occasion of the failed intercept test last December, its contractor, Boeing, was docked 93 per cent of a potential $48.4 million U.S. bonus.

The MDA nonetheless declared the test a success, explaining that interception of incoming missiles is a detail since "all other elements successfully completed their test objectives. In a missile defence research and development program ... the successful integration of the system elements is as important as the intercept."

With deployment of missile defence due next year, it will become harder to argue that missile defence is an art form. The "integration of the system elements" that the MDA rightly stresses should surely precede deployment.

But how can that be when components are missing? Sensible of its predicament, the MDA has responded by cancelling the majority of the planned tests.

The White House view is that the system will evolve once deployed.

This would have been irresponsible if applied to the Apollo moon landing, and is no less so when applied to BMD.

One does not need to be a rocket scientist to see that this program is headed for embarrassment and subsequent oblivion (along with its predecessors: Sentinel, Safeguard and Star Wars). We do no one a favour by pretending otherwise.

Traditionally, Canadians have regarded missile defence as a non-starter. We put ourselves in a false position by our pretended agnosticism.

Our Prime Minister and foreign affairs minister have, in the past, been eloquent skeptics.

They were, as I understood them, persuaded that in an age of intercontinental missiles and hydrogen bombs our best hope lay not in walling ourselves off from the rest of the world, but in engaging with it. They may protest that I offer too stark a choice. A little defence may actually be helpful (it might be argued) against a little offence.

But where does this reasoning lead? Are we, perhaps, to have a little civil defence, too? Just a few shelters, to hedge our bets?

And how would a little missile defence work?

In the improbable case that it was even two thirds effective, it could be negated by any state that increased its number of missiles from, say, two to six.

Then there is the NORAD argument. Canadians, we are told, must change their attitude to global security, or see NORAD die. If that were indeed the choice we should let NORAD die. But it is hard to credit. If NORAD is half as valuable as it is said to be, we shall continue to patrol the skies with our U.S. allies.

Meanwhile, in their interest and ours, we should distance ourselves from this proposal to deploy a facade of missile defence.

John Polanyi is a professor and Nobel Laureate in the department of chemistry at the University of Toronto. He has written extensively on missile defence.

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